CONQUEST BY EXHAUSTION.

New Zealand Herald, Volume LII, Issue 15948, 19 June 1915, Page 1 (Supplement)

CONQUEST BY EXHAUSTION.

BV' LIEUT.-COLONEL A. A. GRACE, K.Z.F A. Ten months of war have produced no conspicuous examples of brilliant strategy which have led to any decisive results. In no sense could the Germans' advance on Pari* bo called brilliant, much less could Von Kluck's part of that operation bo singled out because of any display of military genius. The operations of the Germans, carried out about the same time against the Russians, were characterised by nothing worthy of remark, while of the Austrians' preliminary movements, all that can be said is that they were destitute of military genius. Organisation there was in plenty in the Teuton armies, but of strategy in the highest sense there was nothing which could be called Napoleonic.

[ Of the Allies a better record can be shown. The combinations of the Grand Duke Nicholas, at the outset of the war, astonished, bewildered, and overwhelmed his enemies. But hero again there was nothing of a dazzling or inexplicable brilliance. The most brilliant strategy was that of General Joffre, who turned the momentous retreat in history into the splendid victory of the Marne by springing a mighty surprise on' his enemy at the right place, at the right time, and with a, force sufficient to hurl him in disorder back to the Aiane. Yes, up to thu present, the palm for strategy rests with tho French.

Hindenburg's .operations among the Masurian Lakes were effective, as has also been the recent advance of the AustroGerman armies from Cracow towards Lornberg,' but in reality they can have 110 decisive result, so far as ending the war is concerned. The Germans can hopo to gain littlo by expending • their strength against Russia, but only by subduing France, and every gun and every man employed unneoessarily by them on their eastern frontier is so much strength drawn from the point where their decisive advance must be made, if it is to bo made at all, namely, in the west, against the French. No, up to the present, there has been nothing brilliant in the strategy of the Germans.

| The truth would appear to be that, j with the huge armies which are in the field ,there is no groat scope for the display of brilliant strategy, since strategy consists largely in manoeuvring armies with a view to striking at an advantage; whereas, in this stupendous war, in which so many millions of troops are engaged, and fronts of hundreds of miles are occu pied, manoeuvring resolves itself into merely a general forward movement, which culminates in each side digging itself in, and a species of siege-warfare follows as a natural result. Victory will ultimately rest with the side whose staying powers are tho grater. That is to say, the conquest of tho defeated side will be because of its exhaustion

Exhaustion of supplies, of ammunition guns, men—that is what will decide the issue of the war.

But there is to.be considered an aspect which may modify this conclusion in no small degree. It is the possibility which command of the sea gives tho Allies to spring a surprise on their enemy. 'J he assembling of a large fleet of transports, let us say, at Taranto, might mean that Italy • was going to strike at Turkey by landing troops in Smyrna, or the Dardanelles, or Enos, or it might mean that she was going to land them at Valona, or in Montenegro with a view to attacking Austria through Servian territory. In the same way the assembling of largo fleets of transports at various ports in Great Britain, and the disembarkation of large' number of troops might mean their transportation to Bordeaux, with a view to strengthening Italy's attack on the Trentino or Istrin, it might mean the strengthening of the French army, it might mean a descent in the German coast, or it might mean a decisive movement against tho Turk. There still seems room tor strategy of tho amphibious sort, and fortunately the power of exercising it is the monopoly of the Allies.

But the power which gives the Allies this advantage, is the same power which enables them to exhaust their enemies, for manifestly the command of the sea confers an immunity from famine, whether of food or warlike supplies. Already we have been told by Le Petit Parisien "that in Austria famine has laid its dread hand on whole districts, and that pestilence has followed in the wake of famine. Presently must follow a scarcity of all warlike supplies and then tho end' cannot be far off lor tho Dual Monarchy. Lastly will come the'shortage of fighting men.' Then the collapse. Already we are told the Austrian armies are recruited by the calling to the colours men of 60 and half-grown youths Turkey I have not considered. As a matter of fact, except for the passage of the Dardanelles, the quick communication with Russia, Turkey is of no consequence. But if the armies of the Sultan arc able .to make good their resistance against their invaders, the same conquest by exhaustion will result in their case as will indubitably be the result in the case of Austria and finally of Germany. The frontiers which Austria and Germany must defend extend for nearly two thousand miles. The armies which they must maintain to defend that vast frontier must aggregate at least seven millions. Already Germany's first line army of four and a-half millions has well-night disappeared. There remains her second line army, composed of Landstrumers and Ersatz troops. And that at a period of the war when Britain has hardly begun to put forth her strength. Tho Allies are maintaining in the field against Austria and Germany, irrespective of the forces engaged against Turkey, quito eleven million troops, and that number tends to increase rather than to decrease. Moreover they can maintain that vast army in the field for a much longer period than Austria and Germany'can maintain their inferior forces. Therefore it follows as a corollary that in the end victory must remain with the stronger forces, not merely because of their strength, but because of their power to maintain that strength for tho longer period. But though the end is certain, if merely through the slow process of attrition, perhape the greatly-extended frontiers of our enemies may be pierced at a fatal spot before their resources of men, material, and supplies aro so exhausted as to render their further resistance impossible. A coup do main is possible to the antagonist who possesses a preponderance of force, especially if that force can be used in such a way as to creates a surprise. Is it not possible for the Allies, with their predominant force 011 land and sea, to launch such a blow at the heart of Germany as shall precipitate her demoralisation and subsequent defeat? If there is one characteristic which stands out more prominently than another in the military career of Lord Kitchener, it is that ho has never struck his foo till he could launch a knock-out blow, He always made certain of victory. For years ho made his preparations against the Mahdi, but when at last ho struck, at Omdurman, the blow was fatal. Against the Boers, now our good friends and hrothers-in-arms, ho used methods of warfare which made certainty doubly sure; spreading, as he did, a network of entrenched lines over the country, and driving his enemies as sheep are mustered for the shearing. To-day Lord Kitchener is surely tho samo Lord Kitchener. So far he has been planning his campaign. So far he has not wasted an ounce of strength. Is it not reasonable to expect that when he strikes at Kaiserism it will bi a knock-out blow? Let us wait, and ■ see. Any hi w, Kaiserism is doomed, even Lif merely through conquest by exhaustion*