THE New Zealand Herald. AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. MONDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1898.

New Zealand Herald, Volume XXXV, Issue 10921, 28 November 1898, Page 4

THE New Zealand Herald. AND DAILY SOUTHERN CROSS. MONDAY, NOVEMBER 28, 1898.

When tlio Secret history of the Fashoik incident comes to be written and the true inwardness of recent events in tho Nile Valley revealed, it mil be found, we venture to say, that the interesting explanation of tho whole business which we published the other day from our London correspondent, is in all essential particulars correct, and that it supplies the real key to what has been so mystifying and perplexing in the action of the British Government lor some time past. As our correspondent reminds us, the announcement that llio Salisbury Ministry had resolved upon a military advance into the Soudan was received with almost universal astonishment. Nothing had occurred, so far as the general public were aware, to alter tho condition of affaire in the Soudan, or to render manifest the necessity for a military expedition. Tho wliola country, it is true, was being dominated and devastated by the Khalifa and his hordes, but that state of things had existed for years and was neither more appalling nor more menacing than it had been at any previous time. When General Gordon was sent to the Soudan, the threatened danger to Esrpt from the growing power of the Malidi was a very real one. That danger, as General Gordon pointed out at the time, Was not that the Mahdi would march noithward and attempt the invasion of Egypt proper. It arose from the 1 influence which the spectacle of a conquering Mahommedan Power in the Soudan was calculated to exercise upon the Egyptian population. "In all the cities in Egypt," said General Gordon, "it will be felt that what the Mahdi has done they may do; and as lie has driven out the intruder and the 1 infidel, they may do tho same," But tho Khalifa power was vastly inferior to that of the Mahdi. It was, too, based largely upon fear, and when the British Government made up its mind to overthrow it completely, it was declining both in strength and aggressiveness. It is not surprising, therefore, that tho sudden decision to send an Anglo-Egyptian force un tho Nile should have puzzled lie public. Mr. John Morley thought Ministers had lost their reason, whilo those who still believed in their sanity were utterly unable to read the riddle and to offer any explanation of a courso of action which on the face of it appeared inexplicable and incomprehensible. We know now, however, the reasons which actuated Ministers and led not only to the expedition into the Soudan, but to those elaborate and alarming military preparations in England, and indeed throughout the Empire, of which our London correspondent has from time tc time kent us so fully informed. There can be no doubt that the Government received from some authoritative source seoret intelligence of a carefully-pre-pared scheme by which Prance honed to establish herself in the Valley of the Upper Nile, and to secure a permanent footing in that vast region to •he great detriment of British interests. A coup of this kind, had it been unchecked, or allowed to "be successfully accomplished, would have created a situation both difficult and dangeVous. The Khalifa would have been used by France to strengthen hei. position and to embarrass future British operations in the Soudan ihe wh° le , aSpeCt of the question wou J d have been changed, and there would have been a very serious risk of the continuity of "the red line" which is now to extend from Cairo to the Cape being broken by the in tervention of a French "sphere of influence." It was, unquestionably, a daring and cunningly-devised scheme, and but for the prompt and vigorous action of the British Govern

, i n all probability have ment «"!<"» ; fa p to defc ,t it the succeeded- g oll dflii at once lit'occupation j iencQ r flden'cleteiminatibn of the GoS ad to "smash the "► to Hence «i» the ™. rllts prepni- ,. ■ TWlind for it is evident thaUlie" Government had taken the |„l„,o» S de.iei»»<.re-by - of arms any attempt on the part o France to bar our progress Had France, having got to Fashoda, foi instance, insisted on remaining there, it would have meant or, mid in probably no exaggeration to say that ever before in the history of Engird have such complete preparations been made for dealing a quick and crushing blow had the necessity unfortunately arisen. Although the danger of a conflict between the two nations is not so imminent as it was a little while ago, it I would be premature to suppose that it lias wholly passed away. So long as Egypt and the Valley of the Nile remain under British influence there ! trill always be ft risk of a rupture between France and England. early 20 years ago Ismail Pasha, ""hen beinf pressed to sign his abdication, used" theso words:-"You English have made a mistake. Whatever 1 have been or done I made English interests in Egypt paramount, iou have the railways, the customs, the post office, the telegraphs, and the ports entirely under English administration. To gain more you have called in the French. You then hesitated and Bismarck, who looks far ahead, pushed you on till you have come t|> direct intervention. Mark my words, Bismarck sees what I see, that Egypt will become the Schles-wig-Holstein of England and France." But by making our policy clear, by setting forth our claims in language that cannot be misunderstood, and in showing that wo are determined to carry out that policy and to Uphold these claims without counting the cost, we may minimise the danger of a conflict. So far As the Eastern Soudan is concerned, we can allow no foreign Power to interfere, nor can we tolerate the creation of any influence in the Nile Valley inimical to our own substantial rights.