THE EARL OF ELLESMERE ON OUR NATIONAL DEFENCES. "Awake, arise, or be for ever fallen !"

New Zealander, Volume 4, Issue 215, 21 June 1848, Page 6

THE EARL OF ELLESMERE ON OUR NATIONAL DEFENCES. "Awake, arise, or be for ever fallen !"

Sir,— As the iul>j ct of this letter stands for early discu.-sion in both houses of Parliament, the propriety of this intrusion into your columns, on the part of one who has dcjure a voice in the Legislature, may fairly be questioned. I trust my justification may be found in the circumstance that the state of my health allows a c no prospect of the de facto exercise of the pririlege I possess. It is now rather too late to connder whether a gentleman who assumes the initial of a " P ' for his signature has been governed by a wise discretion in communicating his apprehensions of invasion, and the grounds of those apprehensions to the public. I confess myself to be one who, having long entertained those apprehensions, and having been equally cognizant with "P" of the facts on which he vindicates them, have hitherlo, from reasons which seemed to me imperative, refrained from publishing them to the world at large. I have not, how ver, abstained from stating them in other quarters, and I do now see reasons for contributing what support lean to an appeal which, whether diicreetly or nit, has oeen made to • the common scnie and patriotism of this great country.

Whatever mny be the result of these discussions oi whatever the fate and fortunes ot this enonnnns empire future historian 1 ? will have to record aud explain the faci that for a considerable period, of which it is difficult U fit the precice commence merit, the instinct of self-pie nervation lms been in abeyance and suspension in tlii' country. It is difficult, I say to fix the precice limit o the commencement of this eclipse of the common senst and foreiight which Providence has given to reasoning man for his guidance— to the coward alike, who flic; from danger, and to the brave and wise who arm thenselves to meet it. Some may date it from the yeai when the report of a Parliamentary Commission firsi gave suentific assurance that the Irish Channel mi^h be crowed with equal safety and with greater speed anc certainty by steam than by canvuss. When Sir A. Campbell, in the Rangoon river, made use of a wai steamer to convey troops, to Jbntter stockades, and te run down the war proai of the Burmeie, I think it was time for military and naval men at least to look forward to the further developement of the agencies 10 employed When, however, Sir R. Stopford made his feint at Bry rout, and Sir C. Napier dashed across Djouni Bay, ant effected the lodgement of the f reo at his disposal ir in the teeth ol the hosts of Egypt, I think the reign oi judicial bhudneu had manifeitly set in. From thai hour to this, the professed economists have oursuec their old habit of pressing for further reductions Within a few days of the time I am writing, one who has acquired no inconsiderable influence over public opinion in this country, in an address to an important constituency, has held out to them the old and hackneyed delusion of the feasibility of making large reductions in the exp< nse» of the army, navy, and ordnance The mere fact that such a topic can be 10 handled by 'a popular orator be'ore an applauding assembly, at once demt nstrates the prevalence and intensity of the torpor with which a long peace and the absence ol visible and conspicuous daager have benumbed the faculties of this nation. For the man who thus gives the weight of his nuthority to such dangerous delusions, I enteitain, in lvi character of political economist, a resptct founded on accordance with hit views, as well as on the acknowledged ability which he brings to their advocacy. With him I look forward with hope and confidence to the eventual const quences of that increase and multiplication of our commercial relations which he endeavors la promote. Can any man, however, be sanguine enough to suppose that these results, whatever ibeir eventual ralue, will be arrived at per sallum, or imagine that, when attained, they will eradicate evil propensitiesobliterate recollections of former national livalries— or stifle every came of fresh dissension ? It is the failing of tuccemful propagators of systems, that they almost inraridbljr ascribe universal as well as specific efficicy to the offspring of their invention, their talent and iheir perseverance. This propensity has now led Mr. Cobden, while he gravely proposes to denude this country of the notoriously insufficient means of defence she now possesses, to descend from the station ot a leader of the intelligence of the people, to that of a representative of its ignorance. There are two modes of refutation or consolation by which Mr. Cobden, and the disciples who cheer to the echo the dangerous doctrine he has utte ed, may en* end' avour to soothe the apprehension or confute the predictions of Cassundras like myself. They may hold .hat the attempt at an invasion oi these islands is either alsolutely impossible, or too improbable to be admitted into calculation ; or, secondly, that if attempted, tin country has already the means to frustrate and chastise such attempt. The first mode appears to be that adopted by Mr. Cobden — the second, no person of any authority, has yet been rash or ignorant enough to maintain. , Mr. Cobden's opinion on the naval and military ques.ion of the possibi ity or' the landing of an invading torce in this country, being worth as much as mine would be on the merits of a new mordant for printing calicoes, time would merely be wasted in its discussion. Tne possibility of such an operation rests upon autho rity entitled to as much weight as human authority cantliim. The probability of such an attempt is certainly one of those political question* which defy exact calculation, and which afford no data to the actuary. The expediency of effecting an insurance, and the amount of sacrifice to be mcm red for that purpose, are to be measured rather by the magnitude and value of the stake, than by the probability of the occunence. That ■take is neither more nor less than our capital, our arsenals, our lives, our propeity, our w.vei, our children, which I, for one, believe a few hours might, in our present state of military preparation, pluce at t te mercy of an unscrupulous and resentful enemy. Ido sot believe that it would be impossible in our present state of preparation, for a French minister of ivar, favoured by eircmstances, to land on British ground a force sufficient in numbers, discipline, and equipment, to march in any direction along the turnpike roads of England. That direction might depend on the place of landing t might be Portsmoth, it might be Chatham, it might be the capital. In each, in any cate, with our present means of defence, I believe resistance would be hopeless, and an attempt at armed opposition only productive of useless bloodshed. To oppose in the field such a handful of regular troops as we could muster, scarcely provided with artillery, and totally destitute of a reserve, to a French army, such as under nay supposition would be brought against them, would be an act of useless desperation. If the French were to appear at one end of London, the wisest movement the Guards could make, would be, to move out at the other. For the rest thi cc howitzers would be sufficient, and the Lord Mayor would soon be busy with the details of billets and whatever contribution might be accepted, as a commutation for indiscriminate plunder. Let them come, I often hear it said ; they will never return. Don't let them come, I say ; but if they do, let them return as soon as they can be induced to do so, I really do not see why they should particularly wish it. In the present state of this country 50,000 Frenchmen would find England as safe and pleasant a domicile as any in which the soldiers of Napoleon ever luxuriated ; but if not, the country which sent them here would consider the mere insult to perfidious Albion cheaply purchased by their ultimate sacrifice. It is necessary to look at facts as they are, not as »hey ought to be, or as we could wish to make them. Thirty years of peace, of close and pacific, if not cordial, intercourse, ought, I admit, to have obliterated the recollection of former quarrels, and staunched the old sources of bitterness and illwill. In England much of this effect has been produced. There is neither contempt nor hatred here for France or Frenchmen. In France I know not which feeling predominates towards England. Both are rife enough. In England, if she were to be involved in a quarrel with France, which Lord Palmes ton could not justify on the strongest and most palpable grounds of stringent necessity, a unanimous vote oi the House of Commons would deliver him over to be torn to pieces and devoured by Mr Urquhart. Let M. Guizot tell the Chamber of Deputies, " 1 have insulted England in a manner in which no nation can be expected to put up with," and a war supply would be voted by acelama* tion, and the conservative minister would be carried home to his hotel on the shoulders of the people. This is very unfortunate, but it is neither unaccountable nor

'innatuial. In Ilio fiisf place, there is the old standing grievance of the long and bloody game which was played between the two countries, and which was won by Englind — fairly won, as we think, by pluck and perseverance-— won, as Frenchmen conceive, hy a combination of accidents which can never again recur. The aspiiation to balance this account will not become ex^ tinct wilh the generation which has seen the English encampment in the Bois de Boulogne. These burning? memories of the past are bequeathed from father to son. It is not confined to the partisans of any political creed, or to any class of the community, ltich and poor, Cailist and Philipniste, alike entertain it— none moro than those who in their own persons, or those of their kindred, shared the protection and the hospitality of England during the emigration, and who, Waterloo apait, have, in some instances at least, a kindly recollection of that circumstance. " Une bonnt zictoire," said one of these, " et notis serons les meilleurs amis dv monde.' Is the intercourse with travelling and migratoty England calculated to remove or mitigate these unfortunate feelings t For reasons too many now to enumerate, and too many of which it is not pleasant for an Englishman to admit, still less to detail, I can only answer such a question in the negative. On these grounds and many others, sir, I am not of opinion that the mass of the French nation (I do not speak, I have not spoken, of its sovereign, its statesmen, or its philosophers— peace to and with all such) would be loth to take the iirst opportunity to strike a blow, the deadlier the better, at the vitals of England. That the piesent condition of our defences presents a direct and positive invitation to such an attempt, rests upon better evidence than I now think proper to quote. As things now stand, the adventure may be hazardous j but it would not be deemed mad, scarcely rash, when tho object to be attained is measured ag'iinst the risk of failuie. It is in our power to render it both. The dormant power of England is such as no country ever yet possessed. Give her time to collect the inert elements of strength and resistance she possesses, and against the world, I, who now tremble for the future, would hare no fear for the result ; but the French, ass assailants, are not famous for giving their enemies time to rt fleet. My fear it for surprise, and surprise alone ; but for such an operation the French are at well fitted by natural aptitude as, I believe, they are well provided with the means to effect it. We have ceased to be an island ; we have approximated in the opinion of ■11 observing and reflecting men, to the condition of a coutiuental state. We cannot afford, any more than any other member of tbe European family, to invite that aggression which our position forbids us to provoke. A wise economy would deter us from incurring the risk of having to do in hot haste, imperfectly, and at enormous expense, that which should be done at leisure and with reflection. What is that something which ought to be done ? I have no hesitation, bold as it may seem, in answering that quest on. First and foremost, add a sufficient increase to that body of police which you now call the regular army in these islands. The necessary amount is a matter of detail for tbe government to propose and the country to discuss. It should be sufficient to enable you, by the assii ance of railroads, to diiect upon any points of the coast menaced or invaded, disciplined foices of all arms in such proportion to each other as military experience and science pronounce to be best suited for co-operation. I say emphatically, regular troops. I f arnestly advocate this increase of the regular army on every ground of efficiency, of adaptation to its purpose, and even of economy. Compare that strange and anomalous production, the British soldier, with bis counterp.rt in any other seivice. In a financial point of view be will uppear a high-priced commodity. Look at the service he performs and the manner in which he perfoims it, and he will be found the cheapest aiticla of his class. It is supposed to be tbe intention of her Majesty's government to re-establish, under such altered regulations as may appear dcbirable, that old militia force which contributed so much t9 our military resource* during the late war. I rish it every success ; but I shall look on this measure wilh grave apprehension if it is to he adopted ai any succedaneum for my own nostrum. Intermixed with, or behind regular tioops, not only the niil.tia, but the still more irregular descriptions of foree — yeomanry and volunteers of all descriptions— may contribute fftbctually to the common defence. Alone HDd unsupported by that leaven of old soldiers whose qualities were so well described by the Duke of Wei ington in the Lords' debate of last year, they could only encounter a disciplined French ai my to their own inevitable desi ruction. The annals of war present no instance in which courage and patriotism, without thorough training, and unaslisted by those accident* of ground or appliances of fort fication which do not exist in England, have pre« scnted any serious obstacle to regular troops. The case of the Tyrol affords for obvious reasons no except<on to this rule. I mention it, however, because the true cause of the failure of that gallant resistance of a nation of riflemen is in one solitary respect german my subject. Those who take tbe trouble to investigate closely the history of that transaction will find that the immediate cause of the ultimate failure of that resistance was the want of a few squadrons of regular cavalry, and a few batteries of regular artillery. Let the ordnance look to this ; let that department look, to the recent affairs in Switzerland. In that country there were all tbe elements of a long and murderous struggle. On the one ham], tb/re were indeed numbers, but on the other there were positions strong by nature and improved by art, great exasperation, political and religious fanaticism, and familiarity with tha use of arms. The contest was decidtd, and decided quickly, by the superior force and weight of metal of the Federal artillery. We are neitherjiwiis nor Tyroleie. We are by our habits the least warlike nation on the face of the earth. Increase, then, I repeat, your regular army to that amount which will make an enemy pause before he attempts to set foot on 'the beach of England. Reorganise your militia on the best and least onerous system you can devise. Encourage the yeomanry cavalry. Fortify your arsenals, and such harbours as in enemy may most probably attempt by surprise to occupy. But remember that parapet! without men behind (hem, and guvs without hands to work them, are worse than useless. You will find that all this may be done for an expense scarcely equal to that which you have annually lavished, not in the prevention, but in the aggravation, of the horrors of the slave trade. Do this, and you will have some security for the continuance of peace, unpurchased by the sacrifice of national honour or interests, but which, otherwise, even such sacrifice may fail to secure. Egerton Eli.esmkre.