WELLINGTON.

Nelson Examiner and New Zealand Chronicle, Volume XVII, Issue 49, 19 June 1858, Page 3

WELLINGTON.

We are indebted to the courtesy of the Editor of the Wellington Spectator for forwarding to us, through Captain Scott, a proofslip of the report of Mr. Judge Gresson's decision upon the case submitted to him, as to who is the proper person to exercise the executive powers of Superintendent of the province of Wellington until another Superintendent is elected. The facts of the case were thus stated by his Honour :—: — " The material facts stated in the case are — That Dr. Featherston, the def ndait, was elected Superintendent of the Province of Wellington in the month of November, 1857. " That on the sth April, 1858, he tendered his resignation of office to his Excellency the Governor, who, on the 23rd of the same month, accepted such resignation on behalf of her Majesty. "That on the 15th March last, Mr. Ludlam, the plaintiff, was chosen Speaker of the Provincial Council of Wellington ; and that on the 1 2th day of April last, after the tender by the Superintendent of his resignation, but before it had been accepted, Dr. Featherston, then and still being resident within the Province, by proclamation appointed William Fitzherbert, a duly registered elector, to be his Deputy, and as such to perform and exercise all such acts and powers as by the Superintendents' Deputy Act, 1856, he should be authorized to exercise and perform in virtue of the appointment. "The questions stated for my opinion, are : — "Who, under the circumstances, is the proper party to perform and exercise the executive powers of Superintendent ? Dr. Featherston ? William Fifzberbert ? or the Speaker of the Provincial Council ? And who is entitled to the custody of the Provincial Seal, the subject of the action ?" After commenting at considerable length on the 4th section of the Constitution Act, upon the construction of which, and of the Superintendent's Deputy Act, the solution of the foregoing questions depends, his Honour contiuued — "It was intended to meet, by the appointment of a deputy, the case of temporary absence of the Superintendent, and of death or resignation during such absence. It was convenient that the Superintendent leaving the province for a short time should appoint a deputy who would carry out his plans during his absence, and if the contingency of the Superintendent's death or resignation should occur during his absence, it was inexpedient to take from the deputy the temporary powers he had received, but in all other cases the Speaker, in whom an important trust had been reposed by the people's representatives, was regarded as the fittest person to prevent the administrative powers from being in abeyance." His Honour then alluded to the arguments of the counsel on both sides ; and thus concluded :—: — " I fully subscribe to the following language of the learned Baron Parke, cited at page 587 of Dwaris on Statutes : — • "The rule by which we are to be guided is, to look at the precise words, and to construe them in their ordinary sense, unless it would lead to any absurdity or manifest injustice; and if it should, to vary and modify them so as to avoid that which certainly could not have been the intention of the Legislature. We must put a reasonable construction on their words.' Now, adopting* this language, it appears to me that I am bound to avoid a construction ot the Constitution Act that would make a Superintendent hold office after his death, or even after his election had been disallowed by the Governor, and that I am also bound, looking to the design and object of the Superintendent's Deputy Act, to avoid a construction of the parenthesis in the second section which would contradict the express proviso that the deputy was only to act during the Superintendent's absence, and which would assume that the Legislature had failed to meet the present exigency, at least practically, inasmuch as the deputy's powers, if they exist at all, at least have not been called into activity. I am, therefore, of opinion that the plaintiff, as Speaker of the Provincial Council, is the proper person to perform and exercise the executive powers of Superintendent, and that he is entitled to the custody of the seal, the subject of the action. " H B. Gresson, Judge."