AIR MASTERY

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume 76, 14 October 1941, Page 5

AIR MASTERY

OUTSTRIPPING GERMANY Sri’REMAEY NOW IN SIGHT London, Oct. 12. To-da.v is Britain's chance to outstrip the Luftwaffe. The opportunity has ! come sooner than we dared to hope. Mr Churchill's latest statement contained this cheering news. His words were based on three main factors:— • l i The Luftwaffe is doing a bigger job than was ever intended for it. Com- l pare its task now with that of May. j 1940. Then, compactly based on j I Western Germany, it could concentrate i its whole effort upon a comparatively * area Holland, Belgium, Northern 2000 miles one way and 1200 the other. It must man bases ranging from the i north of Norway to Libya, from Estonia to Bordeaux. It is summoned simul- ; taneously to keep up the air bombard- ; bent of Britain and British shipping, to , ward off the mounting British offensive ! ; against German industry, to defend “oc- I cupied coasts," to bolster the Italians, j to police Norwegians and Serbs—over ; and above all this—to fight on the Eastern front of the greatest campaign the 1 world lias ever seen. According to current estimate the .Sunday Times" air correspondent on sth October said the Eastern campaign 1 is fully occupying four out of five of the great air armies that make up Ger- ; many's air strength. “One.” he says, "before Leningrad, the second backing ' the thrust towards Moscow, the third in 1 the Ukraine, the fourth, calling for re- i inforcements. is based on Northern Nor. j way and Finland and is operating in , the Murmansk area. This leaves in the : rest of Europe the only remaining air army, plus two subsidiary corps in | | North Africa and the Balkans respec- ; tively. These forces cannot answer all ; Germany’s other requirements. At preont. the Luftwaffe is spread too thin to ! be effective.” <2) The second factor is that the j Luftwaffe this summer has suffered j more losses than it bargained for. The ! Battle of Britain was called off when I '» lost 2,100 aircraft. Even the most • i conservative eslimaters allow' that it J lias already lost more than 3,000 in ! Russia. German aircraft industry is ! great and this loss probably does not i exceed German production, though it lias certain’/ eaten into the German reserves. But the loss in machines is ! ess important than the loss in men. | ! We know that the German air crews j now fighting in the front line have been rushed several weeks before their time, straight from training schools, to [ replace casualties. The result is a falling off of skill, introducing a vicious circle which inevitably lends to yet : greater loss. The use of inadequately ! ! trained crews is uneconomic and must ! have been dictated by dire necessity, j (3) The third factor in Germany's; ! weakness is the indirect loss she has suffered through her inability to con- [ centrate on technical improvements : while she is fighting at the present pressure. To meet this pressure she j must keep her factories hard at it on the mass production of existing j models. She has no time to organise j that slow complicated process—the i changeover of plant to new types. Still j less can she get on as she would wish j with introducing new types in effective j numbers into her squadrons. This ban- ; dicap brings her face to face with the : greatest problem of her future; unless he can orgtanise a breathing space she j cannot keep pace technically or opera- ! tionally with the R.A.F. “Strike when j and where your enemy is weak” is the first golden rule of strategy. These three German embarrassments are not necessarily permanent. Therefore, now 1 is our moment to strike for quantitative as well as qualitative superiority. Mr Churchill's hint about German weakness was not just a pick-me-up. It was a summons to effort. Every worker now has his opportunity to turn the tables on the Luftwaffe whether directly from the R.A.F. and aircraft factories, or the Air Training Corps, or indirectly from the ranks of those who release others to train, plan, build and fly. j . j :