Nelson Evening Mail. SATURDAY, JULY 10, 1915. STRATEGY OF THE WAR.

Nelson Evening Mail, Volume XLVIII, Issue XLVIII, 10 July 1915, Page 4

Nelson Evening Mail. SATURDAY, JULY 10, 1915. STRATEGY OF THE WAR.

THE recent successes in Galicia, the difficult nature.of the operations at the Dardanelles, and; the seeming slowness of the Allied advance on the western front, i have dashed the- hopes of an early termination of the war," and made many people wondc'r how the Allies really do stand in regard to the threat-ened-German, offensive on a huge scale-in the -west. ■ That we are on the eve of big and decisive d'evelop'ments seemjs absolutely certain, and injatiuralLy the question raised is, can the Allies stand confidently ta their guns in the face of the hug© German onslaught.- But, bearing in mind the strength of the Germannation after nearly twelve months of war, ib must not be forgotten that our greatest military authority, Lord Kitchener, has from) the first insisted upon tho terrible character of the struggle, and upon the fact that it must be a lon e . war of attrition, a statement reiterated at the great Guildhall gathering reported in to—day's cables. In dealing with the strategy of the war, Mr Belloc makes several weighty observations that ' are, well worth consideration at the present time. He points out, in the first place, that in, round 1 numbers the enemy came ■up against the Allies in the proportion of 1 about eight to five. And. in regard to munitions, the enemy had prepared for the war for the past three years, and had an immense advantage in this respect. Then the enemy was singularly wise in his judgment of what the de-, tails of modern war would turn out to be, so that he prepared:, a very .large number of machine, guns, and a larger amount of heavy artillery than the British and French had, and with high explosive shells, etc., he was able to dominate tKe fortifications. These tilings being so, Mr Belloc comes to the vital question, through what' phases would these numbers pass as the war developed? To begin with, was it going to stay at 8 to 5 indefinitely V Were the munitions going to stay at 2 to 1 enemy would not have been probable,, but absolutely and mathematically certain. It was thought at the beginning of the war, and, according to one of yesterday's cables, correctly so, that if the war remained undetermined for six or nine months, the weakness of the Allies' might be largely limited. In the. nu-1 merical problem, says Mr. Belloc, lies the t key of the -whole business. The German Empire (including Austria) had a reserve of 2,400,000 "men. Some military critics believe Germany "had far more than that numbeT , of reserves. But ; that, as Mr. ' Belloc points.out', is an error.'Not more than'., a. quarter, of ,the male population j may have-been taken for. active'service,, but of'the remaining-three-quarters a considerable proportion must be kept behind 1 to -keep the country going. No nation has put more than 10 per cent, of the total population in the field at once. The number that 'Germany could' put into the field in the course of the war was 7J,- millions, and her ally 5 millions, or a total of just over 12 millions. ' The three batches of these men would come about every three months, and the third would be the last; but tho seate■irent must not be taken too mechanically. If the German army had. suffered no wastage at all they would hu-ve 'had the initial effort nearly up to 5,000,000, which, with subsequent rises, would have reached 7-J,- millions. The wastage of tho enemy has been enormously heavy, luckily for us. It has' been due to a •number of things combined. The enemy knew that time was against them, ana if they were to win thoroughly they had to do so pretty quickly, at a reckless expenditure of men and munitions in dealing the first blows. But the German idea was that although losing so many ,in the first instance, decisive results would be attained, making tho'ultimate advantage overwhelmingly in their favour. Sickness with the enemy is far greater than with the Allies. The Germans are reachincr their third and last wave. The French put every' body into the field after the end of October. The British recruitment takes the form of a lai'ge extension of the Territorial forces, and new efforts for the new armies that we're quite unexpected. The voluntary system is giving, and' continues to give, such large numbers of re-

cruits without upsetting tlie ; life of the nation that the result is unexpected l in its magnitude and effect> But in the equipping of these troops we have, had to •be stower than in training them. Russia, he says, could not equip, feedj and put into the field more than or 2-f millions of men, owing to their being blockaded by the Germans. The result in that while the enemy's army is constantly dwindling, the Allies will receive considerable increases in men. and munitions. It is a calculation of this sort which is at the bottom of the optimism of the French general staff, and is communicated to the British nation, and, though the Russian problem is doubtful, if makes us fairly confident of the issue of the war. Mr Belloc concludes by pointing out that however long the war might seem, there is no such thing as a deadlock, and that July might see the last effort of the campaign. The enemy's offensive could not be indefinitely prolonged, and must certainly be beaten unless it could break out by the anniversary of the war. He would not say that to break out was not possible; but if it -was not done by the early summer the end was absolutely cei*tain.