FOUND GUILTY

Maoriland Worker, Volume 5, Issue 196, 4 November 1914, Page 4

FOUND GUILTY

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Results in the Sacrifice of Forty-three Liven

WILL THE AUTHORITIES DEAL WiTH THE LAW-BKEAHEHB?

Full Text of Royal Commission's Report

The report of the Royal Commissioners'(Messrs. Burgess, Brown, and Dowgray) re the Huntly Explosion was laid upon the table of the House of Representatives on Friday evening last. It reads as follows: To His Excellency the Right HonHourable Arthur William do Brito Savile, Earl of Liverpool, Knight Grand Cross of the Most Distinguished Order of Saint Michael and Saint George, Momber of the Royal Victorian Order, Governor and Command-er-in-Chief in and over His . Majesty's Dominion of New Zealand and* its dependencies. May it please Your Excellency,— The Commission, dated tho 28th day of September, 1914, entrusted to us by Your. Excellency, was received on the 30th idem, upon which date the Commission assembled at Huntly. On the following day the inquiry was formally opened at the Courthouse, Huntly, but was adjounrcd! after a short sitting to enable the Commissioners to visit the mine and make an inspection of tho scene of the accident. The taking of evidence at Huntly was commenced on the 2,nd and continued until the 9th October, when the Commission adjourned to Wellington, where further evidence was taken on the 23rd October. # , During the course of its investigations the Commission examined twentythree witnesses. The proceedings were open to the public, and/ full reports were published in the nowspapers. The parties represented by counsel <rere,— ■* (1.) The Mines Department and Inspector Bennie (represented by Mr P. S. K. Macassey, Assisttant Crown Law Officer, Wellington). . ~ (2) The Taupiri Coal-mines (Limited), (represented by Mr. 0. J. Tunks, barrister, of Auckland). (3.) The trustees of Ralph's Estate, the owners of the freehold of the mine (represented by Mr. « \W. J. Napier, barrister, of Auckland). (4) The Executive of the Taupiri Coal-miners' Union (represented! by Mr. G. M. Newton, barrister, of Auckland). (5) The widows of certain miners killed by the explosion (repreBented by Mr. T. M. Wilford, barrister, of Wellington). , , (7.) The coal-miners of the Dominion affiliated with the United Federation of Labour (represented by . Mr. T. M. Wilford, barrister, of ' Wellington). With the consent of all parties, it was arranged that Mr Wilford, should call the witnesses and conduct the examination in chief, and that each counsel for the other parties represented should cross-examine in the order arranged amonc themselves.

THE MINES. The Taupiri Company's mine, in which the accident the subject of this Commission's inquiry occurred is situated in the, Township of Huntly, near the "Waikato River, and extends under the river in a southerly direction to a. considerable distance beyond. The company ie the lessee from the owners of two coal-mines, known respectively as Ralph's and the Taupin Extended Mines. These mines are contiguous but are worked independently, and a barrier of coal 2 chains in width separates the working of one from the other. There is a duly certificated! manager in charge of each mine, but Mr. James Fletcher, the manager of Ralph's Mine, exercises a general supervision over both. The operations in these mince are extensive, covering an area of 840 acres, and a large number of men are employed in each colliery. The coal obtained is a lignite of superior quality . Ralph's Mine, the scene of the accident, haß three shafts, by any one of which access to or egress from any part of the mino may _bo obtained. The principal shaft is situated close to the railway-line in the Hnntly Township. It descends vertically to a depth of 166 ft., and from fcho bottom of this shaft the main travelling-way dips uniformly to _ the end, a distance of 60 chains, in a southerly direction

The method of working the mine is by the system generally followed in mines in this Dominion, known as the "bord-and-pillar system/ but in one essential feature the mode of operations in this mine differs from that followed in any other mine in the country. It is usual in coal-mines where the bord-and-pillar system is adopted to remove the pillars when the seam of coal in that section of the mine has become exhausted, and the standing columns of coal aro no longer required to support the superincumbent strata. In Ralph's Mine it is impracticable at present to follow this course, for any collapse of the earth due to the removal of the pillars .would involve the almost certain consequence of the waters of the Waikato River or of the Wahi Lake finding their way into the mine, to the great peril of all persons employed, therein and the eventual destruction of the property. As a result of these circumstances there is a considerable portion of the mine in which no further operations # can be carried on, but which remains in all other respects precisely in the Bamo conditions as regards the existing bords-and-pillars as those "districts" in which operations are actually in progress. This portion of the mine te known as the "old workings," and U so designated by witnesses, and will Ss such be referred to in this report, t is important to keep in mind the (peculiar feature of the Huntly mines jfasfc noted, because it has a direct and Iportant bearing on the subject-matter ©f this inquiry. THE EXPLOSION On Saturday, the 12th September bet, a very violent explosion took Blace8 lace in Ralph's Mino whereby fortyaree men lost their lives The manager, Mr. Fletcher, was not in charge of the mine at the time, having been Incapacitated by illness for a week or more, and tho deputy manager, Mr. William Gowans,' a Certificated minettanager, waa in charge. From tlie evidence it appears that the day of tho occurrence was what is called an "off day" in the mine. It was tho day following the usual fortnightly paydiiy, and it is not tho custom of the minors to engage in the ordinary work <rf the mine on such days; but it is tjsuol for (V limited number of workmen to bq employed on. casual works

of a necessary charactr for facilitating the working, or providing for the security of the mine. It is not disclosed by the evidence for what purpose the majority of the meu whose bodies were found in the mine after the explosion went there, but it is conclusively established that a party consisting of five or six men was instructed by Deputy Smith, on the preceding Friday evening, to proceed on the Saturday morning (tho 12th) to section 5 of the mino.'in the old workings, for the purpose- of lifting and removing iron rails which had on the cessation of work been left lying in some of the disused bords. There are two ways by which the old workings can be reached from tho Bhaft—tirst, by the travelling-road for a distance of 50 chains, thence by bords a further distance of about 10 chains (bord No. 6 of section 5 is open at the northern end, but tho entrance is blocked by a door); secondly, the old workings can be reached by a more roundabout route, about 70 chains in length, by way of the little dip, southeast of the shaft, entering eoction No. 5 at the south end. There is no direct evidence as to the route taken by tho workmen in going for these rails, except with respect to the horse-driver Brownlie and two young men whom he took to accompany him. These, according to Brownhcs evidence, went the longer way round, by tho little dip. The reason for this he explains by saying that he # had to tako a horse with him to bring out the rails, and that the opening through tho door above referred to was not sufficiently largo to admit of the passago of the horse. He says that from what Deputy Smith told him he expected the other men to go round by the travelling-way, and after passing through the door at No. 6 bord of section 5 (old workings) to meet him at the place where the rails were to be found. Before ho arrived at the place appointed the explosion occurred, and all the men he was to meet there were, without exception, killed. Considerable doubt has been expressed as to the direction taken by the party who wore proceeding to tho place where the rails were lying, but after careful consideration of the facts and probabilities we have no doubt that they went by way of the travelling-road and entered No. 6 bord by the door previously mentioned. This was the shortest and easiest route, and no special reason has been shown why they should have gone by the other. From the position in which Martin « body was found he would appear to have been the first man to pass through the door. This door was not secured by any lock or other protective fastening.

HOW THE EXPLOSION OCCURRED

It was contended by some witnesses that, judging by the quantity of firedamp found in bords 4, 5, and 6 even some time after the explosion, at the moment of the ignition bord No. 6 must have been so full of firedamp that it would have been impossible for Martin to enter carrying a naked light with him and that therefore he must have como from the opposite direction to the way by the door. There is, howover, no sufficient evidence that these bords contained firedamp to such tin extent as to completely fill them, even at the upper ends . It would: appear as if Martin passed, through the door carrying a naked light in his hand, and'when he had proceeded a short distance down the bord, probably ac far as the cut-through to No. 5, ho encountered an inflammable mixture or air and firedamp, and an explosion took place. This explosion served to disturb and put in motion the coaldust on the floor and sides of the bord, which being, as. recent analysis has shown, of a most inflammable nature, ignited with a terrific explosion, and tlie liberated gases sweeping through the bords and passages of the mine with enormous velocity hurled to great distances, and in most cases destroyed every obstacle in their path. No man within the immediate range of the explosive action escaped alive. The exact spot where Martin was standing when the explosion took place cannot be determined with certainty. It seems probable from the evidence that his body, which when found was, with the exception of the socks and on his feet, entirely devoid of clothing, was carried by_ the forr© of the explosion a considerable distance. His coat which was not destroyed, was found near the third stenton from tho door. The probabilities are that he was carrying hjs coat on his arm, and that it was the first thing torn from him by the force of the explosion. If he had been wearing it at the time, it is almost conclusively certain that it would have disappeared with tho rest of his clothing WHERE THE FIRE-DAMP CAME FROM. The explosion was due beyond any reasonable doubt to ttie emission of firedamp from the roof of No. 5 bord in No. 5 section —known as the old workings—where there is a "fall" from the roof of several months' standing. There is an extensive fall in No. 6 bord which was first, seen after the explosion, but that, in our opinion, did not contribute the firedamp which was encountered by Martin. Its occurenco is probably due to the explosion. There is not sufficient evidence before us to enable us to cay what quantity of gas was present in bords 4, 5, and 6 on tho morning of tlie Occident. All those who could have* thrown light on the matter have, unfortunately, perished. It is a well-ascertained and accepted fact that a large amount of N an inflammable mixture bf atmospheric air and firedamp is not essential to the production of an explosion; but there is no doubt in this instance that the firedamp must have been escaping in considerable quantities to have impregnated the air to an inflammable extent (5.6 per cent.) at the distance from its source at which Martin met it. If Martin entered by tho door, as we think is certain, and was carrying a naked light in his hand, it would have been extinguished by the current of air caused! by the opening of the door. There is almost a certainty that his light was put out and that ho probably relit ib at the spot whore the explosion originated. In all probability tho upper air of No. 6 bord was impregnated with gas .tp a dangerous extent. Martin entering the door carrying tho lamp in his h&nd would not bring tho naked Fight into contact with this inflammable mixture, but if ho' had occasion to raise it for any purpose —such as to fix it to his head before entering on his work —an explosion would inevitably follow.

. IF AN INSPECTION HAD BEEN MADE. It is possible, as suggested, though not probable, that the exudation of "as had not long commenced in No. o and had reached No. 6 just when Martin Be that as it may, we. are perfectly satisfied that if a proper inspection of the old workings had been made with a safety-lamp prior to these men entering through tho door the presence of firedamp in tho air must certainly have been discovered, and in that case, without doubt, steps would havo been taken to render the air pure, and tho calamity which wo now deplore would have been averted. From tho evidence it appears to us certain that Martin was the first to enter through the door. Deputy Smith, the official in authority, and tho only man, apparently, of that party who was in the habit of carry in ga safety lamp, seems to have been very, much in the rear, judging from the position in which tho body was found. The door should not have been open for Martin to pass through until Deputy Smith, or soino one authorised for tho purpose, had previously entered With Jus safety-lamp and examined the place to ascertain its safety or otherwise. There is, unfortunately, no direct evidence as to Smith's movements on that morning, and no absolute proof that ho dkl ' not enter section No. 5 for the purpose of making an inspection before tho workmen arrived; Imt the surrounding circumstances and the ascertainablo facts make it morally certain that no inspection of that part of the mine was mado that morning. There is no evidence to show how long tho firedamp had been issuing from the fall in No. 5 before the explosion occurred. The place had been examined by Deputy Wear three days before the accident, and his report states, and he himself swears, that there were no signs of gas at that time.

At the conclusion of the inquiry, some three weeks subsequent to its opening, Deputy John McGill came forward to say that Mr. Gowans, the acting-manager, and one of the men killed in tho explosion, had informed him that on the afternoon preceding •Jie 12th September he (Gownns) had passed bord JNo. 6 with a naked light without apparently encountering any gas. This evidence, however, throws no additional light upon the matter, for Mr. Gowans wade no inspection or oxnmination, and there may have been even then largo quantities of gas in the upper purt ol tm> bord which lie did not detect. This would bo more particularly so if he were carrying his lamp in his hand. This evidence, too, is open to the objection that no mention was mnde at the Coroners-inquest or before- this Commission at Huntly of the fact mentioned by Mr. McGill, although it related to a matter of the gravest importance in connection with this inquiry. COAL DUST. The important part played by coaldust in a coal-mine explosion was again brought prominently under notice by the Huntly disaster. Dust was plentiful in theme, but according to the evidence the quantity was not large compared with that found in some mines in Great Britain. It, was, however, sufficiently abundant to compel the Inspcccor of Mines to call the attention of the manager to it, and to direct him to take steps to mitigate it by watering tho travellingroad. Mr. Bennie did this primarily out of consideration for the men who had to uso the travellingway, but ho also realised its danger, and in two successive memoranda to the manager directed his attention to the matter. It is only fair to the Inspector of Mines and to the mine-manager to say that, though as a matter of general knowledge the danger of dust-explo-sions in a coal-mine was known and recognised, tho extraordinary nature of the dust in this mine was unsuspected until after the accident Analyses then made by Professor Harold Bailv Dixon, M.A., Ph.D., F.RS., of the University of Manchester, and Dr. MWlaurhV D.Sc, F.C.S., Dominion Analyst, first revealed its unusual potency in creating a disaster. In the opinion of your Commissioners, some legislative provision should be made having for its object the prevention or mitigation of tho danger arising from the presence of dust in a mine. Much evidence was submitted at the inquiry relative to dustexplosions in coal-mines and their remedy, and tho Commissioners wero fortunate in hearing the opinion of so prominent an authority as Professor Dixon on tho subject. Suggestions as to the best means of guarding against the evil will be made later on in this report. With respect to the several matters submitted by Your Excellency to us for our inquiry, we beg to report as follows: — (1) IN WHAT PART OR PARTS OF THE MINE THE ACCIDENT OCCURRED, AND THE NATURE OF THE SAME. The point of origin of the disaster was bord No. 6 in the No. 5 district, the nature of the disaster being an explosion of a large accumulation of firedamp, which raised and ignitod_ ai cloud of coaldust, and was thereby intensified and carried on. The explosion traversed the main haulage- ana travelling roads 'to the top of Ralph's Colliery downcast shaft, and for a considerable distance towards the Taupiri West shaft, with which Ralph's Uolliory workings are connected underground. A- largo area of mine-work-ings was also traversed by the explosion. Forty-three persons employed by the Taupiri Coal-mines (Limited) lo*t their lives as a result of this explosion, which occurred about 7.30 a.m. on Saturday, the 12th September, 1914. That being a no-work day for hewers and truckers, only _ sixty-two men were engaged in tho mine at the time of the disaster; under normal conditions tho number of persons om-plo}-ed underground would bo about one hundred and sixty. (2.) HOW THE ACCIDENT WAS CAUSED. Tho accumulation of firedamp which caused the explosion occurred in bords 4, 5, and 6, owing to inadequate ventilation and inspection. Bords such as these, rising as they do from thg southward to dead ends, favour tho accumulation of firedamp, tho air lining stagnant, and there being no signs of stoppings or brattice in tho vicinity, having been used. The firedamp nib* tiiro was ignited by a minor's naknl ncetylono cap-lamp carried by John Martin^.a_ contract truokoi\ while dciv

forming his duties in that part of the mjne. (3.) WHAT LIGHTS WERE USED IN THE DIFFERENT PARTS OF THE MINE AT THE TIME OF THE ACCIDENT. For the daily examination of tho mine by firemen and deputies before work was commenced safety-lamps were used. Miners and others used acetylene-lamps and other naked lights. Stationary electric lighte wore installed at the shaft-bottom. At tho time of the accident naked lights only were carried in the mino. (1 ) TO WHAT EXTENT THE PROVISIONS OF THE COAL-MINES ACT, 1908, AND RULES WERE COMPMED WITH. (A.) AS TO VENTILATION AND LIGHTING. There is no evidence that firedamp was permitted to accumulate in the actual working-places and travelling roads to and from such working-places in contravention of Special Rule 3, but with respect to the old workings wo are satisfied that sufficient examin-

ation for gas was not made, and that gas was allowed to accumulate in dangerous quantities. In contravention of Special Rule 16, tho manager did not see that tho mine was properly ventilated in all parts, and did not see that the working of tho mino was carried on with all reasonable provisions for the safety of the persons employed. In contravention o fSpecial Rule 16,< the door for ventilation and safety purposes connecting bord No. 6, in which the disaster occurred, with the working portion of No. 5 district, and which was only used occasionally, was not locked, or even provided with a lock. In contravention of Special Rule IS. the old workings and return aircourses of the mine, also bords 4, 5, and 6, No. 5 district, were inadequately fenced, persons being therefore liable to inadvertently enter tho same. ■ Notwithstanding repeated .-ignitions and explosions in Ralph's and the adjoining Extended Colliery, any one of which might have created a disaster, the manager continued to permit naked lights to be used, although undei Special Rule 14 it was his duty to direct tho underviewer to see that locked safety-lamps only were used and naked lights excluded wheresoever and whensoever danger from firedamp was apprehended. (B.) THE EXAMINATION OF THE. MINE. The daily examination of No. 5 district, in which the explosion originated, was entrusted to John Wliorskcy, tho holder of a fireman andj deputy's certificato of service without examination. ' Ho had held an appointment in that capacity prior to tho passing of tho Coal-mines Amendment Act, 1909, which first required candidates to pass nn examination. Whorekey, witb both the other examining deputies, John Skellern and 11. Peckham, were lulled in the explosion. None- of thoso men had passed tho Mines Department's gas test, the only two officials in the mino who had passed such test being Deputy John Darby (deceased) and Joseph Young, (formerly assistant inspector of tho old workings, but now out of the company's employ. Tho frequent occurrence of gris_ in tho old workings was, in our opinion, a source of danger, and there- is no evidenco that No. G bord was examined on the morning of the 12th September. Had the provisions of the Act been ftn'ctly adhered to on that occasion 'tbf explosion would have been avorted. \\o consider, therefore, that no rogular or systematic examination for gas was made in. tho old wflrkinaa.

Oμ tl.'o day of tho explosion Whorsl:cv «!'•(■!<.'! ou> if/inn fit tihuiif. 5 a.m., !',••! :■ b -tuv 7 i>.-n. vr.iio in hi:- ic-jiort-j 1i0,,;.- :i..-t hv, ■\h>.-:\tt -.yns -.lo; h- 19 i j.'Oil.'.! ii° 'A"i> or oi:Jcr an::;.'!'.''*. l |,s />;:j!v n'lwris were of a formal nature, sVl'.loiu <>r evor varying. If Whorskoy, had enti'i-fd No. 6 bord, in which Martin's body was found, and where tho lnttor wits passing along find met his flo-illi n>l (ho morning of tho disaster, he (Whor.skey) could not have failed to discover firedamp with his safetylamp, ns with tho minimum explosive mixture—viz., o.G per cost.—his lamp would have- heroine filled with flaino, j!n<l with q 4'ppr-cent.. mixture the flinio would have risen to the top of his larn;)-glasß. No. (3 bord,- if not actually a working place, was certainly a travelling plnco on tho day of tho explosion, and it is obvious, therefore, that it should have boon examined by Whorskey, in R,ccordarico with section 40, subsection (42), of tho Act, and Special Rules 17, 23, 21. and 25, but it was not so examined by him, nor by any one on his behalf. The only surviving official, Joseph young, now an cx-oniployee, who had passed tho Government gas test, and had formerly acted as assistant examiner of the old workings (or returnair courses), gave evidence to the effect that tlie state of the mine caused him a, great deal of concern. On two occasions last April he had found accumulations of gas amounting to 133,G00 cubic foet, and he had found danqer--OUB quantities in the No. 5 district. At the inquest this witness 6tated that I ho had frequently found accumulai tions of gas in dangerousi quantities. Daniel Wear, examiner of tho old workings (which constitute tho return air course, stated that there wae no one' wl'nso duty it was to test for gas in the old 1 workings, his duty being to look for fires. He added, however, that though it was not his duty to do so he reported the cxistenrn of pas whenever it came under bis notice. Ho had never passed any examination in gas-testing. He stated f'hat he visited bords Nos. 4, 5, and 0 on the 9th September, threo days prior to the explosion, but saw no' gas there. He had no ladder nor nnv otln: , means by which to tost for gas neat' tho roof in any of tho hifji bards of this section, though the fall in No. 5 bord may have afforded means

of tho seam is about lin 10. The s;,stom of work, as already n.cntioned, is bord-and-pilliir. About 2qU acres lit' coal pi!i::r<; uro junv standing. No pillar-oxinietimi has commenced, or is proposed, owing to tho fact Leforo ralorred to —that the surface is travers-. Ed by tho River Waikato, and in places covered by lakes and watercourses of considerable magnitude, from which inundation would follow if the roofsupport were removed. These extensive and' unusual ramifications of old bords and stentons (or cut-throughs) require niorcv than ordinary attention, as the conditions are somewhat unique. Tho tendency for gas-jaccunnilations in tho high places and of spontaneously ignited fires where coal and debris become piled up is great, calling for special care and attention. Special attention was given to tho prevention of heating, but we think, on account of the presenc eof gas, more frequent inspections were necessary. In view of what has been stated above, and of the fact that the Coalines Act and the special rules thereunder have to some extent been either neglected or disregarded by the manager, Mr. Fletcher, it cannot be said that the mine was in all respects well and safely managed by him. If Mr. Fletcher had performed his obvious duty in causing eafety-lamps only to be used in Ralph's Colliery the disaster would never have occurred. He had ample warnings by previous explosions. A manager has not only to comply with the requirements of the lav, but he has a duty to his fellowman beyond mere statutory obligations. Had the Mines Department known of these enses at the .time no doubt legal provision would have been made for the Inspector of Mines to enforce tho use of safety-lamps, by which the disaster would have been averted.

witnesses wo learned that only two inspections were wsdo by the workmen's inspectors' dining the past twelve moistlis—that is, practically, since the new union was formed after the first stiiko during 1912. Inspector Bonnie in r>B evidence complained that he had received no help from the union or their check inspectors. The reference to them in his letter to the Under-Secretary as the creation of the mining companies was not supported by any witnesses produced before the Commissioners, who declined , to hear evidence attempting to show victimisation. (7) SUGGESTIONS FOR THEI PREVENTION, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, OF SIMILAR ACCIDENTS, MINES IN THE FUTURE. Your Commissioners have arrived at certain conclusions with respect to the prevention of future accidents in mines, but they find that in most instances their intended recommendations have heen anticipated by the Coal Mines Amendment Bill now before Parliament. This is particularly so with regard to —(a) Ventilation, (b) safetylamps, (c) duties of inspectors. VENTILATION. Wo approve ,of the provisions of clnuse 7 of the Bill now before the Goldfields and Mines Committee. In our opinion the observance of these provisions will conduce to the safety of the mines and the comfort of the miners working therein. [Mr" Brown concurs m this recommendation, except with regard to clause 7, sub-clause 1, paragraph (a), subparagraph (ID). With respect to this ho recommends that Inspectors of Mines should have discretionary power to increase the number of men in an airsplit to eighty-five.! SAFETY-LAMPS. We approve of and adopt as our recommendation respecting safety-lamps paragraph (a) of subclause (1) of clause 7 of the Bill'now before the Committee. DUTIES OF INSPECTORS. We concur in the provisions of clauses 17 and 18 of the Bill as regards the duties of Inspectors, and submit these clauses as our recommendations on this matter. COALDUST IN'MINES. We deem it imperative that legislation should be parsed with the_ object of preventing, if possible, or mitigating the danger arising from the presence of dust in coal-mines, and. to that end we recommend the incorporation m our Coal-mines Act of section 62 of the Coal-mines Act of Great Britain (1911) in its entirety. NOTICE OF ACCIDENTS. Tho provisions of the Coalmines Act with respect to the reporting ot injuries to workmen are somewhat loose and uncertain, as it is left to the judgment of the mine-manager in every case to decide whether or not the injury is a serious one. In this respect section 80 of the Coal-mines Act. 1911 (Great Britain), is much to be preferred to the corresponding section in our Act, and wo bog to recommend its inclusion in the New Zealand statute, in lieu of section 62. SHOT-FIRING IN DUSTY MINES. We recommend that the following provisions be incorporated in the Coalmines Act: In all dry and dusty mines, and in mines where*the Inspector of Mines is of opinion that dust of highly inflammable nature exists < in dangerous quantity, and also .in mines where safety-lamps are in use, no explosives but those permitted by the Chief Inspector of Mines shall, be used, and all ehot-firing shall be done by officials specially appointed by the manager. 8. AS TO WHETHER THE PROVISIONS OF THE EXISTING LAW . ARE SUFFICENT TO GIVE THE INSPECTOR OF MINES FUXL AUTHORITY TO ORDER THE USE OF SAFETY-LAMPS AND OTHER APPLIANCES IF INTO OPINION SUCH APPLIANCES ARE NECESSARY. We are of opinion that the existing law does not give the Inspector of Mines direct authority to order the use of safety-lamps or other apph- ', ances. There is no provision in the Act giving in precise terms any sxich authority. Section 58 might he employed as a last resource by an Inspector as an indirect mthod of compelling the use of safety-lamps or other necessary appliances, but it was not framed for such purpose, and the uso of it is, at best, a clumsy and unsatisfactory expedient. # t Wo recommend tho insertion in the Aot of a direct and definite section, giving the Inspector power to order the use of safety-lamps and any appliance? lie deems necessary. SUMMARY. We have the honour to report the result of ■ our investigations to be ac folloWS: — , . XT n i 1 The disaster occurred in No. 6 ! bord of No. 5 section of Ralph's Taupiri Mine. . , 2...,The cplosion was caused by a naked light used by Martin (deceased), thereby igniting a gaseous mixture of CH4 iii No. 6 bord. 3. Safety-lamps were used by the mine officials for examination purposes, hut naked lights were used throughout tho mine 'by the workmen. 4. The ventilation of the mine generally was efficient, but was defective as regards eection 5. 5. The examination of the mine frs a wholo was satisfactory, but the inspection of tho old workings was inadequate, and tho absence of ladders ni tho high bords prevented a thoroufeh examination in such places for gas. 6. Tho only explosive used was Curtis and Harvey's blasting powder. 7. There- was not to ,our knowledge in the past history of tho mine any occasion on which it was necessary to : withdraw the workmen. 8. The means of escape in , case of accident were afforded by three shafts, which in our opinion were adequate 9. The management of the mine was, speaking generally, good, but in certain respects—e.g., the prompt carrying out of the Inspector's orders, the precautions taken against danger from gas, the ordering of safety-lamps, and the examination of the old workings — it was lax and unsatisfactory.

for examination of that particular bord. As the height of many of these bords exceeds 11 ft., the inadequacy of Wear's examination is apparent. The absence of ladders for such" exri iitiation throughout the mine, as di- ,- closed b.v the evidence, indicates thr.t tho examination of them for firedamp was inadequate and unreliable. Wo cannot refrain from referring to the frequent occurrence of pas in dangerous quantities in tho working-places of tho mine, to which wo think that sufficient importance was not attached by tho manager. (C.) THE CHARACTER OF TPIE EXPLOSIVES USED. The only explosives used in the Huntly mines up to the dato of this inquiry was Curtis, and Harvey's blasting-powder. No objection had been taken to its use by the Inspector or any other person. The mine was regarded a sa safe mine, notwithstanding the occasional discovery of gas, as this was not looked upon as a source of danger. The extreme inflammability of the dust in the mine was unsuspected until analyses were made of it after the explosion. The nature of tho explosives used in the mine docs not affect our opinion as to the cause of the explosion, for it is quite clear from the evidence that no shot was fired in the mino on tho day of tho accident. (D.) WITHDRAWAL OP WORKMEN IN CASE OF DANGER, There was no evidence tendered at the inquiry to show that at any time the workmen were removed from tho mine. The mine had for many years enjoyed an immunity from serious aecidcius, and apparently no occasion had arisen on which danger to lifo had been apprehended by the management necessitating tho withdrawal of tho men. (E.) THE MEANS OF ESCAPE IN CASE OF ACCIDENT Thrco vertical shafts "Connect the coal-seam with the surface, two of such shafts being equipped with cages and the third with nn inclined and protectod laddenvgy. The depth of these shafts is—two each of 166 ft. at Ralph's Colliery, and one of 207 ft. at Taupiri West Colliery (connected). Tho diameter of each shaft is 10 ft. Tho means of escape are adequate. (5) THE NATURE AND CHARACTER OF THE WORKING AND GENERAL MANAGEMENT OF THE MINE, AND WHETHER THE MINE WAS WELL AND SAFELY MANAGED. Tho coal-seams consist of a superioi brown eonl, tho thickness varying from 10ft. to 34 ft., tho averago thickness worked bninar 20 ft.: the averaao du>

Of the several cases of injury to workmen by the ignition of gas in Ralph's Mine and the Taupiri Extended, only in one instance —that of Kelly —was the matter reported to the Inspector of Mires, it is unfortunate that the Coa»-lines Act does not enforce the reporting of all cases of injury by gas-ignition, whether trivial or serious. It only requires a report' where the accident is attended with "serious injury to any person," leaving it to the manager to decide as to what is or is not a serious injury. The manager in those cases decided the injuriVa were not serious, but we are of opinion that where the man is incapacitated from work for fourteen or more days, as was the case in more than oue instance, the injury should not be treated as anything lees than serious. (6.) THE EFFICIENCY OF THE INSPECTION OF THE MINE. (A.) THE INSPECTOR OF MINES FOR THE DISTRICT. With regard to the efficiency of the inspection of the mine- by the Inspect--0 rof Mines for the district, your Commissioners find that the present occupant of the position, Mr. Boyd Bennio, has been assiduous and conscientious in the discharge of his duties, and has shown himself to be a capable and painstaking officer; but we consider that on occasions he has been satisfied with less than a strict and prompt compliance with orders given by him to the manager with respect to matters relating to the working and safety ot the mine. He has regularly visited and inspected the mine, usually tour times annually, except during the present year, when up to the time or tno disaster he had made seven visits to the mine. . ~ We have- no reason to think that tns inspections were otherwise than thorough and conscientious so far as regards the. working-part of the mine, but we are of opinion that it would have been better if more attention had been given by him to the old workings, which actually formed part ot the return airway of the mmo. It i«, however, due to tho Inspector to say that it was at his instigation that this part of the mino was regularly inspected by the company's officials. With regard to the occasional discoveries of. gas in different places in the mine, it appears to us that the Inspector does not seem to have realised to its full extent the gravity of the situation, as disclosed by the presence from time to time of this gas. In our opinion, after the explosion by which Kelly was injured, the use or safetylamps should have been lnsistontly urged upon the manager. _ The inspector fruit© honestly considered that the gas occurring in' the mine could bo kept harmless by careful inspection and proper ventilation, and that no risk was run of any ignition or explosion by continuing the use of naked lights. That in this he was puilty of an error of judgment is too abundantly proved by the terrible accident which resulted from the continued use of naked lights. Doubt has been expressed as to whether an order given by the Inspector for tho use of safety-lamps could ibo enforced by lnm under the present ■Act or Special Rules. In the opinion of the Inspector, and apparently of the officers of the Mines Department, . [the Inspector has no power to do so. iThero is no direct authority given by the Act or rules to the Inspector to order tho use of safety-lamps; but ■ye are of opinion that section 58 or ho Act, though not apparently framed ior suon purpose, may be employed o.i an emergency to effect the purposo fcv an indirect method. 'i-,j Inspector duly reported to the t "far-Secretary; of Mines the results jffifs inspections and his observations 01 tho condition and working of the mine, and after the accident to Kelly instructions were received by him from the head of the Department tS proseruto tho manager for a breach of Special Rule 14 for not providing safetylamps, subject, however, to a favourable legal opinion of tho case being obtained. In consequence of an adverse opinion bring received by > the Inspector from the firm of solicitors to whom he referred the matter, no proceedings were taken against tho manager. Before there was time for the Department to consider; the position, and to decide what;,'./farther steps should bo taken to secure the safely of the mine, the disaster apprehended by the Inspecting Engineer of the Mines Department (as shown by his several memoranda to the Under-Sec-retary) unfortunately occurred. _ Mr. Reed is entitled to credit for bringing so forcibly under the notice of tlio mines Department his fear of impending danger in the Taupiri Company's mine by reason of the gas known to exist there. We agrco with him in his view that, not being the Inspector of Mines for the district, he had no right to interpose in any directions or orders given to tho manager, although his right as an Inspector of Mines to inspect the mino is beyond question. We cannot refrain, however, from saying that we regret that Mr. Reed did not, in tho interests of human life, personally visit and examine the mino and acquaint the manager of his very etrong convictions as to the imminent danger threatening tho minu. Wo also regard it as unfortunate that specific instructions were not given him by tho Mines Department to do so. Mr. Reed had no occasion to visit the mine lor a considerable time before learning of the presence of gas there, but he had, while at the Thames on other official business, arranged with the District Inspector to visit the mine in his company only n short time before tho explosion, and ho had with him two electrical lamps for triai tliero,' but, being called away to tlio West Coast on official business, the visit of inspection to tho mine was unfortunately deferred. (G) THE EFFICIENCY OF THE INSPECTION OF THE MINE BY (b.) THE WORKMEN'S INSPECTORS. No evidence was given by tlio workmen's insjxKjtors bulore tho Commission, but from tho evidence of other

during the inquiry by the learned counsel engaged, and of tho able am courteous manner in which the ■exam*, inatiou of witnesses was conducted by, them. ■ ' The Secretary, Mt. J. T. Watkiris, has merited our sincere thanks %r Uiq able and satisfactory manner in which he has discharged his duties. Wo return herewith Your Excellency's Commission, and also encloee herewith— (1.) Verbatim report of the evidence submitted to the Commissioners; (2.) Notes of the evidence token before the Coroner at the inquest, which it was agreed should* be accepted and used as though tendered to this Commission. <3.) Plans, documents, and letters produced at the • inquiry. . (4.) Addresses of counsel appearing before the Commissioners. ■' And this our report we have the honour to respectfully submit, for the consideration of -your Excellency, in obedience to the Commission addressed to us. .... ■. Given under our hands and eeali, at Wellington, this 30th day> of October, 1914. , FRED J. BURGESS, Chairman.. J. 0. BROWN. JOHN DOWGRAY.

10. Tho Inspector of Mines is a-care-ful and competent officer, zealous and conscientious in his work; but he was remiss in not exacting prompt and strict obedience to his orders, in notmore frequently visiting the old work- ( ings, and ho committed an error of ' iudgment in not insisting on safetylamps being used in the mino after the accident to the minor Kelly. 11. The inspection by tho workmen's inspectors was infrequent and: valueless. ' '

12. No inspection was made of bords Nos. 4, 5, and 6 of section ,5 (old workings) by any person on the morning of the accident, before the workmen woro permitted to enter. 13. The door at the end of bora No. 6 of suction 5, wlipre it connects with the working-part of the mine, was not locked, nor in any other way securely fastened. If there had been no neglect with respect to the matters mentioned in the two preceding paragraphs the disaster in the mino could not have happened. ' 14. This report contains suggestions for tho prevention., as far as possible, of similar accidents, and for the safe working of this and other mines m the future. ■ Before concluding our report wo would liko to place on record our high appreciation of tho prompt and spontaneous manner in which the attempted rescue of the men in the mino was made- by tho management and workmen, and of tho courage and resource displayed by all engaged in tho work. Wo' desire ■to express our appreciation of tho assistance rendered to us