WAR WITHOUT PLAN.

Manawatu Times, Volume XLVIII, Issue 3597, 1 April 1924, Page 5

WAR WITHOUT PLAN.

CfISDSL CIHPAiGH OF BRITISH CABINET. MORE LIGHT ON GALLIPOLI CRIME OP WINSTON CHURCHILL tßy Electric Cable—Copyright] [Aust and N.Z. Cablt Association.] LONDON, March 30. The. diaries and . memoirs of Admiral Lord Wester Wemyss, who was in command of the squadrons at Gallipoli in 1915, and First Sea Lord in 1917-19, are being published. Extracts from the papers have been made by the Australian Press Association, and the first section follows: f ‘ Lord Wemyss relates that he was summoned to the Admiralty on the 16th February, and told that an attack on the Dardanelles was impending, and he was to proceed to Lemnos immediately. Instructions would follow. His visit brought about a reconciliation with Lord Fisher, with whom he had quarrelled in 1908, when Lord Fisher suggested that Admiral Womyss should become subservient to the Naval Secretary. TURKS MISREPRESENTED. When he arrived at Malta, Admiral Limpus asserted that the Turks loathed Germany, and would not fight further once they felt the pressure of war. , Reaching Mudros on 24th February, he found that everything helpful was lacking. The outer forts of the Dardanelles had been bombarded but plans for comibned operations had not been disclosed, except that a brigade of marines was available to demolish the forts as soon as they were silenced. There was one bright spot—no instructions were received and he would ask for none, but would choosq his own way of salvation or damnation. The arrival of a battalion of Australians on 7th March had a beneficial moral effect on the Inhabitants. General BiJdwood arrived at Lomncs on March 1, and he then first learned that 40,000 troops were expected to assist, the manneh of their help depending on the result of the bombardment. , With General Birdwood, he interviewed Admiral Carden, who was tending to the view that the enemy's concealed guns and mobile batteries must be silenced before progress was

possible against the inner forts The intensive bombardment was discontinued on Bth March, when It was apparent that considerable military assistance was essential. Lord Wemyss proceeds that !he Australians were the most magnificent body of men he had ever seen. He thought the Canadians fine raw material, but these were finer. "They are wild, of course, but such pleasantlooking devils. They always seemed pleased to see me.” CONTRADICTORY ORDERS.

The deficiencies of the transport arrangements was another disclosure of the manner in which the campaign was planned.

Lord Wemyss also mentions that the orders from Home were contradictoi-y. He suggested that safety required the taking over of control of the whole of Lemnos, but the Admiralty did not reply, and left him chafing in ignorance, and never realising that actual plans ■were non-existent.

Sir lan Hamiltaon arrived on 17th of March.

General d’Armade, the French commander, favoured not touching the Dardanelles, but inarching on Constantinople. However, the operations against Asia Minor were banned fi'om London.

The loss, on ISth March, of the warships irresistible. Ocean, and Bouvet pointed to the impossibility of battleships forcing the Straits till the mines were cleared; and this was impossible till the guns were overcome, which meant that troops would have _ to seize the peninsula. The admirals and generals held a conference on 2 2nd March, and decided that combined action must be postponed till the plans were perfected.

BRICKS WITHOUT STRAW. LONDON, March 30. Lord Wemyss, In outlining the preparations for a combined expedition, says: "My heart goes out to the ancient Isaelites, who had to make bricks without straw. If you could imagine what famous authorities seem to expect of us out here! Good God, I have nothing.” He complains of amateur strategists and 'warriors, but with the return of Hamilton on April 10, plans matured more rapidly. His diary of April 23 ssya: ‘‘The scheme is audaciously bold. I think we have done all possible to help towards success, but the Home authorities seem to think it. is a picnic party for all the help they have given. Had we the troops to pour in after the first bombardment, the whole thing would have been finished in a very short time.” DOUBTS OF DIVISIONAL LEADERS In describing the landing, Lord Wemyss highly praises the commander of the Unwin, the originator and organiser of the River Clyde exploit, the heroism of which he declares, is unparalleled. The celerity and silence with which the Anzacs quitted the transports at Gaba Tepe is unstintedly commended. “No higher testimony to the efficiency and discipline of these untried troops is possible,” he says. Lord Wemyss throws light on an incident during the night of April 25, General Birdwood was urgently summoned ashore, from which he sent a letter saying the Divisional Generals did not think it possible to maintain their positions. If the troops had to be j-e-embarked, the sooner the better.

Lord Wemyss realised hat such a step would be disastrous. He went ashore and * urged General Birdwood, with Sir lan Hamilton’s approval, to hold on at all costs till dawn, when isolated positions could be linked up and next morning the line established in a strong position.