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THE JAPANESE NAVAL PROGRAMME.

Tne Washington Conference does not appear to have finally settled the relative naval strength of the Signatory Powers, except in so far as capital ships are concerned. Cable messages received earlier in the month reported from Tokio, through New York, that the revised Japanese naval shipbuilding programme to start next year will provide lor—four 10,000-ton cruisers, four 7000-tou cruisers, twenty-four 1500-tou cruisers, and twenty-eight modern submarines. The cost of these additions to the Japanese Navy represents a gross expenditure of at least £35,000,000, and although no indication is given as to the period over which the now construction will be spread, Japan, with her greatly extended building facilities, is capable ot completing the programme thus outlined within three years. The restrictions laid down by the Washington naval agreement do not apply to cruisers or submarines, and it may he remembered that, while the British representatives urged that the submarine should be eliminated from naval warfare, France insisted upon her right to their unrestricted use. Discussing the position as it affects Australia and Now Zealand, and the British South Pacific possessions, • a writer in the Sydney Morning Herald points out that the effect of the Washington Treaty has been to lessen considerably the competition in capital ships, hut it has made the cruiser and the light cruiser factors of increased importance. In the late war the issue at sea finally resolved itself into a struggle on the Allied side to maintain merchant shipping, and there is no reason to suppose that any future war will be fought out on different lines. In the Pacific at any rate, the first attack would ho made (as in 1914) upon trading vessels. In the narrow seas this would he maintained by way of blockade ; in the wider oceans it would mean commerce-raiding on the trade routes. It was (the Herald writer says) pointed out at the time that, while full license in submarine construction remained, competition in cruiser building was inevitable, and this competition has now been opened by Japan in the Pacific. The four 10,000toimors, mounting Sin. guns, are designed up to the extreme limit imposed under the Washington agreement, and will make the strongest light-cruiser squadron in the world, but it is the twenty-four 1500-ton cruisers which the Herald writer regards with the gravest concern, since they mark a radical departure in naval construction, and are most likely designed for commerce raiding, and they can only bo met in Hie opinion of Australian naval experts, by the Empire (Australia and New Zealand contributing) maintaining adequate light cruiser strength in Pacific waters.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/MS19220626.2.12

Bibliographic details

Manawatu Standard, Volume XLIII, Issue 433, 26 June 1922, Page 4

Word Count
433

THE JAPANESE NAVAL PROGRAMME. Manawatu Standard, Volume XLIII, Issue 433, 26 June 1922, Page 4

THE JAPANESE NAVAL PROGRAMME. Manawatu Standard, Volume XLIII, Issue 433, 26 June 1922, Page 4

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