DEFENCES OF TUNISIA

Lake Wakatip Mail, Issue 4433, 12 September 1939, Page 4

DEFENCES OF TUNISIA

FRANCE'S WORK FOR CIVILISATION

The strategic importance of Tunisia lies in the fact that if it came into Italy’s possession it would enable that country to dominate the Central Mediterranean, The possession of Tunis would lock the Mediterranean at its narrowest point by giving Italy the line Sicily-Pantellaria-Tunis. Given such a position Italy would dominate the French North-south and the British East-west Mediterranean routes. The absence of any signs of trench lines and defensive positions seem to indicate that Italy is not considering any defensive plan. The base for the French defence in this region is the little town of Gabes, nearly 200 kilometres from the frontier. Here, side by side with the native oasis, has grown up a little European centre of a couple of thousand inhabitants, apart from the troops stationed there. One may look out the windows of the Hotel Atlantique, where trim French officers and their smartly-dressed wives and daughters sit, on to the miserable collection of huts which form the native village barely a quarter of a mile distant. These huts form perhaps the most squalid dwellings which may bo found anywhere on earth. Little one-room erections only a few feet square and built entirely of palm, they stand not more than sft high. In front of most of them an Arab woman crouches before a tiny fire of sticks, while gaunt, halfnaked children play in the dus t t around her. The whole compound is surrounded by a palisade of palms, giving it a strangely isolated appearance. LIKE TYPICAL FRENCH TOWN. Half a mile away, the main street of Gabes might be that of any small provincial town in the Auvergne or Uauphine, apart from the number of troops that one sees. For Gabes is essentially a military base. Hero one may see among the troops who pass up and down the street the round coal-black babylike faces of the Senegalese, all the varying features of Berber and Arab, and the clear-cut physiognomy of the Frenchman. At the little port day after day there is an unostentatious unloading of barbed wire, entrenching tools, and pit props for dug-outs. One may also see lorries arrive down the road from Tunis laden with machine gun parts. In advance of Gabes lies the main French defensive positions. A wise precaution leaves an area of from 15 to 20 kilometres between the frontier posts on either side. This avoids any danger of frontier incidents in this barren and desert region, though attacks by brigands on individual travellers are not uncommon in this -no man’s land which is no one’s business to police. Turning to the south, what are the prospects of success for a movement from Libya through the Northern Sahara? French Algerian Sahara is divided, militarily and administratively, into four areas. From west to east: Ain Sefra, Ghardaia, Touggourt, and Oasis. It is the last of these that would have to face the first Italian attack. Here the French lines of defence cover the two roads which run from north to south, the former from Ouarglia to Fort Flatters, Fort Polignac and Djado, at an average distance of from 150 to 200 kilometres from the frontier; the latter from Ouarglia to Im Salah. Tamanrasset and Agades;- a full 200 kilometres further back. These roads follow the course of French penetration of the Sahara during the closing years of the past and the opening years of the present century. Communication from west to east is extremely poor. The difficulties of an Italian advance in this region are obvious. It must pivot on its right wing and swing its left through barren, desert country and across the line which the chief roads take. NATIVES BACK FRENCH, This left flank would, of necessity, be “ in the air ” in military parlance, and would be subject to attack from the Touarreg and other nomad tribes in alliance with the French. The distances to be covered would be very great, the communications totally inadequate to the task. Moreover, the lack of adequate roads on the Libyan side of the frontier would in any case put this venture out of the question. In the event of trouble, would the native tribes of the Sahara region engage willingly on behalf of the French ? There can be no doubt that they would. Whatever criticisms may be offered of French rule the traveller in this part of the world is far more conscious of benefits conferred than of foreign authority unwillingly borne. He marvels less' at what has been done than at the conquests achieved over Nature in a period of effective occupation of less than 40 years. In the words of a French officer at Ouarglia, “ France has brought one great benefit to the native tribes which they fully appreciate —security. Out of this arise four more needs which she is engaged in satisfying: Communications water, medicine, and towns.” Motor roads in Northern Sahara all date from the past 25 years, the two great roads from Ouarglia to the south, the route from Algiers to Lake Chad. Essentially strategic in aim, they have yet gone far to bring the solid benefits of civilisation to the poverty-stricken villages of this country. The problem of irrigation is being tackled with resolution, wells are being sunk, and as a result the planting of corn and fruit trees and a great increase in the date crop is now possible. It is not usually realised that large areas marked as “ desert ” on the atlases do, as a matter of fact, produce a good deal of riorn. The large Hoggar area in the Southern Oasis, for instance now grows enouo-h corn to feed itself. In fact, the picture of the desert that remains most vividly in the thought after journeys of some hundreds of miles in this neighbourhood is less one of undulating sands than of a faded and stubbly green. WHAT THE FRENCH HAVE DONE. The French have in the past 10 years enormously developed the bah a ran towns. Round the military posts have grown up little towns on the approved French model, broad tree-lined boulevards. schools, shops, cafes. A journey of a few hundred kilometres by autobus along one of the Saliai'an roads will show the traveller these towns in almost every stage of development. Perhaps the most interesting is Ouarglia, whore Colonel Carbillct, the commandant, who may well come to achieve for his work in the Sahara the reputation which General Lyantey won in

Morocco, has personally supervised the detailed planning of the town. Spaciousness _is to be its characteristic. Everything seems designed to aiford a conscious contrast to the mean and huddled native village. The magnificent reservoir, the broad palm-lined Avenue Laperinc. the church, the two schools, the museum, all give it something of a metropolitan air. One feels that here is the beginning, and only the beginning, of a great civilising work. The traveller in these regions, be he Imperialist or not, cannot fail to be impressed by those evidences of the French “ mission civil isatrice.” He will certainly feel assured that the comparative histories of French and Italian colonisation in this part of the world, the increasing prosperity of the French Empire, the freedom from colour prejudices, and the scrupulous respect shown to native religious and tribal -customs, the steady flow of immigrants from Tripoli, and the significant decline of the native population in the latter colony, all make it exceedingly improbable that the native races would willingly accept, much less co-operate in bringing about, a change of regime.