“UNEASY OCEANS”

Lake Wakatip Mail, Issue 4432, 5 September 1939, Page 3

“UNEASY OCEANS”

PROBLEMS FACING BRITAIN HAVAL OFFICER LOOKS AT THE PACIFIC Lieutenant - commander Kenneth Edwards, R.N., is naval correspondent to the London ‘ Sunday Times ’ and in a book he has written on the compara tive strength of world navies, their individual strategies, and the problems of each possible sphere of naval activity. ‘ Uneasy Oceans ’is a good title and its contents provide food for thought, and, sometimes, mental mal de mer. He traces naval history since the Great War; the wise and statesmanlike naval Treaty of Washington signed in 1922 by war-weary pens; and the unwise and unstatesmanlike Treaty of London in 1930, that sowed the seed of the Tree of Appeasement and allowed Britain to lose her great naval strength which, in palmier days, could cope with any two-Power combination.

The Treaty of London, he contends, was instrumental in starting the naval armament race of to-day. The capital ship building holiday which commenced in 1930 and ended in 1936 left Britain with 15 ships, eleven of which were over age (30 years), the United States with 15 ships, seven being over age, and Japan with nine, only four of which were old vessels. The cruiser position was worse. In 1918, Britain had 109 At the London Conference the Admiralty claimed that 70 was the irreducible minimum consistent with peace-time requirements. Mr Ramsay M'Donald agreed to 50. Lieutenantcommander Edwards vigorously condemns this blatant case _of political opportunism. “ The Prime Minister who. only a few months before, had vigorously declared ' that the Navy is US.’ had subordinated it to idealism and political expediency.” TO FEED BRITAIN. Great Britain requires 150 ships_ a clay to feed her. The Merchant Service unsubsidised and uncared for by successive Governments suffered in numbers and in tonnage. In 1931 only seven small escort vessels were laid clown in the Royal naval dockyards. Mr Stanley Baldwin, too, smoked In's pipe of peace and kept his eyes shut to trends and developments abroad. In 1935, at the time of the Abyssinian crisis in the Mediterranean, all available destroyers were despatched to the danger zone. This effort left the Home Fleet with one obsolete desstroyer working as a tender to an aircraft carrier! During the September crisis of last year an anti-aircraft gun disappeared from the War Museum in London and reappeared mysteriously on a ship at sea. Such was the cost of planting seeds of the Treo of Appeasement and having beautiful thoughts and lovely ideals, honest and sincere, though they might be. PACIFIC PERIL. It is comforting now to be told that despite the reduction in size, the British Navy to-day is wonderfully efficient and well equipped with guns and ships It is comforting also to know that the menace of the submarine has

been reduced bj' effective modern defence devices. The author devotes several chapters to the respective strengths and strategies of the naval Powers. Certain details are interesting. Japanese warships are heavily gunned; on occasions they have been ‘over-gunned. The secondary armaments of certain Japanese battleships consist of 20 5.5 in guns, compared with the 12 sin of the American and the 12 Gin of the British Italy’s Gin gun cruisers are very fast, being capable of from 35 to 37 knots. The French have a submarine, the Surcouf, which has a displacement when on the surface of 2,880 tons. She carries a small seaplane in a water-tight hangar, and is armed with two 8m trims and 14 torpedo tubes. Russia, weak in other craft, had in November, 1938, 134 submarines and 30 building. She also has immense mine-laying capabilities. .

THE PACIFIC IN WAR TIME. Lieutenant-commander Edwards in part 3 of his book devotes himself to the probable eventualities of war in the Mediterranean, in the North Sea, in the Baltic and continues on to visualise a war between the United States and japan and possible results, and a war us waged between Great Britain and Japan and possible results. He finishes with a discourse upon an imagined world war between the triangle of Japan, Italy, and Germany and a possible combination of Powers contending against them. ... , , Ho is confident that Britain and her allies could cope with the threat in the Baltic, Mediterranean. North Sea, but in certain circumstances he is most discomforting about the ability of the British Fleet to deal with the threat in the Pacific Ocean; a drive south by the Japanese. Admittedly the Singapore base cutting across the communications of the south would be a deter-

rent, but the British ships available in the Pacific could not hope to deal with the Japanese fleet which might he brought against them. Nor could Singapore he relied upon to hold out for over against tbo full forep of in a Japanese navy. In event of attack the British Admiral in the Far East would realise that one of the first objectives of the Japanese would be the oil supplies of North Borneo. British submarines therefore, would operate in the Sulu Sea and off the north-west coast of Borneo. Singapore is the strategic kev to the whole Far East. The British Admiral would concentrate ■ Ins force there, using Ins submarines and mine layers to make the approaches as dangerous as possible for any Japanese We cannot expect Uncle Sam to be

deeply concerned with pulling British chestnuts out of fires. That America came into the Great War at all should ho a matter of surprise and of lasting o-ratitnde. There has been much foolish talk and much misunderstanding since 1918, but no docent-minded thinking Britisher can have any feeling other than a great depth of appreciation. There mav he a fire in the Pacific, and. if so, our chestnuts will ho in it. Will Undo Sam’s? . . , If Japan thought the British Empire too pro-occupied elsewhere, she would move south. Her first objective would he British North Borneo, for oil, and her second Malaya, for strategic purposes. Her third objective would be Australia, in order to provide space for

her population. She would be careful to avoid the Philippines in order not to disturb America. The Japanese Empire would then stretch from Kamchatka to New Zealand. Japan would dominate the Western Pacific. Australia and New Zealand would be occu pied by a prolific race, rendered ambitions' by a great sweep of success, and. what is more, working under wage conditions unacceptable to most other countries. U S. LOSS OF TRADE. America’s first batch of chestnuts would be economic ones. She would loso her trade with Australasia and Asia. In 1935 it amounted to almost a billion dollars. She would lose her world markets, and, more particularly those of South America, whore the European “ axis ” Powers arc, even now. penetrating commercially and politically. The commercial rivalry which would certainly spring up "between America and!the great Japanese Empire would soon assume proportions in which the United States would be fighting for its economic life. From that stage to actual war is a short step.

Thus America’s second hatch of chestnuts is defence, defence of a coastline ranging from 7deg north latitude to sodeg south latitude, against an enemy attacking from the shelter of the Pacific islands. Canada, too, mould have to be defended. The forecast of these dangers is logically and earnestly expressed, but it is difficult to appear altruistic towards the plight of Uncle Sam’s chestnuts when ours will be into the fire first. Put the threat is there, and it is directed towards the Pacific, and all the nations of its shores. “ It is no use hiding the weakness,” says the author. “It is there for every man to see.’