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NOTES ON THE WAR.

The latest communique to hand states that the Germans havo withdrawn to the north bank of tho Vcsle, and that Fismes has been occupied by the Americans. The French report adds that certain of the Allied light troops crossed the river and gained a footing on the northern bank- The inference, therefore, is that the Germans do not intend to hold the line of the Vcsle, but will retire to the Aisne. For this drastic movement two reasons may be given. The first is tho inadequacy of the supply lines across the Aisne- The river itself is liable to floods, so that temporary bridges are of small value, and permanent bridges are liable fo be wrecked by tho persistent attacks from tho air. The second reason i 3 that, although a lino in advance of tho Voslo would be strong in itself, it is already potentially turned from the Rheims flank, and would therefore be a constant source of anxiety. In view of its general advantages,' tho Germans might have been expected to prefer the line of the Vcsle to that of the Ancre, but they had the same choice in 1914. and 'fixed themselves on the beights north of the Aisne as being naturally the best defensive position. It would seem that their judgment has not altered, and that they have no mind to undertake the construction of an elaborate system of communications soutli of the Aisne.

There is a temptation to infer from this movement that tho general policy of the Germans for the rest of the season is to bo one of defence, that they accept defeat in tho west and are preparing to establish themselves in strong lines, leaving the attack to the Allies. Such an inference, however, would be running ahead of the facts; though, as it happens, support for it might be found in other events reported to-day. On the front between Montdidie* and the sea the enemy is withdrawing from pronounced local salients and from unsatisfactory advanced positions. For many weeks past the Allies have been carrying out small local attacks, nibbling here and there and occasionally gathering in a substantial bag of prisoners. The capture of Villers-Breton-neux was a striking example of thi3 policy in action. It was followed by other local attacks in which the Germans were driven from the high ground between the town and tho Somme. Similar local attacks were undertaken north of the Somme. Tho Americans took a hand in.the game when they captured Cantigny, and the French continued it when they drove tho Germans out of Mailly and Aubvillers- Tho British have heen nibbling, too, on tho flanks of the German salient in Flanders, where Meteren and Merris havo been won back-

Broadly, it may be stated that an advanced position is of no tactical value to tho enemy unless it either fives bim direct observation of the Allied lines or wovides ground from which he may

attack a better tactical position. North of Montdidier the Germans havo just wisely evacuated a strip of wound west of the Avre. Tho Americans bit into their lines at Cahtigny. Then there was a long pause until the French gained Mailly and Aubvillers. This French advance left the enemy with two local saliente west of the Avre, and both of them havo now been evacuated. On the southern wing it looks a 3 if the French had advanced further than the enemy intended, and the result may be the forced evacuation of Montdidier. The town is on rising ground beyond the Don, but it is too close to the French guns now to bo comfortable, and it is quite likely that tho Germans will shortly elect to flatten out the anglo of their lino at this point.

The withdrawal of the Germans west of the Ancro is not explained wholly by the operations of the immediately, north of tho Somme, though in all probability those operations had rendered the enemy's hold, especially on the southern flank, rather precarious. Mr Phillips, in a dispatch written nearly a month ago, stated that the let of tho Second Gorman Army in the Ancre valley was very uneuviable. Above Albert repeated attempts to climb out of the river valley had be-en frustrated, and south of Albert tho enemy wa3 harrassed by the persistent attacks of the Australians. Some of the roads were so swept by shell firo that aeroplanes had to bo used to supply the enemy's advanced positions. At present the enemy's movement amounts to no more than a necessary rectification of an irregular front. His advanced positions were retained so long as there was a risibility of a new offensive to v. ..rds Amiens, but the inference to be drawn now is obviously that the Germans plan to consolidate a strong defensive line and, during the period of preparation for larger movements, to.deprive the British of the incentive to organise local attacks. Thus the movements on the Anero EA<3 the Avre were clearly ordered as part of a general policy.

If the enemv proposes now to entrench himself and organise an elaborate system of defences he will find his big salient between the O'isc and Arras anything but comfortable. It exposes two long flanks to attack and tho angle is more acute, and therefore more dangerous than was the case in 1916. Unless the Germans are planning to continue the offensive they will be in no mood to attempt the permanent defenco of their existing front, and indeed it may be predicted that once they definitely accept tho failure of their offensive plans they will begin to look back on the relative security of the Hindenburg lino. Here again, of course, speculation is liable to run far ahead of events, and it would bo absurd to build any big conclusions on the evidence of a couple of strictly local, incidents for which a perfectly adequate local explanation is available. It is highly probable that the enemy will have to hold his hand for another month. Tho defeat he suffered south of tho Aisne has compelled him to make drastic readjustments which are still incomplete, and when they are complete he will certainly have other troubles on his hands, because General Foch will not now stand idle watohing developments. But the end of this month may find the Germans preparing for still i another attempt to obtain a decision, though apparently the authorities do not now regard that aa probable.

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/LT19180806.2.23

Bibliographic details

Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVII, Issue 17861, 6 August 1918, Page 4

Word Count
1,081

NOTES ON THE WAR. Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVII, Issue 17861, 6 August 1918, Page 4

NOTES ON THE WAR. Lyttelton Times, Volume CXVII, Issue 17861, 6 August 1918, Page 4

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