AN EXPERT'S FORECAST.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CXV, Issue 16665, 25 September 1914, Page 8

AN EXPERT'S FORECAST.

ADMIRAL MAHAN AND THE WAR

COURSE OF THE NAVAL OPERA-

TIONS

Iu a highly important interview (wrote the New York correspondent of the London "Times" on August 3), Rear-Admiral Mahan declared that England must at once throw her preponderating fleet against Germany for tho one chief purpose of maintaining her own position as a world Power. For England, Admiral Mahan said, it was a question, if she remained out of the war, of sacrificing her Empire in the next generation to the interest of this generation. The Admiral regards the present war as one of calculated aggressiveness by Germany and as an inexcusable act. He ventured the opinion that the absence of the German Emperor from Berlin at tho time of the Austro-Hungarian ultimatum to Servia was an act cleverly designed to deceive.

"The aggressive insolence of Aus-tria-Hungary's ultimatum to Servia, taken with the concession by the latter of all the demands except those which were too humiliating for their national self-respect, indicate that the real cause of the war is other than that set forth by the ultimatum," proceeded Admiral Mahan. " Knowing from past experience how the matter must be viewed by Russia, it is incredible that Austria would. have ventured on the ultimatum unless she was assured beforehand of the consent of Germany to it. The inference is irresistible that tho substance of the ultimatum was the pretext for a war already determined on as soon as a plausible occasion offered. The cause 'of this pre-determinatiori is to be found in the growing strength of Russia on recovering from her war with Japan, together with the known deficiencies of the French armaments, which were recently admitted. _ The moment was auspicious for striking down France and Russia before they regained their full strength. "Great Britain, as the third member of the Entente, finds herself in the position of Prussia in 1805, when she permitted Napoleon to strike down Austria unaided and was herself struck down the following year at Jena, or in that of France in 1866, when she stood by while Prussia crushed _ Austria and was herself overwhelmed in 1870. Germany's procedure is to overwhelm at once by concentrated preparation and impetuous momentum. If she fails in this she is less able to sustain any prolonged aggression, as was indicated in the Franco-Prussian War during and after the siege of Paris. " In my judgment a right appreciation of the situation should determine Great Britain to declare war at once, otherwise her Entente engagements, whatever the letter, will be in spirit violated, and she will earn the entire distrust of all probable future allies.

"The Kiel Canal will undoubtedly be used in Germany's naval strategy, as affording access to the North and Baltic Seas. England cannot; as I have said, throw a preponderating fleet into both seas, and Germany's hope is to strike immediately. It is a question of existence for her. The stagnation of her carrying trade on the seas must threaten her very life, and the neutral shipping already taxed to its limits, cannot. bear the additional burden of supplying Germany. The suggestion that she might demonstrate with her fleet in the Baltic is untenable. The Russian fleet, with onlv eight preDreadnoughts and no Dreadnoughts or battle-cruisers—however much of an absurdity that type may be—is negligible. Germany could achieve'nothing with her fleet in tho Baltic, for it is a principle of warfare that under modern conditions no nation can afford to waste her navy in operations against fortifications."

As to how far questions of science in naval warfare will be answered in this final test of all theories of war, Admiral Mahan said that the most important undoubtedly would be those of the increased efficiency of submarines and torpedoes and aircraft. " This question of the use and increased effectivity of the submarine is assuredly one of the most important to be tested in actual warfare. They had, of course, no opportunity in the Russo-Japanese war, but in the present confined theatre of operations they should be seen at their best. Ido not share Sir Percy Scott's views of the surpassing power of the submarine to the complote effacement of battleships. Torpedoes, as used in the Russo-Japanese war, were utilised chiefly to put the finish to a ship almost silenced already, by gun-fire, and for such purposes were effective, but torpedo boats are night craft; they cannot be effective in daylight against modern guns. Germany apparently does not place much faith in them. The mooted question of big guns will also be tested. For my own part, I have always believed that the volume of fire was the ; determining factor; the number of hits, and not single shots, is the most important element. I believe, however, all those things we shall soon know—perhaps any minute."