THE SLAVE AWAY CASE.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CXXII, Issue 15558, 7 March 1911, Page 4

THE SLAVE AWAY CASE.

JURY’S VERDICT UPHELD. The motion for a new trial in tho case of George Dean Greenwood v. John Hadlcr, in which damages were claimed for injury to a thoroughbred mare owned by tho plaintiff was dealt with bv Mr Justice Denniston yesterday morning. In giving judgment his Honor said that tho only matter of fact in dispute in the case was whether an inference drawn by the jury from the undisputed facts was warranted by the evidence. H*is Honor then detailed tho facts as brought out in evidence, and continuing said that he had directed the jury that the defendant being a trespasser and having done an admittedly negligent act in putting a horse in tho paddock occupied by strange mares, was liable for any consequences which might reasonably be expected to result from such an act. On the question of damages he had told them that he could not accept what was put to them by defendant’s counsel—that was that the damages were entirely in their hands, lie had directed them that the injury being tho loss of a specific chattel, the measure of damage was the selling value of the chattel at the time of the injury. But, as plaintiff, by his counsel, had offered to leave the matter entirely in their hands they could act on such offer. He had left the case to the jury generally without putting issues. The jury, on being sent for after a retirement of three hours, stated that they had agreed on two points, but could come to no agreement on the third. The points on which agreement had been arrived at were: (1) That a fracture had been caused, and (2) that such facture was the result of a kick caused by defendant's horse being the disturbing element in the paddock. The jury had informed his Honor that the third point was tho amount of damages, and his Honor had repeated his direction on that point, and shortly after the jury came in with the same finding, with the addition of a third : “ Damages £100.” His Honor had said that he thought that that amounted to a verdict for _ the plaintiff, and had discharged the jury, but adjourned tho case till the next morning for further consideration. On the motion for judgment on the findings defendant’s counsel had argued that there was no evidence to support the second finding. His Honor thought there was clearly such evidence. Tliero was evidence that the existence of a fracture proved considerable violence, and that a fracture could not have been caused by the only other cause suggested. The findings must be read with tho evidence. Tho jury had been, evidently, satisfied of tho negligence of tho defendant, and that injury would not have occurred but for such negligence. They had not been able to decido whether the kick was inflicted by tbe defendant’s horse or by one of the plaintiff’s mares. In his opinion the evidence pointed, strongly, almost conclusively. to tho former, but it was sufficient if it. was done by one of the other animals during the horse-plav which all witnesses said would a priori be the probable result of the introduction of the horse as a disturbing element. The gist of the plaintiff’s case was the injury of his mare bv a kick, tho result of the negligence of tho defendant putting his horse into the paddock. All these

elements had been found by the jury. If the statement of claim had averred that the injury was caused by a kick either of the horse of the defendant or a marc of the plaintiff, he could not imagine that a word of the evidence would have been altered or a tittle of additional evidence tendered. He had said, before discharging the jury, that he would he prepared to allow any amendment necessary to make tho statement of claim agree with the evidence and the findings, and this must ho considered as done. The unsoundness of the defendant’s contention was shown by the fact that it was argued for him that, as the jury had by their findings shown that they were not satisfied that the plaintiff had proved it was the defendant’s horse that delivered tho kick, the defendant was entitled to judgment although they had found the gist of tho plaintiff’s case to tic in Ins favour. Such a conclusion would be inconsistent with the modern practice of tho Court and a reproach on its procedure. Judgment would be for the plaintiff for the amount of verdict, with costs as per 6calc, disbursements and expenses of witnesses. Ho had already certified provisionally for a special jury and £5 5s for second counsel.

At the hearing Mr Beswick, with him Mr Gresson, appeared for the plaintiff and Mr T. G. Russell for the defendant.