INTERNATIONAL “PERILS”

Lyttelton Times, Volume CXIV, Issue 13947, 2 January 1906, Page 2

INTERNATIONAL “PERILS”

(Stvicvi of Botnstrs.) A writer in “ Blackwood’s Magazine” discourses on the subject of the various “perils”, of which, we have of late heard so much—the Yellow Peril, the Anglo-Saxon Peril and the Tartar Peril, more inexactly the Russian Peril. It is to the last-named that ho devotes most of his remarks. THE TAKTAU PERIL. Napoleon I. and Bismarck, he reminds us, both feared it; and M. de , Witte has just shown his hand says' the writer, by declaring to a correspondent of the “ Matin ” that the best remedy for Russian internal troubles is a foreign war in pursuit of Russia’s “ historical destiny,” which “ Blackwood ” interprets to mean aggression in the Near East or on the Indian frontier. Ho admittedly considers the Russians as Asiatics, “ with a veneer of civilisation among the very limited educated class.” He bases his dread of the Tartar Peril chiefly on the immense numerical superiority of Russia’s armed forces—6,ooo,ooo soldiers, an overwhelming force as compared with that of any other European Power. But it by no means represents Russia’s resources during a prolonged war, still lees does it represent her total resources after a few years’ undisturbed domination in her Asiatic territories. Moreover, the withdrawal of a large proportion of the male population from ; the ordinary pursuits in Russia would disorganise her internal economy much less than would be the case in other European countries. From her Asiatic possessions, when once assimilated, she will be able to add, the writer calculates, another couple of million to her army. And the whole experience of the war just ended shows that final supremacy must rest with the big battalions—not the inference always drawn, but the writer argues that if the loss of the victors be only one-third that of the vanquished, and the victors could not promptly replace their losses, while the vanquished could draw on almost inexhaustible reserves, then the big battalions must in the end .win. Ho conjures up a fearful picture of Europe overrun by a vast host of Russians, aooompanied by “ hordes of marauders from Central and Northern Asia,” all under the Russian standard, and, though half-savage, yet well generalled, and therefore far more formidable than their predecessors. No European Power could invade Russia; she has too bad a climate, and her economic development is too backward. But these Russo-Asiatic hordes, if not . arrested on the frontier, would soon disorganise and demoralise any civilised State in Europe. ’ ’ THE YELLOW PERIL. The Yellow Peril, except from an economic point of view, the writer does not regard as serious. But he does think Chinese and Japanese cheap labour, combined with these nations’ marvellous manual dexterity and training of the eye, might be turned to commercial account in such a way as to become a serious danger to European and American industries. From . certain-points of view the Yellow Peril becomes a political German Peril, a gentle hint to somebody to/'pull the German chestnut of Shantung out of the fire, for the writer does not know, how, unless the status quo be guaranteed. by the new Anglo-Japanese treaty, Germany can retain Shantung, except at Japan’s pleasure. THE ANGLO-SAXON PERIL. As for the Anglo-Saxon Peril, "recently advertised by the Berlin dealer# in ‘ perils,’ ” he does not see what it can mean. A Customs Union of the British Empire and the United State* would be, indeed, an Anglo-Saxon Peril for Germany; but of that, at present, there is no chance.