WAR NOTES FROM LONDON.

Lyttelton Times, Volume CVI, Issue 12589, 26 August 1901, Page 3

WAR NOTES FROM LONDON.

THE END OF THE WAR IN SIGHT. [From Our Special Correspondent.] _ LONDON, July 19. The news from South Africa this week has been somewhatgrateful ami comforting.” The capture of the papers of Mr Steyn’s peripatetic “ Government,” at Reitz, by General EroadWoo'd, throws a brilliant light on the recent military situation, and the fact that Lord Kitchener has intimated that ho can dispense with the majority of his infantry and artillery and a goodly portion of his cavalry of the line is evidence that he himself now considers that all organised opposition is a thing of the past, and that the future operations will consist of hunting small groups of oanditti. For the swift extinction of these irreconcilable foes it is necessary that Lord Kitcheners hands should be strengthened by the immediate addition to his forces of ten or twenty thousand mounted riflemen. The men are to his iordriiip’s hand, for out of tire infantry of the line he is going to discard there’could be picked without much difficulty some ten thousand! men to whom the transformation from a foot soldier to a mounted rifleman would be an easy step. Surely infantry men who can. ride a bit, shoot well and have had experience of the wily Boer .and his country would) come quicker to hand as effective mounted infantry than the raw volunteer? But, ,of course, the authorities will nob re-info-rce Lord Kitchener from such a source. They will scour the country (they are now doing so) to supply ids' lordship’s demand for mounted men and the samples of recruits we see daily in our streets suggest that Lord Kitchener's latest reinforcements will require a considerbale period of probation before they can be trusted to “run about and bite on their own ”; which is essentially what the policeman-soldier must be able to do in South Africa. Of the letters which Lord Kitchener has cabled Home the first from Mr Reitz to Mr Steyn was written on May 10, and informs Mr Steyn that Commandant Botha and'the leaders of the Transvaal Boers had met; tha t they found their men continually surrendering and their ammunition almost exhausted, and that they had the near prospect of being unable to feed their commandos. They saw a further prospect that they would be crashed and that the Burghers would blame them and be ready to become loyal British subjects. Accordingly, they proposed to ask for permission to «end a message to Mr Kruger, and failing that, to ask for an armistice to obtain the opinion of the Transvaal and Orange River Burghers “of future policy.” Mr Steyn’s reply, written five days later, describes Mr Reitz’s communication ais a “ great blow.” He sees no reason to suppose that an armistice- such as was proposed would be granted. His Burghers had been four months without cannon, and ammunition was scarce. He was for holding out in the hope of European intervention, and he pointed out as additional grounds of hope that Lord Milner was going nominally on leave, but really because he was not allowed a free hand. For these reasons Mr Steyn was against surrender. These letters show that as long ago as the middle of May the Boers in both colonies were in great difficulties, and saw little chance of continuing their resistance much longer. The Transvaal leaders, it will bo remembered, obtained permission to communicate both by messenger and by- telegraph with Mr Kruger. The letters show that they have in reserve the request for an armistice with a view to take a sort of plebiscite. Such an armistice—for which even Mr Steyn thinks they could not reasonably ash—■ would certainly not be granted by the British Government now. The letters show that if the so-called Governments are made an end of the resistance will more rapidly collapse. The letters give the clearest possible hints for the guidance of the British Government. The Boers of both colonies merely need to he pressed harder and they will surrender in. increasing numbers. This process must lead steadily to the ultimate goal—the abandonment of the straggle. But that is not all.. The Boer leaders are afraid that their people will feel that they have been misled, and will give their confidence to Great Britain. The general impression produced by aperusal of the two letters is, that instead of negotiation the quickest means of ending tire war would be to add ten thousand mounted men to the mounted forces available. This impression is strengthened by a telegram from Melbourne that in answer to inquiries from Queensland Lord Kitchener lias said that he would be glad cf more mounted men. In any case, the letters found at Reitz' give' an insight into the

situation of the Boers such as the public at Home has not yet had,and the authenticity of the documents can hardly doubted. A BAD BUSINESS.

THE SURPRISE OP VICTORIANS At . OLIFANT’S RIVER. A GRAPHIC NARRATIVE. The “Standard” correspondent supple* ments the extremely meagre details we re ceived by cable regarding the night sui* , prise of the Victorian, Mounted Rifles, near to the Groots, Oliiant’s River, between Bethel and Middleburg. Tim cable refer- ' ences to this bad business mad© no mention of the loss cl the two pom-poms which accompanied the force. The affair took - • place on the evening of Wednesday, June 12, Major Morris, R.A., who was in command, had with him about two hundred and fifty men, nearly all belonging to the -, Fourth Contingent of the Victorian. Mounted Rifles, and some thirty officers and men of the Royal Artillery, in charge of two , pom-poms. The -small fore© were detached by Colonel Beat-son to make a three days’ reconoaisan.ee. On the evening of June 12, it camped on a small rise above a spruit which runs into Olifant’s River. In the afternoon, numbers of Boers were seen to pass along theridg.es south of the column, but no additional precautions appear to - have been taken -when the small camp waff laid out for the night. At any; rate, 'only - four piquets of six men each were and these were seven hundred yards apart. As night fell, a. bank of mist came down to intensify the darkness outside the camp. Only on the west, on which side a veldt fire was licking up the dry grass and bringing the camp into relief, was there any opening in the gloom. The attack cam©' from the east, so that the camp and .everythingin It, from the recumbent forms of the tired Victorians to those of the few who, at the moment, were seated or standing about the fires built to ward off the intense cold of the night, were silhouetted from the . point of surprise. The attack was made between 9 p.m. and 10 p.m.. Making the attack from the east, the Boers had all the advantage; they could see ■everything, but could not themselves be seen. The pique\ : on the north-eastern and south-eastern corners being well out, could see the camp clearly by looking back, as the reflection from Hie grass fire had the same effect upo* their vision as it had upon that of - ht, Boers. But inside the view, on a line, neither of the piquets could see a few yards i away. The attacking Boers—who number- , ed, it is said, only one hundred and eighty out of a party of some five hundred, the balance being held in. reserve —made their approach in complete silence. Led by Commandant Muller, they crept' through between the piquets, and being still undiscovered, were actually withing twenty yards of the sleeping camp before they fired. When, they opened with a volley, the few men who had been about the dying camp fires were nearly all killed or wound-.-ed, and some of the sleepers in the lines j never Woke again. The crash of the volleying brought the camp into sudden commo- • tion, and amid the shouting of orders and the falling of men and horses, Victorians and Artillerymen maid© a rush to the pompoms, first- with the idea of turning them i on to the enemy, and then with the idea ol saving them. As fast; however, as the men got to the guns they were shot down —either killed or disabled. For half a,v , hour the brave Victorians withstood tin one-sided, attack, but fighting in the and each one a target, they had the greatest difficulty in locating 1 the Boers, who ... were hidden, in the mist. When-the Artillery captain in charge of the pom-poms was stretched out beside the guns, which he could not possibly have saved 1 , and it wa« clearly hopeless to prevent a disaster, ft party of Victorians took to a Kaffir kraal on the west of the camp, and holding back the enemy, made the issue doubtful for the moment. But, as a matter of fact, there was no hope from the first, .the surprise being absolutely complete, and the camp beiyg so unprepared that it was only the . instinct of battle which caused the colonials ; to shoot back and knock . over fourteen Boers-—seven killed) and seven wounded— v before they gave up their arms. The spoil to the Boers included some 250 rifles 1 , 15,000 rounds of ammunition, two pom-,, poms with 1000 rounds, all the horses ’ which weie -not disabled, and a certain quantity of foodstuffs. Altogether, with our casualties —-two officers and sixteen men. killed, and four officers and thirty-eight men wounded —it was a bad business.