BATTLE OF JUTLAND

King Country Chronicle, Volume XXVIII, Issue 4633, 8 December 1934, Page 2

BATTLE OF JUTLAND

NEW BOOK ON ACTION. BEATTY TRADUCED. .GENIUS OF JELLICOE. London, November 1. “The Riddle of Jutland” is the title of a book published to-day, of which the authors are Mr. Langhorne Gibson and Vice-Admiral J. E. T. Harper. The latter co-author was head of the board of officers who examined all the evidence in 1919 and produced the famous “Harper Record.” Admiral Beatty comes under criticism in that he obeyed “the impulse to rush into action,” and left the Fifth Battle Squadron “to make the best of their way after him,” and that, in spite of the fact that his guns could outrange those of Hip-

per’s squadron, he delayed opening fire and allowed Hipper to open fire first.

“The superior force placed in Admiral Beatty’s hands by Admiral Jellicoe had been granted opportunity to cut down the German battlecruisers when they were flung out alone, exposed and vulnerable. . .

The British Commander-in-Chief had foreseen the situation and provided "for it—-his provisions had been spurned. * Beatty, the tempestuous, had done what tlie enemy wished it to do—the Battle Cruiser Fleet, whose leader had dared to divide his strength to satisfy his thirst for battle, .had complied with every German hope and desire.”

Beatty Held to Blame.

“Hipper had reached security. Outnumbered, he had out-hit and outfought his adversary, and brought Beatty south within reach of the German main body. Hipper had lost

two destroyers, and in exchange had taken two of Britain’s battle-cruisers and crippled a British destroyer. The surviving' battle-cruisers had been fearfully battered, and had suffered far more damage than they had delivered.

“The defeat could not be dismissed as the fortune of war. True, the light had favoured Germany. But the principal factor had been Beatty’s neglect to concentrate his forces before going into action, a neglect made doubly acute by the failure of his battle-cruisers’ gunnery. The immediate presence of the Fifth Battle Squadron would have made the run to the south a British victory.”

A Slip of Paper.

A slip of paper was delivered to Admiral of the Fleet Lord Jellicoe as he was about to leave his office at the Admiralty on Christmas Eve, 1917.

“The Admiralty building was hush-

a typewriter clicked in

the anteroom outside the First Sea Lord’s office, preparing orders and dispatches for signature. When he had signed them Jellicoe would leave. He must be at his desk again in the morning.

“The typewriter stopped. He could hear the clerk push back his chair, cross the room, knock. ‘A note has just come for you, sir.’ “Jellicoe opened the envelope. Four or five lines lay on a sheet of paper within, over the name ‘Eric Geddes.’ ... On the authority

of the First Lord he was relieved from further duty as First Sea Lord.

Retired.”

With Jellicoe’s departure from the high command, say the authors, “the spark of genius vanished. Alone of all the commanders on either side who had been in high authoritative position when the war began, he was the only one whose record was distinguished by an unbroken triumph.

Unconcealed Bias,

According to Mr. W. H. Wilson, Naval Historian, writing in the Daily Mail, “systematic denigration of Lord Beatty greatly impairs the value of ‘The Riddle of Jutland.’ ” The authors cannot conceal their bias.” “In the account of Jutland insinuations against Lord Beatty are multiplied. One of the charges against him is that his signallers used flags, instead of searchlights, to make the signal at 2.32 p.m. for the Fifth Battle Squadron to alter course. The message was not taken in, owing to smoke from the ships’ funnels obscuring the flags, and the Fifth Battle Squadron turned away from Beatty. “But in actual fact the Fifth Battle Squadron had plenty of notice of Beatty’s intentions. At 2.25 p.m. he had signalled his destroyers, by flags, to get ready for a change of course. “At 2.30 he signalled by search-

light—and the signal was taken in the Barham, as it figures in her log—another warning.

“The authors praise the tactics of the battle fleet, but ignore the criticism of such a dispassionate witness as the Russian Captain Schoultz, the one foreign officer present with the British Battle Fleet.

“He has pointed out that the British formation.in one enormous line ahead was ‘too clumsy to enable the material superiority of the -.British in number of ships and calibre and number of heavy guns to be fully exploited.’ ” • The authors of the new volume affirm: “Jutland determined Germany’s future. Its effect was decisive and fateful, and influenced profoundly all the military and political events which came after it. History, in the most emphatic terms, gave the palm of victory to Jellicoe and Britain.”

Admiralty’s Mistake.

Speaking of contributory tragedies of the battle, the authors mention that the Lion —Beatty’s flagship—had lost the signals for challenge and reply. She asked the Princess Royal for them by flashing lamp. The Princess Royal replied and an enemy ship saw the signal—“the Germans had obtained a precious secret.” And the destroyer actions astern, seen by the Fifth Battle Squadron, were “not considered important enough to report to the Fleet Flagship.” The Malaya, in the rear, actually identified a German battleship, but the information was not passed to Jellicoe to warn him that he was drawing ahead of the enemy. The Admiralty had intercepted a message from Scheer asking for airship reconnaissance to meet him off Horn’s Reef, but “failed to grasp the enormous importance of transmitting it to Jellicoe without delay.” And when the Admiralty did signal a summary of intelligence it -failed to contain the most important fact of all—that Scheer was making for the Horn’s Reef Channel.

And so “the Battle of Jutland was over—but Scheer, aided by Fate, had saved the High Sea Fleet.”