DEFINITION OF ROAD

King Country Chronicle, Volume XXVI, Issue 3444, 12 November 1932, Page 5

DEFINITION OF ROAD

JUSTICES' DECISION. APPEAL ALLOWED. The reserved judgment of His Honour, Mr. Justice Smith in the appeal Wi Wallace, motor driver, Te Kuiti v. Constable Muir, was delivered in the Supreme Court, Hamilton, on the 10th instant. The appeal was from the decision of Messrs. Mostyn Innes-Jones and W. Stanley Cato, Justices of the Peace, who convicted the appellant, Wi Wallace, of a breach of Regulation 11 (13) of "The Motor Vehicle Regulations, 1928." In the course of a ten-page judgment His Honour, Mr. Justice Smith, in allowing the appeal said: — "This is an appeal on a point of law from, the decision of Justices convicting the appellant of a breach of the "right-hand rule" as expressed in Regulation 11, Clause 13 of the Regulations made under "The Motor Vehicles Act, 1924"—N.Z. Gazette, 1928, Volume 1, page 511. The point of law which is raised is that the appellant was not approaching an "intersection" within the meaning of that word in the regulation. The relevant facts are as follows: The Te Kuiti Borough Council is the owner in fee simple of a quarry situated in the Waitomo County. The entrance to the quarry is a strip of land leading from the Te Kuiti-Hangatiki main highway to the quarry. This strip is some fifty links wide and some 386 links long. The land comprising the quarry and the entrance constitutes one parcel of land and is contained in one certificate of title issued to the Borough Council. The findings of fact in the case show that this entrance strip is formed as a private road for a width of approximately ten feet eight inches; that this private road is used as a means of entrance to and exit from the quarry proper by motor-lorries and other vehicular traffic; and that it is also used at the sufferance of the Borough Council as a private road giving access to the properties of settlers residing beyond the quarry. In their able and careful written reasons for judgment the Justices thus describe the private road:— "We find that the road in question is not a public road, but is a private road running across property held in fee simple by the Te Kuiti Borough Council, and leading towards a quarry and thereafter to several settlers. "This road is open to the public. Its open condition is practically an invitation to the public to proceed along it, and, indeed, strangers might easily take it to be an ordinary public thoroughfare, there being nothing to distinguish it from any other side road. It is in, other words, ade facto road." "On June Bth last the appellant was emerging from 'he private road on to the main highway when a motor car upon the main highway, driven by one Bennett, was approaching on the appellant's right-hand side. The appellant stopped his lorry. When stopped, the lorry projected seven feet into the main highway which was 19ft. wide. A collision occurred between the motor car and the lorry. The Justices found that the driver of the motor car could have avoided the collision if he had been keeping a proper lookout, but they convicted the appellant of a breach of the "offside rule" as expressed in Regulation 11, Clause 13, and ordered him to pay the sum of ten shillings for costs." Regulation 11, Clause 13, is as follows: — Every driver of a motor vehicle when approaching any intersection, the traffic at which is not for the time being controlled by a police officer or traffic inspector, and to which any other vehicle (inclusive of trams) is approaching, so that if both continued on their course would be a possibility of collision, shall, if such vehicle (being other than a tram) is approaching from his right, or if such vehicle (being a tram) is approaching from any direction, give way to such other vehicle, and allow the same to pass before him, and if necessary for that purpose, stop his vehicle, and no driver of a motorvehicle shall increase the speed of his vehicle when approaching any intersection under the circumstances set out in this clause."

Mr. Mackersey, counsel for the appellant, contends that the intersection at which the collision occurred is not an "intersection" within the regulation. An "intersection" is defined" in the regulation as meaning the crossing of a road by any other road or by any railway or tramway at a level-crossing and includes the meeting of a road with any other road. Counsel for appellant also submits that the word "road" as used in the regulations can only mean a public road, over which the public has a right of passage, and that, therefore, "intersection" can only mean the crossing or meeting of one public road with another. In the present case the Borough Council's private road is simply a piece of private land, upon which the Council has formed a road of approximately ten feet eight inches in width. The Council does not control it as a public authority for the regulation of traffic in the public interest, but owns it and uses it as a private landowner. Although its land is used for the time being in the manner described in the case, the Council can close its land at any moment and erect a gate upon it as any private landowner may do. Under these circumstances, this bit of private land, though formed as a private road to the frontage of the public road, is not a "road" within the meaning of the Motor Vehicles Act or the regulations made thereunder and consequently cannot make an intersection as defined in the regulations. The socalled road is no more than an entrance on the private property leading from the public road to the quarry on the private property. The present appellant was not guilty of a breach of the off-side rule at an intersection as defined in the regulations and the appeal must be allowed. At the hearing of the appeal Mr, E. M. Mackersev appeared for the appellant, Wi Wallace, and Mr. H. T. Gillies for the respondent, Constable , Muir.