United States of Manchuria, Japanese Plan

Horowhenua Chronicle, 23 February 1932, Page 7

United States of Manchuria, Japanese Plan

TOKYO’S PROGRAMME FOR EXTENDING CONTROL OUTLINED.

The view was frequently expressed in September,' after the Japanese military had occupied the city of Mukden, that the army had taken matters into its own hands, and was acting contrary to the judgment and wishes of the Japanese civilian authorities. Some writers even hinted that the Japanese General Staff and the War Department were at odds over their Manchurian policy, v If this was true in September, it,was certainly not true in November and December. During those months the Japanese military and civilian authorities appeared to be working in economic harmony, and to be carrying out a plan carefully prepared long in advance, states the Mukden correspondent the Christian Science Monitor. After conversations with Japanese military and civilian leaders in Mukden during the first week of November, it did not require prophetic powers to set forth the programme which «he Japanese systematically carried out during the succeeding two months. The programme was to break up permanently the Chinese military organisation constructed during the years 1912-193-1 by Marshal Chang Tso-lin and hia son Marshal Chang Hsueh-liang, which the Japanese considered a menace to the prosperity of Manchuria; to occupy the stategic cities of Manchuria witfc small, compact Japanese forces, intended to act as police until Chinese police forces could be organised; to set up independent local Chinese Governments in Manchuria which might eventually be consolidated into a “United States of Manchuria”; to take over and operate as a single economic unit witn the Japanese-owned South Manchuria Railway the four Chinees railways built with Japanese loans which have never been repaid; and to consolidate and extend Japan’s economic interests in Manchuria independently of the railways.

Japanese View of Situation. By the end of November, the broad details of that programme had been substantially accomplished. It seems safe to predict that subsequent events in Manchuria will indicate merely an extension of that programme. Japan’s leaders, military and civilian, know what they want to do in Manchuria, and have proceeded as slowly as they have in deference to world opinion, and not because the Chinese have offered any serious obstacles. There is no doubt that the Japanese have already broken up permanently the Chinese military machine in Manchuria. The cost of this machine was enormous. The two Changs and their semi-independent satellites had swollen their armies until in 1931 they had about 400,000 men under arms. The city of Mukden had become a military factory. More than 25 per cent, of the population' subsisted directly on the military Government. The huge arsenal and trench mortar factory supplied arms and ammunition for this organisation. Clothing depots made all the army uniforms and soldiers’ equipment. With the exception of aeroplanes, the Mukden war lords needed to buy bottling more from abroad. The two Changs took great delight in their air force, and had bought in Europe and America more than 201) fighting planes. The weakness of this unwieldy and inefficient war machine is evidenced. by the fact that the Japanese, with the use of less than 20,000 soldiers, have broken it up so easily". Manchuria Needs no Army The Japanese brief against the Manfchurian war machine may; be put in a few words. In a conversation with a newspaper correspondent last November General Honjo, commander of the Kwantung army, declared: “The Chinese in Manchuria do not need an army. They need only a police force. For this purpose 20,000 well trained men would probably be sufficient. 1 ' He asked: “Whom did the Manchurian war lords expect to fight? They must have known that they could not face Japan or Soviet Russia. The Japanese Government has stated on several occasions that it will not permit another Chinese army to invade Manchuria.” The only motive behind this war machine, it was inferred, was the invasion of China proper, which the Japanese considered would be disastrous to the prosperity of Manchuria and China alike. The Japanese present convincing evidence that this huge war machine was not used successfully as a police force. Banditry had become steadily worse in Manchuria. Regular soldiers seldom moved against the professional bandit gangs, which harassed the railways and frequently looted cities and towns. During October and November the, Japanese military declared open war on the bandits, who had been reinforced by deserting Chinese soldiers, and in a few weeks, with the use of less than 20,000 Japanese soldiers, accomplished more toward breaking up these gangs .than the Manchurian war lord’s 400,000 men had done in the previous year.