THE H.B. TRIBUNE. FRIDAY, MAY 4, 1917 "AN ALLY OR HINDRANCE.”

Hawke's Bay Tribune, Volume VII, Issue 110, 4 May 1917, Page 4

THE H.B. TRIBUNE. FRIDAY, MAY 4, 1917 "AN ALLY OR HINDRANCE.”

“ But now, thank Heaven, we have ceased to be neutral. We have now at long last taken sides, and the side we have taken is the. side of democracy, of public faith, of all that makes for right dealing between nations. It is the side to which from the first the sentiments of the vast majority of the . American people have overwhelmingly inclined.” So Mr. George Harvey, the editor of the ‘"North American Review,” opens an article in which he discusses the question as to whether the United States is to be “an ally or a hindrance.’.’ At the time of his writing nothing more had been done than to break off diplomatic relations with Germany, and, while foreseeing that a state of war was an almost inevitable sequel, he first considers in what directions, during the interval, American resources could most profitably be employed for the benefit of all the Allies.' The turning point of. a formal breach with Germany having been rounded, some things were certain. One was that American diplomatic heckling of the Allies must cease. Questions of blockade, of the censorship of the mails, of the black list and of trade and property rights, could no longer be made the basis of representations by. the State Department. The admission is made that the Allied blockade of Germany. close as it may have been, would have been far closer and far more effective but for the anxious consideration which the British and French Governments had shown for American interests, and possibly for American good-will. The suggestion is offered that the State Department should now at length act as the British Government acted during the American Civil War. Although at the beginning of that war the naval forces of the North were manifestly and admittedly inadequate for the maintenance of a blockade as internationally defined, the British Government never once in any way questioned its validity, and accepted without discussion the novel but rational doctrine that ultimate destination, not the mere port of ostensible delivery, governed the right of interception and seizure. Beyond this, it is contended that the whole sphere of American financial resource should be thrown open to the Allies without restriction of any kind.

"‘But war, if war comes, will raise other and far more momentous questions than these, questions not of expediency but of fundamental policy. It will raise in particular the question whether the United States is to become an Ally among the Allies, or is to wage an independant war on her own account.” Then is discussed the question, which has recently been mentioned in our cables, as to whether America should subscribe to the compact entered into by the European Alliance not to make a separate peace. On this point Mr. Harvey is emphatic. ‘lt can hardly be imagined,” he says, ‘‘that we shall enter into any naval or military operations except in closest consultation with who for two and a half been shouldering the civilization’s struggle. that co-operation can we they and form of our the United States is boundin’ the same agreement as binds all the other Allies?” It is urgently insisted that there must be no coming in as a free lance, or pursuing undisclosed or indefinite aims, with a possibility of deciding at any moment that America had had enough of it. “In such case the United States might be more of a hindrance than a help.” Anticipating Marshal Joffre’s recent declaration in "Washington, the “North American” editor said two months ago that there was nothing that the French and British peoples would more heartily welcome than the appearance of an American division on the soil, of France. “They would welcome it not so much for its material assistance, but as a symbol of the brotherhood of democracy.” But here, and no matter to what numbers the American force might grow, it has to be remembered that it has to fight under the supreme direction not of an American commander, but under that of a French or British Commander-in-Chief, who must have some assurance that its strength will be maintained until the end of the war. “An. extraordinary emergency such as Washington had in contemplation has and we hope that there will be statesmanship enough at the capital to seize its rich opportunities. We hope that Mr. "Wilson, if arid when Congress is compelled to declare war on Germany, will let it be known that, just as the United (States can take an effective part in the war only by making its naval and military activities conform to the general scheme of Allied strategy, so the general policy of the United" States will be conducted hand in glove with the policy of the Allies. There is much that the United States can do for the Allies in providing them with funds and munitions, in keeping the sea lanes open, and in hunting out the submarine bases that Germany has undoubtedly established on this side of the Atlantic. But, in the necessities of the case, unless the war is prolonged beyond the present year, her main assist mce must be moral.

. . . . The best assistance she can at once render the Allies is to range herself unreservedly on their side, to send outworn political prejudices to the scrap heap,, and to declare that she enters the war as an ally among i Hies, prosecuting it in conjunction with them and binding herself to make no peace except by the consent of them all.”