THE H.B TRIBUN. WEDNESAY, OCT, 25, 1916. THE RUMANIAN CAMPAIGNS.

Hawke's Bay Tribune, Volume VI, Issue 265, 25 October 1916, Page 4

THE H.B TRIBUN. WEDNESAY, OCT, 25, 1916. THE RUMANIAN CAMPAIGNS.

I Rumania’s entry upon the war, whatever may prove to be its ultiI mate bearing in deciding the final I issues, cannot but be said to have furnished some initial dramatic | situations. Despite all that may now | be said and written by the diplomats and inspired journalists of I Germany to the contrary, the announcement of Rumania’s determination to take sides with the Entente (Powers manifestly came to the Teutonic Alliance as a most unexpected and unwelcome surprise. The furious storm of accusations of vile treachery, and threats of condign punishment, which it evoked on its first publication are proofs of this that no subsequent _ professions of complacent expectation can rebut. If corroboration were needed it is to be found in the marked success attending Rumania’s earliest military operations, for which both German.)' and Austria were plainly unprepared. Rumania, by her first thrust, succeeded in penetrating deep into Austrian territory, more especially in her Transylvanian province, whose population is largely of the Rumanian blood. Then came Mackensen’s rapid concentration of a composite Bulgarian, Austro-German and Turkish force upon Rumania’s Dobrudjan frontier south of the Danube, quickly followed by the spectacular capture of Turtukai (or Tutrakan) and Silistria, and the movement of his lines into dangerous proximity to the. only Dobrudjan railway of any importance. Russian reinforcements now appeared in the arena and we were told that Alackehsen, threatened also in the. rear by Rumanian forces which had crossed the Danube behind his lines, was in parlous plight aud liable to be the victim of a great catastrophe. In justification of this prediction the main Russo-Rumanian Army in this district did succeed in driving him back over a very substantial section of the ground over which his first advance had been made, and into what was described as a ‘‘terrain” almost impracticable for any successful recovery. But gradually we came to learn that the menace in his rear, on which so much of anticipatory hope had been based, resolved itself into a mere minor demonstration, the troops engaged in it retiring quickly across the river.

Then there came a comparative lull on the Dobrudja- front, such activity as was shown being represented as resulting favourably to our Allies. But then Falkenhayn’s counter-offensive in Southern Hungary began to assume definite shape and power, and the Rumanian retirement in this area commenced. Although the military critics, with the exception of a few of the more capable and cautious, had had nothing but a triumphant note to sing with regard to the Rumanian advance, they had now to reconsider the situation and discover that it had never been contemplated that Rumania would be able to maintain her gains in Hungary, and that her invasion was designed merely to induce the diversion of substantial forces from the main fronts and hold them on, or near, the border, keeping control of the passes crossing it. But Falkenhayn was not content to be held, and he—and his successor in command, if, in truth, he has been superseded—have aroused, in the popular mind at any rate, more of less grave apprehension with regard to the immunity of Rumania from an effective invasion from the north. Anxious attention being thus focussed on Rumania’s northern frontier, and doubtless Russo-Ru-manian troops hastened thither to meet the threatened incursion, Mackensen, previously represented as almost hopelessly involved, like a giant refreshed, suddenly marshals an apparently irresistible force and drives our friends across a railway whose retention we have been led to understand was of vital importance to their military operations, seizes the terminal port, and, according to some presuming to speak with the authority of knowledge, virtually pens up the Russo-Rumanian forces in a corner from which there are very inadequate means of escape, excepting, of course, by successful counter-attack. At the same time the cables, which yesterday gave us reason for thinking that the rein-forced-Rumanians were, at the worst, able to stay the northern invasion, sugeest overnight that Falkenhayn’s armies occupy commanding positions. To further complicate the confusion of successive impressions created by the miscellaneous news received from time to time, the German correspondent of an American newspaper, professing to be on the spot, seeks to emphasise the fact that the Rumanians in the north are suddenly displaying unexpected vigour in defence, thus materially slowing down Falkenhayn’s progress. Whether this last representation of the position is designed to enhance a hopedfor victorv, or to excuse an apprehended stoppage, it is, of course, impossible to say. It would obviously serve either purpose equally well. It will thus be seen that the Rumanian campaigns, brief and all as has been their duration up to the present, have provided us with, quite a sufficiency of thrills of varying character, and the prospects are all in favour of them supplying still further like sensations.

It is by no means in any pessimistic mood that we have entered upon this lengthy review of events fresh in the minds of moist readers, for we have no doubt whatever- as to the eventual result even in the particular theatre under notice, although further reverses may still await us there. But from the narration two morals may be drawn which it will tend to peace of mind to keep steadily in view. The first is that we should not lend too ready ear to the irresponsible conclusions and deductions of uninformed critics, who can, after all, base their surmises only upon such information and suggestions as the military authorities may deem it prudent to make known. Fortunately for us we may place fair confidence in the official news and forecasts which those in command on the main western and eastern fronts vouchsafe to us, and there is possibly no great harm in our permitting ourselves an indulgence in the little vanity of fancying we can read the portent of events. But, in truth, we can know but little of the inner strategy that dictates appar- ( ently isolated actions. Thus our guesses at it, and also the guesses of those who think they have some special call to make their guesses public, should be entertained as the mere passing guests of an overhospitable and, perhaps, not too well filled house, whose evanishment with light promises unredeemed will not disturb our serenity. But the more serious lesson to be learned is that, under German direction, our

enemies are still redoubtable foes, whose military exhaustion is as yet far from accomplished. The advantage of central position and of exceptionally efficient, means of transport may account for much in the way of the enemy’s capacity for concentration at. selected points. But this is one of the few unwasting advantages that will remain with him in the. main theatres until the end, and does not wholly explain whence these sudden concentrations are drawn. It is best for us to assume that Germany, in aer own and her Allies’ populations, bars still considerable human reserves upon which to draw, and that the process of their reduction to the point of submission may be a long one. This process can be made surely effective only by our keeping up to full strength the forces of disintegration to play upon them.