Hawke's Bay Herald. TUESDAY, OCTOBER 14, 1902. THE WAR OF THE FUTURE.

Hawke's Bay Herald, Volume XXXVII, Issue 12267, 14 October 1902, Page 2

Hawke's Bay Herald. TUESDAY, OCTOBER 14, 1902 . THE WAR OF THE FUTURE.

Some time ago we referred to the extraordinary difference in the views entertained by military men with established reputations as to the lessons which wore to be drawn from the experiences of the South African war. While some experts were of opinion that the whole science of war was revolutionised, others appeared to think that little change would be effected in the case of a war conducted under such conditions as obtain in Europe. We referred to a discussion of the question by Lieutenant - Colonel Maude, who maintained that in the future, as now, the line would be the decisive factor in winning a victory, and that, on that point at all events, England was able to give a lesson to her Continental rivals. This was n comfortable doctrine, but it was, perhaps, rather too much like a defence of established rules by an officer who has been largely occupied in instilling these into generations of military students,

The latest, and in some respects the most remarkable study of the fouth African war is that which appeared lately in the Itmio des Deux Mondes, the famous Erench magazine, and which is understood to be from the pen of General Negrier, one of the foremost authorities on military subjects in Erance. The article has been translated in the last number of the Contemporary Review, and is now available for English students. It is quite the most fascinating account of fighting under modern conditions that we have met with. Although the general was not an eye-witness of the campaign he relies largely on the accounts of the Erench attaches, and quotes largely from them. The conclusions at which he anives are especially interesting, because, as our readers will remember, the Erench authorities made absolutely no change in the conduct of the autumn manceuvres. They stick fast by the old conventions, with the result that the English experts who witnessed them, and who had the experience of South Africa in their minds, had little doubt that troops led in that fashion would meet with disaster.

If the general staff of the French army thinks that no modification of the old system is necessary, General Negrier is not of that opinion- In the article in question that officer has developed and formulated his views so concisely as to enable the layman to grasp readily the necessity of a complete transformation of the methods of attack and defence, which only five years ago were deemed by the highest authorities in France, Germany, and Great Britain to fulfil the most up-to-date requirements of military science, but which are to-day obsolete. General Negrier appears to admit that the English officers and men very quickly adapted themselves to new conditions. The first brush with the Boer forces took place early in November, 1899. By the middle of December the British forces had been checked at Colenso, at Stormberg, and at Magersfontein. But from that moment the old methods were abandoned and for the remainder of the campaign the British forces were practising the lessons which they had learnt from the Boers in the first few encounters. There is no question that every other European army would have gone into the campaign on exactly the .'same lines as we did. It may be doubted whether any would have realised so speedily the necessity for a change. General Negrier gives unqualified praise to the courage of the British officers and men. It is pleasant to read his enthusiastic references to their coolness in danger. In particular he refers to the magnificent work of the artillery, which, in the words of an attache whom he quotes, behaved on the field of war as if they were on parade. General Negrier, like General de Gallifiet, General Brugere, and, indeed, the leading military authorities in France, ad, mita that, in spite of their administrative shortcomings, the British War Office and the British Admiralty have nevertheless accomplished the feat unprecedented in history of transporting a fully equipped army of two hundred thousand men across the sea and maintaining it for over two years on a field of operations six thousand miles from home. This achievement is now fully appreciated in Faria, where the difficult transportation of General Duchesne’s expedition to Madagascar and back again was performed with unsatisfactory results, and also in Berlin, where it is now admitted that there were many hitches and faults disclosed by the transportation of Field-Marshal von Waldersee’s expedition to China and back. The tactical lessons of the war are considered by General Negrier to be of vast importance. In his opinion there are eight axioms of tactical evolution that have become altogether obsolete, and must be erased from the books of instruction. The South African wap has proved the fallacy (1) of moving troops in column within the fire zone of the enemy, (2) of the attack in front, (3) of all movements of cavalry in masses, (I) of the present system of reconnaissance even when performed by small groups of cavalrymen, (5) of artillery shell fire upon sheltered or concealed positions, (6) of the classical artillery duel hitherto considered as the necessary condition precedent to all battles, (7) of infantrymen firing in any other position than that of concealment or lying flat, and (8) of the concentration and massing of artillery batteries, Even more important than these matters, however, is the proof that in the future the morale of the soldier will count fop so much more than in the past, It will, in fact, be everything. General Negrier points out that the tension to which the soldier is subjected is sucb that after a few hours of fighting men become absolutely worn out and incapable even of pursuing a flying enemy. The battle of the future will be in the hands of the individual to an extent which Fas been unknown since the introduction of gunpowder. Smokeless powder has made the skirmish line the culminating issue of the battle, wherein each individual unit has its value, and this General Negrier affirms will give the intelligence and good marksmanship of the active little French infantryman great advantage over his more cumbersome European competitors, In short, the conclusions of General Negrier are that the individual qualities of the soldier are of far greater importance now than ever before, and that the fighting strength of nations is not so much in the great number of men under arms as in the moral and physical qualities of the individual, backed

up by ability to bit a buU’n-eye at a thousand yards distance.