JAPAN’S NEW STRATEGY

Grey River Argus, 2 July 1945, Page 5

JAPAN’S NEW STRATEGY

STANDRN NORTHERN f 'CHINA Reason for Withdrawal ’ • •; '• (Rec. 7.30) NEW YORK, June 30. Mr Walter Rundle, United . Press Agency manager "fpjr China, stated: The Japanese on the Asiatic mainland are now writing off nearly half their territorial gainp in China in favour of new strategy and the bitter last-ditch defence in North China, Manchuria and Korea. Chinese and American sources in China see in the present large-scale Japanese withdrawals from south and south-east China, which began soon after the American landings on the Ryukyus, an indication that Japan hopes to make the war so long and so costly in her northern fortress of Asia that the Allies will be ready to agree to terms short of an unconditional surrender. Reports reaching Chungking from occupied territory tell. of feverish Japanese preparations, and' also defences comparable to those on Iwojima and Okinawa, at strategic coastal points, and also along the main communications routes of north China, Manchuria and Korea. Several enemy divisions are known to have been drained from south China and the south-east China coast to man ttyese hew defences. The Japanese ablut-face exjlains the recent d’evelopfrnents in the China war. Neither Chinese nor American advisers would seriously pretend that the Japanese withdrawals, which have enabled Chinese forces to reoccupy Liuchow, Kweilin or coastal ports, such as Foochow and Wenchow, represent genuine Chinese victories, or the opening of a Chinese •counter-offensive. It will take months of American effort to train and equip China’s badly battered and demoralised army before it will be able to seize ’the initiative on the Asiatic mainland. But no time is being wasted in capitalising on the withdrawals. Japan’s decision to abandon most of south and south-east China has been prompted by two simultaneous developments—American landings on Okinawa directly threatening the Japanese homeland, and a Japanese defeat in Hunan and Honan provinces, where the enemy early in the spring sought a cheap, easy victory, which would have deprived our Fourteenth Air Force most of its remaining forward bases, and would have established a protective zone three hundred miles west of the Japanese trans-China corridor, and also would have crippled the new American training programme. With American strategical advice and planning and close American air support, China committed some of her best trained and bestled troops in Hunan, and, at the cost of heavy casualties, convinced the Japanese that their planned campaign in China would cost more than Japan was ready to pay. Well-in-formed Allied sources feel that too much importance is being given to the Chinese recovery of the abandoned coastal area facing Okinawa. Foochow and Wenchow are not large ports of a type needed for a major invasion attempt. They are hemmed in by mountains, and are connected with the interior by few and poor mountain roads. They do not offer access to China’s all important waterways. The Japanese realised the relatives unimportance of such ports and also of Swatow and Amoy. Accordingly, they withdrew.