WAR ECONOMY

Grey River Argus, 8 November 1939, Page 8

WAR ECONOMY

Comparison of Powers (By Bernard Keeling) As regards foodstuffs, the complete dependence of the United Kingdom on outside supplies is well-known. Two-thirds of Britain’s total food supply'—and even more of her wheat — must be imported, a fact of which she has been unpleasantly' reminded by the recent heavy increase of ihe German submarine fleet. No other Power’s pos'tion is even remoleiy comparable. Germany need only import onefifth of her food, and South-Eastern Europe should supply her with any deficiencies in cereals and wheat. It should, however, be remembered that Germany must import about 50 per cent, of her supply of fats; and the incapacity of South-Eastern Europe to supply these in the last war was an important factor in Germany’s defeat. The situation of Denmark, Holland and Lithuania, three of the world’s largest exporters of butter, is therefore immensely significant. With the notable exception of Britain, therefore, and to a very' much lesser extent of Germany’, the Great Powers are not subject to any' major problem of food supply. It is in respect of industrial raw materials that their deficiencies are most glaring. To name only’ the four most important—coal, iron ore, oil and cotton—the United States and Russia are alone self-sufficient in all four.

Moreover, while Britain and Germany both have a surplus of coal, neither has sufficient iron ore. France, on the other hand, has more than enough iron but not enough coal. Italy and Japan are in an even worse position with insufficient reserves of both materials. All the Great Powers with the exception of the U.S.A, and Russia have to import wool, copper and manganese, while even these two Powers have to import rubber and nickel. 'T’he position may', of course, be eased oy the synthetic production of materials. Thus nitrates were produced by' Germany in the last war, and under the Four-Year Plan she is rapidly expanding her’ output of synthetic oil, textile fibres, and rubber. But the prospect of self-sufficiency in oil and iron ore is remote. Germany produced one-third of her requirements of oil in 1938, but those were peacetime requirements. In war it is estimated that her oil consumption would rise from 7,000,000 tons to at least 15,000,000 tons. Against this her domestic output of 2,500,000 tons does not make much impression. As regards iron ore, Germany now supplies one-quarter of her own needs; and it is very doubtful if she can ever supply' more than one-third In spite of her Four-Year-Plan, thm-c--iore, Germany must continue to import huge, quantities of key materials such as oil and iron ore. Roumania’s oil and Sweden’s iron ore, not to mention the aluminium ore of Hungary and Yugoslavia and the latter's copper, must therefore acquire immense significance in time of war.