RUSSIA AND JAPAN.

Grey River Argus, 11 June 1904, Page 3 (Supplement)

RUSSIA AND JAPAN.

The Japanese have been displaying t remarkable reluctance to "play to the gallery" in the matter of their military operations, and at the close of last weeii "the gods" were unquestionably becoming a little tired of the hailing action of "the piece." T ._> pausese were, of couriie, accentuated by the brilliancy of tne opening naval scenes, and, after a fortnight of repeated assurances that great battles on land were imminent, it is not* surprising that the British public was beginning to feel that Japan was hardly treating it fairly in the matter of military sensations. The British public is apt to be rather censorious in this* respect, even as regards its own army. It does nob mind waiting a few weeks ; if necessary, provided that it has a notion of what is going on, although, doubtless, its ideal in such a connection was realised in 1759 when, as Horace Walpole said, "it was necessary to ask ©very morning what new victory there was for fear of missing one!" But it does nob at all appreciate — Japanese commanders please note— not only an .absence of "victories," but complete mystification as to what is being done and when the next great battle may be expected. . ' it is all very well to argue that the Japanese have been giving the whole world -a lesson by this admirable exhibition of reticence, and that they can hardly be expected to show their hand freely when dealing with such an enemy as Russia. But the public, like Gallio. cares for none of these things, and, if it cannot have either news or knowing hints, it demands rumours and gets them. If one steadily set to work at the beginning of this week and compiled a list of the rumours which were in active circulation as to the war in the Far East, it would probably have been found, that, to render them all in any degree probable, it would have been necessary to give both the Russian and Japanese armies wings. This would be in addition to such trifles as the personal -intervention of our King, to make the Mikado shake hands with the Czar, the latter having in me meantime dressed himself in the relics of Peter the Great's wardrobe with a view to leading • his forces to glory both by land and sea. Truly, never was distinction more neatly, more cunningly drawn than in the immortal phrase "Wars and rumours of wars!" And what) of the critics? They have had an even juster cause of complaint . against the secretive Japs, for they have both the public and their own editors to satisfy,- and when, for the eighteenth time, you have discovered that the Japanese have got command of the sea, that the Siberian railway is a gossamer thread which will probably break, and that it is not at all likely that Port Arthur will be taken by sea, you cannot expect that much more of the same sort of thing will be tolerated. Happilyi there is still, even in this instance, the weather to fall back upon, and probably. when all is said and done, it is the weather which has been chiefly responsible for the recent lull. Even the Japanese cannot land troops comfortably on ice-bound coasts, and it is quite conceivable that, at any rate as regards the Liao-tung peninsular, the cpur whose rowel is Port Arthur, the disembarkation arrangements have been a good deal interfered with by the wintry presence of General Fevrier. For in all disembarkations the difficulties increase in arithmetical progression, and cannot be reckoned by any simple process of addition. For instance, disembarkation in the teeth of hostile opposition may be twice as difficult as it would be in a partially ice-bound bay. Bub given both these obstacles, the business would be at least four times as troublesome as ib would be if only one were present. But, while the reports concerning landings in the neighbourhood of Port Arthur and Vladivostock continue to be rather vague, there can be little doubt as to the substantial nature of the forces which Japan has been pouring into Korea. The suggestion was that, at the beginning of the week, there were about 100,000 Japanese soldiers in the Hermit Kingdom, and that, in opposition to these, the Russians had about 25,000 men along the Yalu. The Japanese were said to be holding Ping- Yang on the west, and Gen-san on the east in considerable force, and, as a matter of course, in virtue of the protectorate which, .practically speaking, Japan has. established over Korea, there was no local opposition to the arrangement. Perhaps the situation, a little involved as it is, is explicable in the assumption that, ready as the Japanese were for operations, both by land and sea, the course of events, coupled with the unusual severity of tihe winter, had brought about a slight modification of their plans. They were fortunate enough to cripple the Russian fleet effectively in a marvellously short space of time, and the Russians had not, even by' a brisk use of their torpedo-boats and destroyers-, attempted any cort of retaliation beyond the contemptible performance of the Vladivostock squadron in the Tsuguru Straits about the middle of February. Probably in the Japanese plan- of operations some weeks were allowed for the achievement of a result which was actually attained in a few days. Again, Russia's defensive strat-egy-on land has been of a high order of merit, and has necessitated the utmost caution on the part even of an enemy which has the control of the sea. Port Arthur and Vladivostock are. undoubtedly hard nuts to orack by land, and a Russian commander-in-chief , acting from Harbin or Mukden, and having 25,000 good men on the Yalu with the MotienLing, one of the most easily defended passes in the world.' to fall back upon, is far too strongly placed to render even Japanese surprise landing? such easy and comfortable enterprises as some seem to imagine. The original intention of the Japanese may very possibly have been to attempt to isolate Port Arthur and Vladivostock the moment they had secured command of the sea, but it looks now very much . as if these projects had ' been advisedly subordinated to the: plan of placing the security of Korea' beyond question, and, perhaps, of gaining a decisive advantage over the Russian force on the Yalu. The latter with the Motien-Ling Pass in their rear is, in a way, a more formidable objective than either Port Arthur or Vladivostock, for any relaxation of the' pressure now being exercised upon it might,, mean its sudden bulging into Korea, and a subsequent grave menace to Seoul. While, therefore. Japan can, very -possibly and has been endeavouring to, ■"contain" simultaneously Port Arthur, "Vladivostock and the Russian force on the Yalu. it has doubtless foreseen the for extreme caution in any action wfrieh cannot be. assisted by its Naval supremacy. Let us suppose that 50,-. <JOQ, 'Japanese itroops have. landed m the

Ltao-tung Peninsula. In one seme sue cess in this operation would mean no) only the isolation of Port Arthur, but 1 also the possibility of driving a wedge 3 between the Russians at Mukden and " those on the Yalu. But . it also means c that the Russians at Mukden would " probably be able to do a great deal more [ harm tio the Japanese in the Liao-tung ; Peninsula than Sir Redvsrs Buller was able to do to the Boers to the south ; of Ladysmith, and to be in what the Germans call "the tactioal middle" is always rather an anxious business.