BATTLE OF JUTLAND

Gisborne Times, Volume LIII, Issue 5665, 20 December 1920, Page 5

BATTLE OF JUTLAND

OFFICIAL DISPATCHES PUBLISH-

JELLICOE ON THE LESSONS OF

THE STRUGGLE.

SAYS GERMANS SHOWED UNEXPECTED SPEED.

“WE HAD A GOOD DEAL TO LEARN FROM THEM!” .

-•(United Press Association— Copy right.) - • LONDON, Dec. 17. The Jutland battle official dispatches, with, appendices, were issued * to-day, consisting of a volume of six hundred pages, with numerous maps, charts, and diagrams. The reports are most numerous comprising one from . every ship engaged. . Lord Jellicoe, in a covering letter dated Iron Duke, June 8, 1916, directs attention to the number of lessons drawn from the battle. He says that when the Admiralty ordered the Grand Fleet at Scapa to proceed to sea on May 30, he ordered Admiral Bea.tty, whose ships were at, Rosyth, to be at a certain, spot in the North Sea. at Wo in the afternoon of the 31st, giving also his own. probable position at that hour. If Admiral Beatty had no news at two o’clock he was to stand toward Lord Jellicoe. Lord Jellicoe says, that he had no anxiety about Lord Beatty's advanced position, owing to the gunpower and speed of Admiral Beatty's ships, but the German third squadron displayed unexpected speed. Although nominally the British battle-cruisers could do twenty-five knots and the German ones only twenty and a-half, the former were unable to increase the distance from the Germans.

AN UNPLEASANT SURPRISE

GERMAN GUNNERY OF A HIGHSTANDARD. . “This comes to us as an unpleasant surprise,” he stated, “and will considerably affect future operations. It is quite evident the German ships were much faster than their nominal speed. Admiral Beatty adopted the correct and only possible course in keeping between the enemy and his base, and keeping in touch with the enemy he had great superiority.” The loss of the Queen Mary and Indefatigable, added Lord Jellicoe, was unpalpably due partly to the different armour of the British battle-cruisers and the disadvantages as regards 1 the light, hut the German gunnery was of a very high standard. It falls off when they are hit. but even then is very accurate. “The German organisation at night time,” he added, “was very good, and recognition of the signals excellent, whereas ours was practically nil. We have a good deal to learn from them. The German tactics were as anticipated. The enemy's turning away movement under cover of the destroyers’ attacks is difficult to > counter. It has been closely studied, but there is no real counter except ample time and superior speed.” , LONDON, Deo. 17. ■Among the signals is the one much discussed which was sent from Admiral Beatty to Viscount Jellicoe. at 7.47 o’clock on the evening of the 31st and received seven minutes later: “Urgent! submit van of battleships follow bat-tle-cruisers. We can then cut off the whole of the enemy's battle-fleet.” Yiscoxynt Jellicoe, at 8.14 p.m., ordered Adiniral Jerram, commanding the 2nd Battle Squadron, to follow Admiral Beatty, but Admiral Jerram at 8.43 p.m. reported that, the battle-cruisers were not in sight. Another signal from Flotilla Leader Faulkner at 1.52 on the morning of June 1 announced that, he had sighted enemy battleships and giving the position but the Iron Duke, Viscount Jellicoe’s flagship, did not. receive the message, which was probably- “jammed” by the Germans. This is viewed by some almost as a tragedy as Viscount Jellicoe’s battleships were then speeding southward to cut off Von Scheer. Faulkner’s message, if received, might have prevented the enemy reaching home and would have showed Viscount Jellicoe tliat Von Scheer, about that time, was crossing his track. Critics are busily reconstructing events in the light, of the signals and the two “schools” are still sharply divided. Some declare that the signals uphold the previous contention that Viscount Jellicoe, by turning away, Iqgt a chance of a decisive victory. Others say that Viscount Jellicoe took a less spectacular but a logical course, avoiding torpedoes. They direct attention to the fact that Admiral Beatty did not signal before Viscount Jellicoe manoeuvred away, but half an hour later, and Viscount Jellicoe had completed the manoeuvre at 7.35 p.m. A. and N.Z.C.A.

" BRITISH PRESS COMMENT.

JELLICOE SIGNALLY VINDiI-

GATED

HUN SUPERIORITY IN FIRE DIRECTION DISQUIETING.

(Received Dec. 19, 5.5 p.m.) LONDON, Dec. 18. In connection with the Jutland despatches, the Morning Post comments that the documents show that the conduct of Viscount Jellicoe and Lord Beatty was of the highest merit. They prove that under Lord Jellicoe’s command the Grand Fleet, l in every conceivable manoeuvre, had been constantly practised and every contingency foreseen. Never was a reputation more signally vindicated than the reputation so foully assailed of Lord Jellicoe. The Daily Express points out that Lord Jellicoe’s tactics were substantially those submitted to the Aciiniralty in October, 1914, for use in case of fleet action, which the Board officially endorsed. The German fleet escaped annihilation by “jamming a series of vital wireless signals from the destroyer flotilla during die nl The Daily Chronicle says the documents show that Jutland did not result in a complete British victory, owing to the time of day when the battle was fought, but it is, disquieting, to learn that the German battle cruisers were better armored ■ and l their system of fire direction superior to the British., . The Daily News states that the main controversy,; whether Lord Jeilicoe had,.it. in his .power to destroy the'German fleet, .jvill never satisfactoifllyL'be settled., Lord Jellicoe will, receive praise-.or blame, ,as critnesybbe in sympathy with one typo or strategists or ' the other. A. and N.Z. C.A.

THE ONE GREAT FACTOR

THE SPIRIT OF THE BRITISH SAILOR.

J LORI) SYDENHAM’S VIEWS

ACTION MEANS DISAPPEARANCE OF BATTLE. CRUISERS.

'(Received. Dec. 19, 11 p.m.) LONDON, Dec. 19. Lord Sydenham, in an interview with Lloyd’s Sunday News, suggests that we allowed the Germans to deceive" us over our battle cruisers speed:' justDas earlier they did over , their. iThe -German fleet; haa j purpose—to-fight ■ us m tlio •‘North.. Sea. The Kaiser could, .therefore,'>Kuild ships cut into secWatertight system, creating such cfir- ' Acuities relating to .the' restriction of the crew, space for internal 1 communication. and discipline -that ' battleships . like ours, wOiiVd'-hevunable to follow tlieir niodel:r|:';'XHe Germans had certaim advantages' in speed, fire direction j.

night communication, and other technical devices. Then why did they, go home? They went because their seamen were not as good as the ships they sailed. This one ' hammering knocked the fighting spirit out or them. Von Scheer could not .subsequentlv trust the morale of liis own sailors" In tlieir position. British tars would have hung on like gum death, so the Jutland sacrifice,, was well worth while. The n lessons of the battle show that the gun is still as supreme and the torpedo .as disappointing in fleet action as it proved, in the Russo-Japanese war. Thirdly, the officers must give more careful study to strategy and tactics ; fourthly, not all the technical science in the world can supply the place of born seamen. The future will see battle cruisers disappear. The battleship and the destroyer will fight tips big actions. Tlie cruisers.; will scout and sweep the seas, but men will count for everything every, time,—A. and N.Z. C.A.

GERMAN OFFICER’S VIEWS,

BATTLE IN NO WAY IMPAIRED BRITAIN’S MASTERY.

(Received Dec. 19, 11 p.m.) LONDON, Dec. 19. 'Captain Von Hase the Derffinger’s chief gunnery officer at . rue battle of Jutland, in his book “Kiel and Jutland,” which is shortly being published by Skeffington’s, admits that Lord Jqllicoe ’s strategy was unimpeachable, and that the battle, though indecisive, in no way impaired Britain’s mastery of the seas. —A. and N.Z. C.A.

WIRELESS IN WAREFARE

NEW LIGHT ON BATTLE OF JUTLAND.

Sir H. B. Jackson, who was First Sea Lord at the time of the Battle of Jutland, says.— “We have heard much about /the use of wireless direction-finding for minor tactical movements of all arms, but this is a case of a major strategical operation, which brought about the historical meeting of the British and German fleets at the Battle of Jutland on the 31sfc May, 1916. I may incidentally mention that, in spite of other statements of which I have heard, its Commander-in-Chief (Lord Jellicoe) and I lived, so to speak, with the object of bringing about such a meeting. Our wireless direction-find-ing stations kept very careful and intelligent watch on the positions of German ships using -wireless, and cn the 30th May, 1916, heard an unusual amount of wireless signals from one of the enemy ships, which they located at Wilhemshaven. This was reported to me. The time was a critical and anxious one in the war, and I had also some reasons for expecting that- the German fleet might put out to sea during the week! Our fleet was ready at short notice, and had arranged, unless otherwise prevented, to put out to sea on the following morning for a sweep of the North Sea. But if the German fleet got to sea first the chance of a meeting not unfavorable to us was remote. Our object was to try to get to sea before or shortly after the Germans, and hitherto we had not succeeded in doing so. Later on in tlie afternoon it was reported to me that the German shin had changed her position by about deg., or a few miles to the northward. Evidently she and her consorts had left the basins at Wilhemshaven and had taken up a position in the Jade River ready to put to sen. This movement decided me to send our Grand Fleet to sea, and move toward the German Bight at once, and try to meet the German fleet and bring 'it to action. This they did with their usual promptitude, and the result was the famous Battle of Jutland, and it was indirectly brought about by the careful work of Captain Round and his staff, for which I hope they will now accept my belated thanks and appreciation. Tlieir work is not ended. Direction-finding has come to stay for more general use in peace. Errors are being eliminated, and there should be a great future before it.”

In the course of an interesting paper. Captain Round recently dealt with the methods by which the great difficulties in the way of direction-finding had been overcome by the scientific workers. One of the worst of these was the “jamming” of signals; that is the interference with one another of signals ’ from two stations which are sending simultaneously. By an ingenious device it was found* possible to completely eliminate the signals from a strong station, and thus to enable those from a weaker station to be heard. In this connection Captain Round made the following statement: “One general feeling amongst the Naval Intelligence operators, I know, is to meet the one operator who controlled the German Zeppelins and warships. They always imagined it was one particular man. who was a super-operator. On several occasions with nine or ten Zeppelins in a raid, all frantically trying to communicate with home for bearings or otherwise, wireless occasionally got into a horrible tangle. At that moment the super-man would arrive, take control, and in a twinkling all would be peace and order.” . Captain Round gave an incident which occurred in the Mediterranean, where our direction-finding stations were compelled to use_ a system of wireless intercommunication, which could be heard by the enemy. “An Austrian submarine, requiring her position, came to the surface, sent signals, waited for us to state her position, then thanked us, and again submerged.” This, of course, indicates the necessity of linking up dir-ection-finding stations by a system of : line intercommunication, and also the ! possibility, of using direction-finding for navigation.