FRICTION IN CHINA

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXXI, Issue 21550, 1 November 1944, Page 3

FRICTION IN CHINA

CHIANG’S REGIME U.S. LEADER REMOVED ALL PLANS THWARTED (10 a.m.) NEW YORK, Oct. 31. The decision to remove General Joseph Stiiweii from the post of commander of .the China, Burma and incua theatre has the most profound implications for China as well as American policy toward that country and the Allied war effort in the Far Fast, says the New York Times’ correspondent in Chungking, Mr. Brooks Atkinson, who has returned to the United States. It may mean that the United States has decided in future to discount China’s part in the counter-offensive. It represents inside China a political triumph of the moribund anti-democratic regime which is more concerned with maintaining its political supremacy than driving out the Japanese.

Mr. Atkinson adds that MajorGeneral Patrick Hurley conducted the negotiations with General Chiang Kaishek for two months to give General Stiiweii full command of the Chinese ground and air forces and to increase China's participation in the counteroffensive against Japan. General Chiang at first was inclined to agree to General Stilwell’s appointment as commander-in-chief, but later decided to accept any American commander except General Stiiweii. General Chiang’s attitude became stiff and hostile and, at a private meeting of the Kuomingtang Central Executive Committee, he announced the terms of ills personal ultimatum to America as first, General Stiiweii must go; secondly, the control of American lend-iease materials must be placed in General Chiang’s hands; thirdly, he refused to hely to unify China by coming to terms with the Chinese Communists. If America did not yield, General Chiang declared that China would fight the Japanese alone. “Constantly Frustrated”

President Roosevelt agreed to recall General Stiiweii, who knows more about China than most foreigners and is more intimately acquainted with the needs and capacities of the Chinese Army than General Chiang or the War Minister, General Ho Ying Chun. For the fjast 32 months General Stiiweii has been constantly frustrated in his attempts to help China stay in the war and to improve the combat efficiency of the Chinese forces.

The United States is now committed, at least passively, to supporting a regime which has become increasingly unpopular and distrusted in China which maintains three secret police services and also concentration camps for political prisoners, which stifles free speech and resists democratic forces.

Tiie fundamental difference between General Chiang and General Stiiweii is that the latter has been eager to light the Japanese in China without delay and General Chiang hoped he would not have to do so. This is the only explanation of a long series of obstructions and delays which have prevented General Stiiweii from fulfilling his original mission of equipping and training the “unlimited manpower” resources of the Chinese Army. General Chiang has the virtue of refusing to make peace with the Japanese, but his technique in preserving the ticklish balance of political power keeps him passive. The Chinese Communists wiiom General Chiang started trying to liquidate in 1927 have good armies and one is now fighting a guerrilla war against the Japanese in north-eastern China. The Generalissimo regards these armies as the chief threat to his supremacy. Distrusting the Communists, General Chiang has not made a sincere attempt to arrange at least a truce for the duration of the war. Chinese Armies Maltreated

The Generalissimo’s regime has become bureaucratic, inefficient and corrupt. Most of his armies are poorly fed and shockingly maltreated. Most of China’s troubles now are the result of having been at war against the Japanese over seven years and being totally blockaded for two and a half years. The reason that nothing has been done to alleviate China’s miseries is that the Generalissimo is determined to maintain his group of ageing reactionaries in power until the war is over when, it is commonly believed, 'he will resume the war against the Communists without distraction. General Chiang, bewildered and alarmed by the rapidity with which China is now falling apart, feels secure only with associates who obey him implicitly. His rages become more and more ungovernable. He attacks the symptoms rather than the causes. The Generalissimo’s attitude toward America has become more resentful and American criticism of China is hotly rebuked. General Stilwell arrived in this stagnant, baleful atmosphere in February, 1942, animated by the single idea of lighting the Japanese immediately, but the war in China was initially handicapped by the Allied decision to fight Germany first. General Stilwell was unable to get 1 per cent of the American Army xor use in the China-Burma-India theatre and was unable to get the needed equipment. Calamitous Burma Campaign Less than a month after his arrival, General Stilwell was plunged into the calamitous Burma campaign without notice and had to return to Chungking to induce General Chiang to return to the front to vest him with sufficient authority. Furthermore, although the troops were in need of transport, most of China’s trucks were hauling civilian loot from Burma to China, where the goods were worth huge sums. General Chiang and his staff like the American Air Force, which needs nothing except food and airfields, but the Chinese Government hedges and hesitates over anything involving the the use of its armies. Foreigners can only conclude that the Government wants to save its armies to render its political power secure after the war.

The United Press’ correspondent, Mr. Darrell Berrigan, who has just returned from China, says that one hitherto undisclosed aspect of the controversy is the report by the United States Asmassador to China, Mr. Clarence Gauss, who submitted his resignation as a result of General Stilvvell’s removal. Mr. Gauss, who has long been an advocate of a strong policy in China, is said to feel that the withdrawal of the veteran general has weakened the American position in China. v