CARRIER FORCE LOST

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXXI, Issue 21549, 31 October 1944, Page 3

CARRIER FORCE LOST

JAPANESE NAVY’S PLIGHT implications" of defeat (10 a.m.) NEW YORK, Oct. 30. “Admiral Nimitz’s communique confirmed earlier reports, that the enemy’s main carrier force was completely destroyed,” states the New York Herald-Tribune’s correspondent at Pearl Harbour. “There are still some Japanese carriers in the repair yards and a few held for defence'of the home islands, but as a striking force the enemy’s naval and air strength is approaching vanishing point. Had the Americans been able to press the attacks in the final stage of the three-day engagement, the victory would have been even more decisive. The fact that the Third Fleet’s carrier task force had to go to the assistance of the Seventh . Fleet’s hard-pressed carrier escort groups enabled the enemy crippled warships to limp away. Long-range pursuit was impossible because the American ships needed fuel and fresh supplies of bombs and ammunition. “After the Philippines battle we cannot find anything to attack,” said Admiral W. F. Halsey, commander of the U.S. Third Fleet, in a broadcast interview. “The Japanese are able fighting men. but as strategists they are good ping-pong players.” Asked what effect the victory would have on the Third Fleet, Admiral Halsey replied: “Business as usual—find the enemy, destroy him, and kill him.”