The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES” GISBORNE, MONDAY, AUGUST 11, 1941. THE STRENGTH OF JAPAN

Gisborne Herald, Volume LXVIII, Issue 20630, 11 August 1941, Page 4

The Gisborne Herald. WITH WHICH IS INCORPORATED “THE TIMES” GISBORNE, MONDAY, AUGUST 11, 1941. THE STRENGTH OF JAPAN

The aggressive attitude of Japan and the talk of a possible drive by her to the south naturally raise questions of her prospects of success in such an ambitious undertaking. There are indications that some of her leaders are inclined to take a cautious view, but opposed to them are the militarists and extremists who take the view that Japan should not hesitate to embark upon what they regard as their divine mission. It is probable that a large proportion of the Japanese people, cut oIT as they are from the rest of the world, nave been impressed with the evidence of their own strength and fail to realise the extent of the force to which they might be opposed in the event of their attempting to assert their supremacy in the Pacific. It would be unwise, of course, to underestimate the probable strength of the Japanese, but such information as is available does not suggest that they are in a position to successfully challenge the combination of Powers which ultimately would be arrayed against them. There is a natural tendency to measure the power of a nation by the strength of its land, sea and air forces, but experience has shown that economic resources and the availability of imported supplies are weapons without which all other factors can well be rendered useless.

In any southward advance Japan would necessarily have to rely largely, if not solely, on her navy, and her navy is admittedly her strongest weapon. Its actual strength is not known, but it would be wise to concede that it is more than equal to .the naval force which either Britain or the United States could dispose in Pacific waters. What may well be doubted, however, is whether her fleet is equal to that which Britain and America combined could assemble should the need arise. In addition, there is the far from negligible Dutch East Indies navy to be taken into account. It may be assumed, therefore, that in any naval conflict Japan would start with a numerical disadvantage. The efficiency of her new ships is an unknown quantity, but it is unlikely that they would be equal to the modern vessels which Britain would be able to release for service in the Far East. Japan is well served for naval bases, both in home waters and among the islands of the Pacific, but she has nothing to equal Singapore, in addition to which an Allied combination would have handy bases at Sourabaya and in the Philippines and more distant ones in Hawaii and Australia. Taken all round it might be said that naval strength would be more or less even, but there are indirect advantages operating against Japan. It may well be that Japan’s indecision in the past year has proved fatal to any plans which she might have cherished. A year ago the British navy had its hands full in maintaining a watch over the North Sea, the Atlantic and the Mediterranean. Since then, however, the danger in these areas has been greatly reduced, if it has not been entirely eliminated. Both the Italian and German fleets have been rendered virtually impotent, and to the extent that they may still have a nuisance value they can be dealt with by small craft and aircraft. The stil! necessary work of convoying merchant shipping also can be carried out by small craft, and there is no apparent reason why most of the larger ships of the British navy should not be released for service in the Far East. Similar arguments apply to the United States navy, which is steadily increasing in strength and which has behind it a nation geared up to a maximum war effort. It is extremely doubtful whether the Japanese navy could face this powerful combination. Its task would be rendered the more difficult because or the need for convoying and servicing its forces — since all its troop movements would have to be sea-borne—and in attempting to counter the blockade which would inevitably be imposed and might strangle the economic life of Japan itself. Japan could not make much real progress without the use of her land forces in conjunction with her navy. Already these forces have been seriously depleted in China and they would-have to be prepared for much more strenuous opposition from China.

In addition, it would be necessary to maintain a large force-on the Russian bordbr and possibly even to attempt to capture Vladivostock, which, in Russian hands, would be a constant menace to Japan itself. Japan, of course, can raise a large army, but the difficulty would be to transport it in safety to tire various theatres ol‘ war. It is generally accepted that the Japanese air force is the weakest link in her armour. Its strength is unknown but its general inefficiency has been demonstrated more than once. Certainly it would be a poor match for the modern machines which are being turned out in such large numbers by Britain and the United States. More important than anything else is Japan’s vulnerability on the economic front. It is certain that her economy has already been severely strained by the years: of war in China, and it will be further handicapped by the sanctions which have already been imposed by the countries upon which she relies most.' All these facts should deter Japan from embarking on a new campaign, and they suggest that if she does she will have scant hope of success.