STALIN THE SPHINX

Greymouth Evening Star, 31 July 1946, Page 2

STALIN THE SPHINX

New Light On . ■ War Events “When the men who command the destinies of the earth deceive themselves as to what is possible, it is a great evil. . . Their obstinacy, or, if you will, their' genius, procures an ephemeral success for their efforts; but, since they are at variance with the dispositions, the interests, the entire moral being of their contemporaries, these forces of resistance react against them, and, after a certain time, long enough for their victims, but short con-

sidered in the light of history, there remain of their undertak-

ings only the crimes they have

committed, and the sufferings they have caused”

With this quotation from Benjamin Constant’s “Spirit of Conquest,” prophetic in 1813 and still to-day, Grigore Gafencu, former Rumanian Minister for Foreign Affairs, and .former Rumanian Minister to Moscow, prefaces his book “Prelude to the Russian Campaign” (London: Frederick Muller, Ltd.). This book (writes “Q” in the Evening Post), though it was written before the end of. the war in Europe and covers the period only from the Moscow Pact (August 21, 1939) between Hitler and Stalin to the opening of hostilities in Russia (June 22, 1941), throws new light on the personality and policy of Stalin, the sole survivor in power to-day of the protagonists in the gigantic struggle of 1939-45.

“Stalin is Russia”

So far as the outside world is concerned Stalin is Russia; it is he who dictates the policy of Russia now as he did then, and what he did then, as set out by the ex-Rumanian Minister to Moscow, may help to explain what he is doing now. Gafencu foresaw before the end of the war that Russia would be the main problem of the peace. What are the intentions, he asks, and what the future of the US.S.R.? “There are 180,000,000 people in Russia who are awakening to the extent and power of their country, and this- weight of population will increasingly press on the European boundaries; which must be consolidated with wisdom, if they are to be effectively consolidated. Nothing could be worse than to approach the problems of the East with indecision —to dream of indefinite lines of demarcation —to talk of zones of influence, to fall back on other,phrases equally vague, or to put in train for the day when peace dawns plans that are makeshift and illusionary. • • • • The only thing that will count is resolute action coupled with the intention of fixing precise limits. Such action might ensure peace in the East.' Europe is, in truth, a very small continent, which might be sunk, unless care be taken, under the weight of a great empire. ... No peace is possible with intolerance as a foundation; no security, while ignorance harbours grievances and animosity, or mutual distrust pre- 1 pares the ground for further calamity. Russia should again become an integral part of the world; she should take her place, openly and directly, in its affairs. The renewal of the I links in the community of mankind is of more importance than the differences between political systems. To reach that position is the burning desire of everybody who looks to a. sincere and durable peace in the East.” By “East” Mr Gafencu means always Eastern Europe.)

War Inevitable In End

Though the Moscow _ Pact may have postponed a conflict between Hitler and Stalin for a year or so, it made it all the more inevitable in the end. To make her rear secure before embarking on the conquest ol Western Europe Germany gave Russia a virtual free hand in the East to annex the Baltic Republics, part ol Poland, and the Bessarabian province of Rumania; also to exact by war new boundaries from Finland. “In a word,” says Gafencu, “she had re-awakened a long-dormant imperialism, which only awaited the moment to take its place in the great traditions of Tsarist policy. Hitlers action brought Russia to an understanding of her strength, her greatness, and her destiny. The gates of Europe were opening before her, one by one the strategic positions ol the East, fell into her power.” But Germany’s conquest of the West proved much easier, cheaper, and Quicker than ever Stalin expected, and within a year powerful forces of the Wehrmacht and the Red Army were facing each other on a common .frontier from the Baltic to the Black Sea. No “buffer States” now intervened. The Moscow Pact did not cover the Balkans, a particular preserve of Czarist Russia, and Hitler, having done with the West, giving up hopes, like Napoleon in 1804, of a successful invasion of Britain, turned to the East. One by one the Balkan States fell, by easy diplomacy, backed by threats, under Hitler’s control. Finally, only Greece and Jugoslavia and Turkey were left. The Turk had vainly tried to create a Balkan front. Prince Paul of Jugoslavia was about to yield to the Axis, when he was deposed by a popular revolution, and the new Jugoslav Government turned to Russia, the traditional protector oi the Balkan Slavs.

Risks and Benefits At this point', to quote Mr. Gafencu: “Stalin spent more than a week m calculating the risks and benefits of a clear-cut and public stand. Finally, he decided to make a gesture which, considering the extremely circumspect nature of his usual methods, might be regarded as heroic, but which had, none the less, been carefully weighed in his mind, and was limited to a show of friendship, sincere but platonic. On Sunday, -A-P 1 ’ 1 ! 6, 1941, Moscow awoke to learn that a new pact had been concluded during the night, binding Jugoslavia and the U.S.S.R. by mutual engagements of friendship and nori-aggression. Gafencu, who was in Moscow at the time, gives full details of this episode, which ended in a press photograph of Mr Gavrilovitch, the Jugoslav diplomat, and Stalin standing side by side. “The master of the U.S.S.R. never stopped smiling. Wha., if Germany becomes angry, and attacks you?’ asked the Jugoslav diplomat,. astounded by the speed with which matters had been arranged. ‘Let them come!’ replied Stalin, unperturbed and serene.” ■ Yet on May 9, little over a month later, Mr Vyshinski, on behalf of the Commissariat of Foreign Affairs, toid Mr. Gavrilovitch that the U.S.S.R. no longer recognised ..Jugoslavia s right

to maintain a diplomatic mission in Moscow, as she had lost her territory and her sovereignty. By that time Hitler had made up his mind to attack Russia, and such gestures as appeasement were as vain as Munich. Berlin maintained a stony silence # towards all Moscow’s efforts to rescue collaboration under the Moscow Pact. Cripps and Stalin Throughout the currency of the Moscow Pact (August 21, 1939, to June 22, 1941, date of invasion of Russia) Stalin had snubbed the British Ambassador, Sir Stafford Cripps, and repelled all possibility of closer relations with Britain with “a rudeness,” says Gafencu, “from which he reaped the greatest benefits.” “A man of perception and principle,” says the author of “Prelude,” Sir Stafford had too straightforward a character, and. too strict a code, to be able to understand and appreciate the turns and subtleties of Stalin’s policy. . . the traits and shadings of the most Oriental of all Oriental characters.” He could not understand why “the U.S.S.Pv. scorned the British Empire to such an extent that, even in a moment of dangerous tension with the Reich, Moscow did not feel any need for closer relations with London.” , , To Mr. Gafencu “Stalin’s calculation in openly defying Great Britain was very simple. . . . Stalin, like the Czar Alexander I, who for years temporised with and then finally, in 1812, fought Napoleon, knew that the moment Hitler made war on Russia Britain would automatically come in on Russia’s side. Stalin, like Alexander, wanted “to choose peace up to the last moment.” Events proved both rulers right. The impression one gets from Mr Gafencu’s book, though no doubt the author, who is pleading for Rumania throughout, did not intend it, is that Stalin is utterly without sentiment for the outside world, the hardest of realists, for whom Russia comes first and last and all the time, who, as Mr Churchill saw and said, respects power and despises weakness. All through this story of the “Prelude to ■the Russian Campaign” power politics prevails. For weaker States there is no mercy either from Hitler or Stalin. To such zest for power limits must be set. That is the lesson for the Western nations if they want to win a peace that will last.