INVASION EXPECTANCY

Greymouth Evening Star, 14 June 1943, Page 2

INVASION EXPECTANCY

COMPLETING PREPARATIONS

DIFFICULTIES TO BE OVERCOME “RUGBY, June 13.. A month has passed since Tunisia was cleared, and tense anticipation of the long-expected Allied descent on the Continent, is mounting towards a climax, as the combined Staffs complete the final preparations in dense secrecy. Many indications of the approaching operations can be noted, such as the prolonged softening by bombers of certain areas, movements of troops and shipping, and preparations in ports. It is pointed out, however, by Lord Hankey, in the “Sunday Times,” that the softening is spread widely, and no one can be sure that the bombing of some districts may not be an experiment, using air forces as the main weapon. A surprise landing might even come at an unbombed section oi the coast. Ships and. troops’ movements are not conclusive. They have at times been used as a ruse de guerre, since amphibious warfare ■ ends itself to strategy, owing to the mobility of ships. Lord Hankey, who was Cabinet Secretary in the last war, gives a reminder that the Allies have to overcome formidable obstacles to the first landing, particularly in the provision of air cover. The degree of difficulty would depend on the place of landing, and the success of the preliminary softening by the air. Almost harder tasks are rapid provisions and repair of aerodromes, disembarkation of material of all kinds, creation of great depots of munitions, supplies, and repair facilities, and so forth. In a ’word, the rapid establishment of a spacious bridgehead from which to start an arduous campaign. Invariable lessons were learned, in North Africa about the co-operation of the three Services of several nations. “A superb international force well equipped, well supplied and with confidence in the leaders, elated by victory. and in the highest state of morale, has been built up on the southern shores of the Mediterranean. it should provide a splendid nucleus for the larger forces required for more formidable tasks.”

GERMAN WEAKNESSES LONDON, June 13. Mr Churchill’s phrase “amphibious operations of peculiar complexity and hazard on a large scale are approaching,” has been a main topic of conversation since his House of Commons speech. . Discussing an attack against Europe, “The Observer” states: “The old tactical pattern of a landing on a defended coastline no longer applies. It has radically been altered by a new factor, that of air power, which overwhelmed Pantelleria Island without land fighting. Germany, in addition to her eastern front line of roughly 1,500 miles, has also to provide for the defence of some 5,000 miles of coastline in the west and the south. Distances between various fronts average from 2,000 miles upwards. Communications have to be held up on roads and railways, which often are poor and dilapidated, and exposed to attack from the air, while rolling stock is heavily over-strained. This position takes away from Germany almost all advantages of her concentration and her interior line. It would be altogether an untenable position but for the great tactical advantage that most of this overextended front is coastline. Therefore it is difficult. Once this initial difficulty were overcome and bridgeheads established, German armies, on almost- every front except perhaps, only, in the Channel coast, would fight under most serious conditions of exposure of over-stretched communications —conditions compatible with Stalingrad, and some cases like Norway and Crete, and comparable to Tunisia. In a word, we have reached a stage where the normal advantages of the interior line largely cease to be of account, owing to over-extension. Indeed, it is thinkable, that in more than one case, strategic mobility of an attacker on an exterior line, given sufficient reserves, and shipping space, will surpass the defender on the interior line —a situation wherein Britain can exploit to the full the advantage of sea and air power. The strategic aim of the combined amphibious power of Britain and America must be to kep the Germans constantly extended to the utmost degree, and to force them to battle simultaneously, or successively, on widely separated points, where they, in turn, will be forced to weaken, isolate, and or expose their armies of defence.

GERMAN PROPOSALS STOCKHOLM June, 1.2. _ The “Svenska Dagbladets” Berlin correspondent states: The “preventive” landing of a shock force in Britain, and a mine-laying campaign to be carried out by two thousand planes figure largely among German plans to prevent an Allied invasion of the Continent. The Germans also propose to lay a colossal number of mines off the south coast of England, in gigantic night operations, by a fleet of motor boats and other craft. An enormous concentration of planes will also be used for the mine-laying and bombing.”