Greymouth Evening Star. MONDAY, JUNE 14, 1943. AIR MASTERY.

Greymouth Evening Star, 14 June 1943, Page 4

Greymouth Evening Star. MONDAY, JUNE 14, 1943. AIR MASTERY.

QRATIFTCAI 'TON at the capture of Pantelleria and Lampedusa should not cause over-estimates to be made of the value of these successes. Nor should the happy facts that Allied casualties were few, and the time taken to secure the surrender was short, lead to a belief that attacks on other Axis bases must have similarly quick results. The Allies’ aerial and naval power was gigantic and well-used, and the opposition proved comparatively weak. Why the Axis did not send more aerial force and some of the Italian fleet to the-aid of the island bases is a matter for conjecture, but it would be too much to expect that similar indifference, or helplessness, will be displayed when stronger island or mainland areas are the Allies’ objectives, Alleged strongholds have not come up to expectations during this Avar. The Allies lost Hong Kong, Singapore, and the Maginot Line much easier than was previously thought possible, and it may be that when they, in turn, invade Axis “impregnable” fortresses or bases this history will repeat itself. That one effect on the Italians of the fall of Pantelleria and Lampedusa, will he a further dAvindling in morale appears probable, and thus the way of the Allies’ attacking forces will be so much easier, but not to the extent of merely coming, seeing and conquering. No question arises that the Italian position is becoming desperate, and there can be but one end to the conflict, but it is sheer guessing to predict when and how this unconditional surrender will take place. Thankfulness that the Allies’ position in the Mediterranean area is now so much happier, with little likelihood of control ever being lost, and confidence

that even greater results will come from the vaster efforts of the future, arc enough to go on with, meanwhile.

Those who have, claimed that bombers alone can win the war, if numerous and powerful, may point to Pantelleria and Lampedusa as evidence of the truth of their assertions. Certainly, the bombings and naval, shelling made possible a troops’ landing almost without cost, that, otherwise, must have caused a heavy casualty total. The absence of serious opposition in the air and on the sea, on this occasion, however, was partly responsible for the cheapness of the Allies’ triumph. When enemy opposition is active, a heavy price may have to be paid, as is demonstrated by the raids on the Ruhr. The resumption of these raids this week-end cost the R.A.F. many planes and lives. It is claimed that the results of the bombings on Ruhr centres are worth the tragic penalty, but be this as it may, the fact is clear that opposition to bombers makes tremendous difference to the operations. It cannot, be denied, however, that the Allies’ air strength is rapidly growing, whereas that of the Axis is on the decline. Even in Russia, the Luftwaffe is on the defensive, and any “reprisals” on Britain are minor. Italy and Japan are in no position to help Germany, and will be hard put to defend themselves. The Mediterranean happenings have shown what air mastery means. It was not the first chapter of this story, nor will it be the last.