MARINE INQUIRY

Greymouth Evening Star, 7 August 1936, Page 2

MARINE INQUIRY

WRECK OF ABEL TASMAN THE CAPTAIN’S EVIDENCE Opening at the Greymouth Courthouse, to-day, the marine inquiry concerning the wreck of the s.s. Tasman, which broke away from het moorings at the wharf, during ;• flood in the Grey River, about 5 p.m. on July 18, drifted down the me,, over the bar, and stranded on JX North Tip, nromises to be of a len»tnj nature. The first witness was Captain W. D. Archibald, of the Abel Tasman, and he had been in the witness box for three hours when the Coni adjourned for luncheon. There ate nearly a dozen other witnesses to be h< Mn H. Morgan, S.M., presided, with Captain J. Mawson and Captain Baron, both of Wellington, as nautical assessors. Mr. N. A. Foden, of Wei lington, represented the Minister o Marine and the Collector of Customs, Mr. E. K. Kirkcaldie, of Wellington appeared for Captain W. D. Archiba.c of the Abel Tasman, and the owners of the vessel, the 11. C. Sleigh Coast ers Proprietary, Ltd., of Melbourne Mr. F. A. Kitchingham for the Grey mouth Harbour Board; and Captail H. A. Dillner as advisor, on behalf o the Marine Department. Mr. D. C Milne( Harbour Engineer) was alsc in attendance with Mr. Kitchingham Captain William Daniel Archibald called by Mr. Foden, stated that oi Saturday, July 18, the Abel Tasmat was moored at the Greymouth whaif

having arrived on July 10. The vessel went to the timber berth, the authorities, through Captain Moar or Captain Cox, being in charge of the berthing operations. The first cable was not put out until the afternoon of July 10. The vessel’s stern was moored dose to the wharf, and she had fore and aft moorings. On July 16 she was shifted down the wharf, to bunker, the moorings being similar. The starboard cable was put out. The vessel remained at the coaling berth from the Thursday until the Saturday, when she broke away. At 5 p.m. on July 18, the moorings on the inside bow were three parts of six-inch manila, leading to a post ahead. On . the outside bow, three parts of set en-inch manila, leading across the. bow to the next post lower on the inside bow. These moorings were bought in Dunedin last March. The starboard cable was leading ahead inside the post to which the starboard lines were fast, and fastened on to the next post upstream. The port cable led across inside the same post as the starboard cable, and was fastened to a post inside the first line. Aft the moorings consisted of a. four parts coir, with a. three-inch wire, and there were five parts altogether of six-inch manila leading aft through a spring made of four parts of seven-inch manila, with a thimble and bight, through which was rove a wire. The moorings were according to custom at the port. There was nothing to stop witness putting more lines out, if he considered they were necessary. He was quite satisfied that the moorings were sufficient to hold the ship to the wharf, under flood conditions. At the same time he did not like the moorings. He did not like the practice of unshackling anchors from the chains. On the morning of July 18 he thought ’it would be prudent to reinforce the moorings, and discussed the matter with the chief officer in respect to an 18-inch coir spring that was carried on board. He told the chief officer to measure it and see if it would fit any of the posts on the wharf. The officer told witness it was too long for the lower posts, and too short for the higher ones. Under the circumstances, witness said they would have to use the port chain, which was not then put out. It was put out just after 12 o’clock, but witness did not see the work being done. About 5 p.m. witness was standing on the wharf, but was not actually looking at the ship. He was with the chief officer and the third officer, between two lines of trucks, after having inspected the forward moorings. They heard an unusual sound, which he took to be the moorings carrying away. Witness did not expect them to carry away. He did not see which mooring carried away first, but all the forward moorings went, with the exception of the port chain. When witness jumped aboard they had all gone except one cable. He believed that the starboard cable broke away first. The gipsy of the port cable was surging, but the starboard gipsy was stationary. It was only a matter of seconds after witness heard the unusual sound, that he ran around the rake of trucks and reached tho vessel. He had to jump about five feet on to the deck from the wharf, and ascend the ladder to the forecastle head. The vessel sheered off the wharf and carried away all the moorings except the port cable. He tried to check the ship with that, but she still continued to veer. Witness gave instructions to the second mate to tell the chief engineer to shake the engines up. Witness turned the telegraph to “full ahead.” He told tho. wireless operator to take the wheel and put her “hard aport,” which was done. The ship grazed along the bow of the Raima!, and then sheered off. Witness again put. the telegraph to “full ahead." The port, chain broke when the ship got partly clear of the Kaimai, before the stern of the Abel Tasman was below’ the stern of the Kaimai. The port chain was normally used as the anchor chain. Up to the time it broke it had been sustaining considerable strain. In witness’s opinion, it held the strain as long as any stronger chain would have done. To his knowledge, there were no defective links in the port chain. After scraping along the Kaimai, and witness rang “full ahead,” the signal was answered, and the engines were working, as was show'll by the increased flow of water from the condenser discharge. He instructed the bosun to couple up the starboard anchor. The ship was making considerable stern way down the river. He attempted to put her into the Blaketown lagoon, hoping her head would cant to starboard. She did not cant, and he stopped the, engines and put her “full astern.” She ran about half a minute, and he then ordered the helm “hard astarboard,” and rang “stop”) and. “full ahead,” but she did not cant sufficiently to make the lagoon. He; realised tiiat she must be dragging considerable port chain, which was stopping her from canting, so he told the bosun to heave in on the chain.! Opposite the Blaketown lagoon she 1 started to set over towards the northern training wall, and he ordered the

helm “hard aport,” in an endeavour to cant the ship to port. He they carried on the way they "we ing they would pile up, so he ordered the helm amidships, and rang stop and “full astern.” He told the bosun to stop heaving on the port chain, and ran the ship full astern down the river She failed to clear the Kaponga wreckage, and her stern canted towards the North Tip. He then stopped the engines, for fear of stripping the blades. The ship’s head started to swing to the southward. He called the men off the forecastle head The vessel continued to swing, and got broadside on to the bar, the ves s e J was bumping on the bottom, and the sea stove in No. 1 and No. 2 hatches The ship continued to swing with her head to the south, through west and north, and eventually struck the North Tip. Witness went on to describe the measures taken to land the ship’s crew. The first time the vessel touched was on the wreckage of the Kaponga. The swirl was visible, where the Kaponga wreckage- was locateul, and he had no doubt that the Abel Tasman struck the Kaponga wreckage. The wireless operator was at the wheel up to the time, the ship first struck. After she first touched, the ship was never actually waterborne, for any' length of time, and witness had no opportunity of judging whether she could he maneouvred effectively. She got into the rough seas on the bar. The propeller was more or less out of actibn after the wreckage was struck, and she also bumped on the bottom, when bioadside on to the bar. The distance from where the Abet Tasman was moored to the Kaponga wreck was just under a mile. He estimated the average speed of the Abel Tasman downstream at roughly' three

knots. The current wouiu ue eight knots. Under the circumstances, the breaking away' of the ship created a situation of very great danger; they had not the use of the anchors, which was the principal factor. The engines were working two or fhiee minutes after the breakaway, and he did not think the engines would have made any difference if they had been turning over at the time of the breakaway. They could not stem the tide with the power they had, and the result would have been the same. Had the full power of the engines been available one minute earlier, they might have helped the port chain, but it was a difficult matter to judge. The officers and crew carried out their duties effectively in every respect. Witness did. not see the Harbourmaster (Captain Cox) on the wharf, but he might have been there. Witness had had experience on the Australian coast since 1919, including the bar harbour at Clarence River, 24?, miles north of Newcastle. The conditions there were not comparable to those at Greymouth, and witness could not make any suggestions regarding the Grey River. He had never seen the Clarence River in flood, and had not been at any port where there was a river with a running current. He had visited Greymouth about 50 times, and the practice with regard to mooring the ship had been the same recently. At one time, the stern was slacked off, but he did not know by whose instructions. There was some doubt in witness’s mind' as to who was responsible for the mooring of the ship on arrival in port. The harbour regulations said that witness must obey the Harbourmaster, but in another part the regulations said that the port authorities would not accept any responsibility. Witness conformed' to the local practice. He had no doubt that the moorings would, be fully efficient to hold the ship under ordinary flood conditions. There was always a possibility of a ship breaking loose through unforseen circumstances, such as earthquake or landslides blocking the river and banking tho water up until _ it burst through; again, a ship lying downstream was at the mercy of the moorings of a ship lying above it; the backing up of debris and logs, the moorings were of manila and wiie, and the cables were used as an added precaution; there might be defects in the mooning cables from crystallisation. The case of the, Abel Tasman showed that there was always the possibility of something unforseen occuriring. He did not feel safe with the cables shackled to the wharf, and unshackled from the anchors. In witness’s opinion, the

SYSTEM OF MOORING at Grey mouth was not satisfactory, in view of tile unforeseen possibilities. The system was quite sufficient for ordinary floods in the river, with a current up to 10 knots. The moorings were sufficient to hold a ship to the wharf with a flood, but they were dangerous if through any cause the moorings were carried away, by reason of the fact that a ship was then deprived of its first line of defence, namely, her anchors. In connection with the Abel Tasman, he was of the opinion that some extraordinary factor operated, because of the speed with which the ship left the wharf. The stern moorings were not slackened on this occasion, but witness did not comment on that fact. With the stern bound hard against the wharf, it increased' the pressure of water on the inside bow. That pressure was lessened by slacking the stern off. If the stern was slackened off, the angle at which the ship was lying to the wharf, when the engines were running, would increase the possibility of damage to the propellers, by floating logs. If the port cable had been affixed to the anchor, ready for dropping, and the anchor been dropped when the starboard cable parted, this would have given a better chance to hold the vessel for ot least long enough to bring the engines into full play against the current. The effect of the anchor w’as not felt for a considerable time after the anchor was

let go. The fact that the cable was fastened to the wharf checked the ship more than the anchor would it it had been dropped when the starboard chain carried away. However the anchor would have given more chance to check the ship’s progress down the river, as the anchor would have gripped the ground to some extent. Witness inspected the moorings frequently during the afternoon, an to his mind the danger point of that ebb tide had passed. The run ttas stronger on the ebb than on the flood. The result showed that all danger had not passed. To Mr Kitchingham: The practice was that the captain conferred with the Harbourmaster regarding the state of the river and the moorings iequired. It was possible that he discussed the matter with Captain Cox on July IS, but he did not remember it. He had always found the

JUDGMENT OF CAPTAIN COX

to be sound. On a visit some months ago, similar moorings were used at a berth further downstream, whel X run in the river was at least nine knots, or one knot more than on Ju y IS The winch-brake would not horn the cable, after the ship broke away. He did not think it would have been of assistance if it had been in operation while the ship was at the whaif. It was inevitable on such occasions that the brake must veer or the chain nart. The function of the brake was to hold a ship lying at anchor and not to hold a ship fastened rigidly to the wharf. The ship was drawing about 14ft forward and 16ft 2in. aft, at the wharf. There was a heav'y sea ion the bar, with a lift he estimated at nine or ten feet. The Kaponga enginetops were visible, and therefore witness knew where the stem of the wreck would be. He was in touch with the signal station by Morse lamp, but did not get all the signals. To Mr Kirkcaldie: The anchor cables were used to reinforce the mooring lines. In some ports there were mooring springs, owned by the port authorities, and witness considered such springs would be an advantage at Greymouth, as they would leave ships free to use their anchors. If anchors had been available aiter they’ passed the Kaimai, witness believed they would have asisted to save the Abel Tasman, and . would have given a better opportunity to cant the ship. Witness on several occasions made sure .that the mooring lines were bearing an equal strain, by a personal inspection. He tested the forward lines just before the break-away, being acompanied by the first and third officers, and they were en route to the aft lines when the accident happened. When he first asked for steam on the vessel, it was available. He could not say whether the engines were going ahead after he rang the telegraph on the first occasion, but he knew there was an instant response on. the steering gear. The engines may have been turning, when he first rang. He did not think the engineer would start the engines, without an order. So far as the ultimate consequences were concerned, witness got steam when he asked for it. It would not have been an advantage to have the port chain locked in a compressor, after the starboard chain had parted, as the effect would be to part the port chain. By easing the chain over a windlass the effect was secured, without the danger of breaking the chain. Witness would prefer to have the stern moorings slackened off, rather than bound in, as they were on July 18. Such slackening would ease the pressure on the inside bow.

At this stage, the luncheon adjournment was taken.