ENGLAND’S PERIL

Greymouth Evening Star, 1 July 1912, Page 8

ENGLAND’S PERIL

THE HOPELESS ARMY, ynd the defenceless millions; ■■■ (By Harry S. Gullett.) LONDON, April 5. The utter dependence of tills country upon its navy is not fully realised until you have been here for a considerable time. London, of course, is helpless before any invader who might escape the British fleets, and roll'Up the petty British army. That everybody appreciates. But the Londoner cherishes a vague belief that in the rest of the Kingdom there would be, apart from the army, some stout resistance to the destroyer. He never clearly defines what this resistance is, but he talks in a large way of “the Yeomanry,” and cites history to prove the magnificent fighting qualities of Britain’s raw material. When you have spent some time in the provinces there comes to you an understanding of what such material would be worth if faced by a great professional Continental army. You know then just how many days of the week England would last if anything went wrong with the fleet. This is holding the British army cheap. But is any other belief possible? In itself the army is powerful, but relatively it is puerile. The regular forces at home and abroad number 166,000 the regulars in India 77,000, the reservists 136,000, the special reserve 63,000, the Territorials 270,000. Of all sorts, native troops included, there are 732,000. But tiny are scattered all over the world. The chief force in these islands is made up of the Territorials, and, to be frank, the Territorials are not impressive. They would be all right, no doubt, if they went out to fight amateurs like themselves. But put them up against Continental regulars, and God help Eng.land! Gerraanys forces, on the basis of war, number 4,000,000, and they arc being increased. France has 3,500,000, Austria-Hungary 2,000.000, Italy 1,000.000, Russia 3,000,000. And nearly all those foreign armies are in Europe, at call, ready to march out at short notice. All are professionals. Of England’s small host one-third are clerks and artisans playing at soldiering for a night or two a week, an occasional afternoon, and a fortnight or three weeks a year in camp.

“NOTHING BEHIND THE ARMY.” And what Of the resistance of the nation apart from the army? It is appalling. London is no more defenceless than the provinces. 'The fighting value of the rustic is a good theme for ballads, but it does not exist in fact. I here would not be half an hour’s job fur a few tlxousand German soldiers in ail the farmers and farm labourers and country gentry in the Kingdom. They would go pell inell into the cities. And the cities ? Rome, in her most debased amir, or Egypt at her softest seasons, 'Ld not present to the barbarian a task half so easy as the great cities of England. It would not be necessary to shed a drop of blood. There would be no long sieges. The story would be: The overthrow of the handful! of regulars, the confusion of the hapless Territorials, the retreat on the cities, and—starvation and national capitulation. impresses you so deeply is that M ; rh defencelessness exists in a nation wiiich is in the very prime of its vigour. For whatever may come in England iu th.o future as a result of the hideous crowding into cities, it is only the fool who talks deterioration to-day. ibis country is sound and strong; its people are full of courage and fight. 1 hat is why their helplessness affects you so strongly. It seems all wrong that a mighty people, physically and mentally clean and vigorous, and with a peerless record in feats of arms, should be in itself so incapable of defence. It is hard to accept the policy which declares that it is the navy, or disaster; that if a few score thousand British seamen are beaten on the water. nothing remains but to bow to the invader. No Eastern fatalism is more amazing than this. MILLIONS OF BABES, iou see here in the mighty industrial centres more able-bodied men and more men capable of tight than in any areas of similar size in the world. You see tens of thousands of strong men leaving the docks and the iron works, and the mills, and the mines ; and you realise with a gasp that not one in 50 of them has handled a rifle, and that not a thousand of them could stand up to ■fifty German soldiers. And they go to their homes with light hearts, and their employers, the greatest industrialists the world has ever seen, sleep soundly in their beds, careless of the possibilities of the sudden destruction which might possibly overtake them. Tlio nation is strong in its opposition to a larger army, stronger still against universal training; the Territorial forces, although yet young, and offering novelty, cannot be kept up to their full strength.

One cannot convey the impression of feebleness which, say, Lancashire gives to the stranger. Yen see millions upon millions of strong, intelligent men, who, if invasion came, would be as harmless as babes. Such a condition cannot be justified. No naval strength condones it. The most powertul navy is but an artificial barrier, a tiling subject to the assault of combinations which might overthrow it; subject moreover to “acts of God” or the capricious sea. The nation is, in us na\y, more or less dependent upon a strong element of luck. England is not intrinsically strong. It is a repetition of the old folly of a successful wealthy nation laying down its arms and leaving its defences to a few professionals and to the power of money work 67 m Wai ’ Can ° nly do parfc of A CHANGE NOT LIKELY. But no change is probable. Nor is this surprising. It is easy to point to the danger, but difficult to point to an alternative . scheme. Easy to talk of a citizen soldiery, difficult to bring it about. More soldiers mean more taxes, i lip poor will pay no more taxes for the maintenance of the army. Tax wealth, you say. . The same thing. Ihe taxed employer will not ' increase ms wages. The workers are after higher wages. Again, the workers fear militarism. Thus the nation’s millions are opposed to a great British 5 ;V ld without the vote of the millions the change cannot be made. Aor is the opposition of Labor the one obstacle. What is the use, says the voice of the majority, in having a great army if y ou can’t feed it and the people in the time of peril? In other words, if the season ever comes when foe is able to land in England the British Navy will have %&****<* *«•;»«. jirtS eontm! is gone England will starve, and the finest army in Europe will not save her. Therefore we are, whether wo like It or not, dependent' on the navy, and not upon the army, and our course, is clear. ;■ rV; ; " • '• ‘ _• . L . • So savs the Liberals and Freetraders. Enter then the Protectionists, who insist that this utter dependence upon th© navy and oversea supplies must come to an end, and that, together with a strong army, must come the resuscit&Hpn 'of;'England's rural industries. Alid then you are back ■±9 th© fiscal issue, and so the ; argument goes round and round. The rural industries can only be revived by duties and higher

prices. And the millions , .of Lancashire, already pressed for existence!, ask if .it is hot., better to ,be dependent on the navy and oversea supplies,; than to be starved out of England altogether. The --appalling . defencelejssness is a nightmare, but the solution is not so simple as it might- appear.