BRITAIN, U.S.A., AND FRANCE HAVE DIFFERENT VIEWS ON RUHR

Evening Star, Issue 26153, 15 July 1947, Page 5

BRITAIN, U.S.A., AND FRANCE HAVE DIFFERENT VIEWS ON RUHR

(N.Z.P.A. Special Correspondent.! (Rec. iO a.m.) LONDON, July 14. The British Government is to send a team of experts to Washington to discuss the production and distribution of Ruhr coal. It is reported that America will ask the World Loan Bank for a £75,-. 000,000 loan to assist Ruhr recovery. , The significance of Washington’s invitation; it is stated, is that it underlines the importance attached by America to the problem of industry in Western Germany, where coal is the key to greater output. It further emphasised the generally accepted American view that aid to Europe must at the same time mean that greater use be made of 'Germany’s industrial resources. Sooner or later, it is remarked by the diplomatic correspondent of the ‘ Yorkshire Post,’ the quesion of what contribution German ' industry is to make will have to be faced if the Marshall offer is to materialise. He adds that Britain wants to put into effect in the near future Mr Bevin’s often declared aim of nationalising the Ruhr mines,, but America is opposed to this, and proposed that trustees be appointed for a five-year period, and that the Germans should then decide on nationalisation.

Some members of the British Cabinet are reported to be ready to accept the American proposal, but acceptance would mean postponement of the nationalisation of all basic industries in the British zone, which has been a cardinal aim of British .policy. The ‘ Economist ’ remarks that the Paris discussions on the Marshall plan cannot develop' far without the question of the Ruhr moving to the centre of the stage. The Ruhr, presents the Allies with three problems: First, the level of production to be permitted; secondly, the type .or authority which should supervise the area; and thirdly, the disposal of the Ruhr’s products in a divided Europe. The paper adds that Britain and France disagree at every point on a policy for the (Ruhr, and the beginning of more active American interest ha# not resolved the differences, but introduced new variations on a troubled theme. The Americans appear to distrust the British administration of the Ruhr, and it is likely that America will insist that it should be managed either under Anglo-American control or under - a tripartite administration with the French. (Remarking On the “ very complex situation,” the ‘ Economist ’ adds that if the Marshall offer is not to result in fundamental disagreement on principle, there must be some coming together of Allied opinion, sqjne pooling of differences, aiid some willingness for compromise in the solution. The position to-dav is that while the French and Americans agree on interAUied control and the British do not, the Britisli and Americans believe iij a higher level of industry and the French do not. This deadlock is reinforced by the lessening value the United States appears to attach to AngloFrench co-operation. It will demand \ some sacrifice of opinion from each of the Powers if any compromise is to be coaxed or screwed out of this uncompromising situation.