RATANA DERAILMENT

Evening Star, Issue 23015, 21 July 1938, Page 21

RATANA DERAILMENT

FURTHER COMMENT BY INQUIRY BOARD In addition to its finding on the cause of the Katana derailment on March 26, the Board of Inquiry commented as under on various matters arising from the hearing:— “ The position of the speed board near the 6.4 chains radius curve at which the derailment in the present case occurred is, as we have stated, 429 ft beyond the commencement of the length of line that it is intended to protect. Radius boards are always placed at the beginning of the curves to which they relate, and we think it desirable that speed boards should similarly be placed at or, if necessary, before the commencement of the lengths of line that they are intended to protect. Caro should be taken to ensure that those boards are so placed as to be clearly visible for as groat a distance as possible. “ We desire to make it clear that the position of the speed board in question had no bearing on the derailment of train W 4. It is even probable that the imposition of a special speed restriction to 20 miles an hour from a point 429 ft south of the present location of the speed board is unnecessary. The point that we desire to stress is the desirability of placing a speed board in a position that coincides as nearly as practicable with the point at which the working time-table requires the special speed restriction to become effective. STANDARD SCHEDULES. “ It appeared during the course of the inquiry that the chief engineer’s branch, which has no responsibility for the actual operation of trains, not only determines the speed restrictions, which ia the legitimate duty of that branch, but also prepares the detailed running schedules for the use of the operating branches. This seems anomalous, in that the civil engineering branch is no more concerned with the actual operation and performance of the locomotives and rolling stock than the locomotive superintendent is with the maintenance of the way and works. This procedure docs not actually relieve the locomotive superintendent of any responsibility; it rather makes his responsibilities more onerous, because the train-runping schedules are drafted, with speed-restrictions as their basis and chief concern, by officers who do not' possess first-hand knowledge or experience of the economics of locomotive operation, or of the practical handling of trains over difficult country such as is characteristic of most of the New Zealand railway system. . “ One result of this procedure was disclosed in some very frank evidence that was given before the board in the course of this inquiry, when it was stated that, in actual practice, drivers did not feel bound to give any ‘ slavish adherence ’ to the standard schedules prepared by the chief engineer’s branch, but relied more upon their own knowledge and experience in train-handling. It seems desirable to observe, therefore, that some amendment of the existing procedure in the preparation of standard running schedules is called for, in order to remove any possible ’justification' for not adhering, strictly to the limits prescribed, and would be in the interests of economical operation as well as of safety. “It is for the chief engineer to prescribe the maximum permissible speeds over those sections which, by reason of difficulties (e.g., curves and steep' descents combined) due to exigencies of location or of maintenance, demand special restrictions; but the manner in which the engine run as a whole is to be shaped, so as, on the one hand, to meet the requirements of the traffic branch, and on the other, to ensure due observance of the necessary restrictions of the way and works branch, is essentially a matter for the responsible operating officer—namely, the locomotive superintendent.” CONSTRUCTION OF CARS. On the question of - the replacement of the passenger cars now m use on New Zealand railways by cars of allsteel construction, the board agreed with the memorandum (previously published) of the general manager (Mr G. H. Mackley). Reference was also made to a report on the circumstances of a collision between two trains on the Rhodesian railway system on April 4 of this year. Sir Nigel Gresley, chief mechanical engineer of the London and North-eastern Railway, who is a recognised expert, stated that it was his belief that more lives would be lost in a collision between heavy steel coaches than in one between trains of more flexible construction. With heavy steel coaches the impact would be more sudden and severe. The board concurred with this expression of opinion, and added that in its opinion the substitution of electricity for gas as a lighting medium for passenger cars had removed, or, at all events, very considerably reduced, the risk of fire that formerly was present in all bases in which a train was seriously damaged as the result of a collision or derailment. DRIVER’S FRANKNESS. The board, in the course of its report, remarked that throughout his entire evidence the driver displayed a frankness and sincerity which were to be commended. His general evidence was more consistent with the ascertained facts and with other evidence on which reliance could be placed than that of any other single witness who deposed to the matters covered by him.