JAPAN AND RUSSIA

Evening Star, Issue 22974, 3 June 1938, Page 10

JAPAN AND RUSSIA

CONFLICT UNLIKELY TILL HEW FACTOR ARISES Will Japan fight the Soviet Union? No question, perhaps, is more frequentiy discussed in the Far Last; and on few questions is such little precise information available, writes W. H. .Chamberlain, from Tokio, to the > Christian Science Monitor;’ When I .was in Mukden last October lively interest had been aroused among the foreigners there by recent largo movements of Japanese troops and war material by various routes ±o the north, towards the Soviet frontier. In Tokio, in Peking, in Shanghai, Harbin, and other Far Eastern centres there are periodical waves of rumours about impending Soviet-Japanese hostilities. On the eve of winter one hears that tvar will begin as soon as the freezing of the huge Amur River makes it more passable. In spring the rumour is to the effect that warmer weather makes hostilities more feasible. A peculiarly stubborn rumour, which had acquired some measure of credence in Japanese circles last autumn, was ithat the Soviet Union proposed to help China by encouraging its satellite State of Outer Mongolia to attack the Japanese troops in North China. I was altways sceptical about this strategic idea myself. PTo matter how well trained its army may be .under Soviet instructors, Outer Mongolia, with less than a million inhabitants, is clearly no match for Japan. , Should Outer Mongolia take the initiative and attack the Japanese it would merely give the latter an excellent excuse for . occupying this vast, sparsely-populated territory and coming np directly to the border of Siberia —the last thing the Soviet Government would desire.

SEEMS TO HAVE GONE. So, -while Outer Mongolia -would inevitably take part, on the Soviet.side, in any general Sovict-Japanese conflict, isolated action by Outer Mongolia never seemed to this writer to make sense. It has certainly not occurred up to the present time ; and this particular rumour seems to have subsided. Considerable movements of troops and supplies to the Siberia-Manchukuo border there certainly have been, and on both sides of the frontier. But these movements are hot necessarily indicative of an imminent outbreak of hostilities. What is important is not the absolute, blit the relative, strength of an- army, or of a navy also, for that matter. For instance,, there were prohahly about 350,000 Soviet troops in Eastern Siberia and about 150,000 Japanese troop* in Manchukuo before the fighting in China started last summer. These figures have considerably increased, may have doubled on each side. But this leaves the situation, as regards relative strength, very much where it ■wa* before. Neither side on the basis of the present situation could count on a certain, swift, and easy victory. Soviet numerical superiority is offset by superior Japanese facilities for quickly bringing up reinforcements. Now a fairly even balance of strength Is, next to thorough-going mutual disarmament, a reasonable deterrent to war. No Government likes to assume iihe political and financial risks of modern warfare unless it feels reasonably confident of victory. Moreover, despite the bristling Japanese and Soviet military preparations along the 'Amur frontier, there are strong deterrent factors whkh would seem to restrain each country from going to war. HEAVILY INVOLVED. Japan is heavily involved in China, and for an indefinite period of time. As for the Soviet Union, it can feel no certainty that Hitler’s Drang naoh Osten will stop short of its frontiers, especially if it should become involved in a serious struggle many thousands of miles away from its European boundaries. Moreover, the amazing slaughter of prominent generals, diplomats, and other high Soviet functionaries would not suggest a state of internal morale capable of standing the strain of a large war. To say that war, on the face of the available evidence, does not seem imminent is not to suggest that JapaneseSoviet relations are friendly or normal. Far from it. There are perpetual pinpricks, of which the_ latest is a dispute over Manchukuo’s liability to pay the concluding instalment of the purchase price for the Chinese Eastern Railway, acquired from the Soviet Union in 1935.

Arrests of Japanese and Koreans in Soviet' territory and detentions of Soviet ships in Japanese waters add to the tension. The Soviet Government is making a determined effort to squeeze out three more Japanese Consulates in Soviet towns,_ after already closing the Consulates in Novosibirsk and Odessa. And, of course, the participation not only 'of Soviet aeroplanes, hut of Soviet flyers, one of whom was recently captured, in the war on China’s side does not make for good feeling in Japan. To the much-discussed question whether the Soviet Union will fight Japan, I should be inclined to risk the answer “ No,” on a short-term view of the situation.

On tho other hand, if one takes a long-term view, there is unmistakably enough mutual suspicion and ill-will between the two countries to make plausible, a score of pretexts for war. But this war is not likely to start until some new factor, invisible on the political horizon at the present moment, tips the present relatively even balance of military strength decisively to one side or to the other.