BATTLE TIDES

Evening Star, Issue 16824, 28 August 1918, Page 6

BATTLE TIDES

THE EBB AND FLOW. HINDENSURG'S LINE. WHY CONSTRUCTED. ALSACE. [By Criticcs.)

Bain is falling on the western front, covering the countryside with deep mud and pools of water. The area, over which the fighting is taking place, being a wide mass of shellholes, soon becomes a mere quagmire under the influence of rain, so the rapidity of o\ir advance is slackening. Noverthless, useful progress continues to be made, and our attack east and southeast of Arras seems to have surprised tho Germans, who had drawn away their reserves to meet attacks further south. At Monchy 1© Preux, it is pointed out, we have breached tho Hindenburg line. That is true; but the Hindenburg line at that point runs quite close to Arras. In point of fact, only that part of tho German line running for a few miles south-eastward from Arras was called the Hindenburg lino in the first instance, other sectors being called the Siegfried line and similar names; but tho fact that the new line had been established by Hindenburg, aud the convenience of using one name, led the whole of the line, from east of Arras via St. Quentin to La Fere, being termed the Hindenburg line. There is a report that the lino has been smashed near Heninel, on the Cojeu'l River, five miles southeast of Arras, and the Scottish have reached the outskirts of Ro?.ux, on the Scarpe. Further south, the capture of Favreuil, nearly two miles north-east of Bapaume, and Le Barque, two miles to the southwest, halve drawn, a half-circle round Bapaume, and there is a. report of its capture. Bazentiu le Grand, at the eastern extremity of tho Thiepval Ridge, has fallen to the Welsh, so the whole of the ridge is now ours. English troops are elose to Mon'ta-übon, rather more than a mile almost due south of Bazentiu le Grand, and the Australians have captured Suzanne and Gappy, standing respectively on the northern and southern banks of the Somme and on a lino two miles east of Bray. The French fronts seem quiet for the moment, and little is reported save the capture of Fresnoy lea Rove, three miles north-west of Rove, a.nd St. Mard, on the banks of tho A vie. only n, little more than one mile to the west "of the same town. But it is highly probable that General Mangin is preparing aaiother shrewd blow. A good point to look for it is along the Vesle and eastward, between the Aisne and the Ailctte. Now that, they have bent back the Germaai flank in that neighborhood to n right an.de, the French are not likely to allow the enemy to retain possession of the Vesle without a big effort to eject them, isv drivinc the Germans back from the Vesie the Allies will regain the use of the Paris-Rheims lateral railway, which will be invaluable as a line of communication for the forces east of Rkeims. A later cable states that the French have advanced south-west of Rove, taking 1,100 prisoners. THE ENEMY'S DIFFICULTIES. Marshal Foch has very aptly likened tho position to the ebb of the German tide which so recently readied high-water mark. It woidd be difficult to imagine a more complete reversal of a situation than that which we now see, compared with the position three months ago. It will not, however, be wise to take seriously all that is coming through from the correspondents, -R'ho are obviously elateii by the turn of I events. No doubt the enemy are somewhat pressed for men, and probably it is ' true that they are throwing them into the fighting line in comparatively small numbers ; but it is easy to exaggerate thoir difficulties. Now that they are thrown back upon tho defensive, they are bound to keep the main body of their reserves well in hand, and feed them in sparingly, in order that they may have a powerful j force with which to meet any sudden blow. Moreover, the road's leading rearwards will be heavily congested with transport, guns, and impedimenta of all descriptions. Reinforcements moving towards the fighting lino against the stream tend to make confusion worse confounded, and it is natural that the German High Command should wish to send back no more than is necessary. This tendency to under-estirnate the enemy's strength is merely the reliction against the tendency to over-estimate their strength which prevailed a few weeks ago, when they were gaining ground. X'ir shook! too much importance be attached to discussions in the German Press of the possibility of a retirement to the Rhino becoming necessary. The enemy are certain to discuss all possibilities, but they are by no means in a humor to admit themselves beaten yet. The ' Kolnischo Zeitung ' says : '" It is no longer a question of Belgium and Alsace-Lorraine; we are fighting for Germany's life. Let us not despair." And 'Vonvarts' adds: "The German people are not beaten; what are bfaten axe the omnipotence of tho mailed fist, and the jingoes of world dominion." These are the utterances of a people aiive to tho seriousness of the situation, and realising that they have their backs to tho wall; but there is no evidence of despair. When Germany falls hack to the Rhine it will mean that she is beaten, because she can only do that bv abandoning the source of 80 per cent, of her iron supplies and tho very life-blood of her war industries. THE HINDENBURG LINE.

She will probobly never retire to the Rhinc> voluntarily, and to guard her iron supplies she must fight to a finish on the Hinden-. burp line and the Lorraine front. So the already famous Hindenburg line is likely to become an even more historic name in the future. The reasons for the choice of this particular line are of somo interest. In the first place, Germany had to choose a line for defensive purposes vr-lnch wa-s ns short as possible, and yet which kept the Allies at arms' length'from the great iron fields of tho Brioy Valley. The Hindenburg line fulfilled both these conditions fairly well, being as short as circumstances allowed, and vet nearly 90 miles west of the Briey Valley at La Fere. It is fairly well covered by rivers, hills, woods, and other natural defensive features. Moreover, from Luxemburg the ground slopes steadily westward towards the Atlantic, the high ground contracting to quite a n arrow ridge about 30 miles wide «outh of Arras. Tho Hindenburg line crosses that ridge where it m still comparatively narrow, while behind it the ground rise 3 eteaclilv eastward. So if the Allies attack the lino from west to east they will bar© to fight uphill all tho way to Luxemburg. The Hindenburg line is one of the great tide mai-ks of the war formed by the forward and backward swaying 'of the contending forces, Amiens , and the Marne representing the opposite limits. When the Germans made their great rush in 1914 thev reached Amiens and Senlis, the latter place being only 30 miles from Paris ; but thoy were then pushed back to the Aisne and tho We made a big bulge in their line i«* the Sommo in _ 1916, and Russia gained great successes in the east during that year. The opening of 1917 saw the enemv so heavily pressed by Russia that Hindenburg decided to fall back in the spring to what is now known as the Hindenburg line. But then came the collapse of Russia, and this, by relieving tho pressxvre on the eastern front, rendered possible the German offensive of this summer, which again carried th?.m to tho Marne and near to Amiens, Now the tide |is ebbing again. But we still have about 18 miles to go before we again reach the I Hindenburg line at St. Quentin. A RUSH FOR THE RHINE.

Although it is highly desirable that wo should drive the enemy back to the Hindenburg line this summer, there is no reason why we should attack that line except by rolling it up from the south. Once the enemy have fallen back behind it, our

true strategy is to operate in the angle behind Nancy, where wo have the inner line. The Central News, in a message from Paris, declares: "Interesting events are expected in the Yosges and Lorraine, but the hour has not yet struck." If the Allies were about to strike along the fronts mentioned, it would not be good business to advertise the fact. Yet there are great possibilities in the direction of the Vosges, tho line of hills dividing France from Alsace, if the Allies want a good line of operations to fill in their time this autumn. Tho French and Americans are well across the border into Alsace, and only about 15 miles from the Rhino. Now, there has been no heavy fighting in Alsace for many long months/and the German front there is almost certain to be thinly held by troops of inferior quality. We have, in addition, the inner line in that region. By bluffing heavily in tho north against the Hindenburg line or the Briey Valley, whilo secretly concentrating against Alsaoe, Marshal Foch could probably spring a surprise on tho enemy this autumn which would carry the allied front to the Rhine along its narrowest reaches, and perhaps even across it. That would put the enemy into a terribly difficult strategical position, as it would constitute a threat to tho heart o'f Germany, and the Allies might even aspire to join hands with tho Italians across the Tyrol. Tho Germans would have to guard „both tho Briey Valley and the eastern bank of the Rhine against superior forces holding tho inner lino, and their task %vould bo practically impossible in face of skilfully-conducted surprise attacks.