WHERE WILL GERMANY STRIKE?

Evening Star, Issue 16677, 8 March 1918, Page 6

WHERE WILL GERMANY STRIKE?

NOT OX THE WESTERN FRONT. SAYS FRANK H. SIMONDS. The campaign of 1918 opens with certain very ciearly marked problems in all minds. By reason of the Russian collapse and the Italian disaster, the Germans have regained the offensive, the initiative. Theirs is now the opportunity and the power to strike. If or their enemies the riddle is now : TV here will the next German blow fall? In the west, in Salonica, In Asia? In addition, there is the problem of the Italian campaign, which is still proceeding. Will the Germans and their Austrian allies, who are doing moat of the work, hr able to press their advantage to the extent of compelling the Italians, now supported by the French and the British, io fall back to the line of the Adige, surrendering Venice, Vicenza,, and Padua? It is perhaps worth while at ths outset to examine for a moment the conditions out of which the present Goman advantage has gioun. At the outset of the last campaign, that of 1917, the German situation was, on the surface, almost desperate. Russia, Franco. Britain, and Italy, with their minor Allies, possessed a combine,:! force, vastly in excess of the troops oi Germany and Austria. 'Dio Central Powers wore outnumbered on every front, and, by contrast with their condition in the previous year, they no longer possessed a strategic reserve like that used against. Verdun, GERMANY HARD PRESSED.

Beginning in June, July, and August, 1916. when French and British troops at the Somme., Italian troop? alone tho Isonzo, and Russian troops in Galicia had developed a concentric and, in a measure, a co-ordinated offensive, the Germans had been compelled to accept the defensive, and on all frents they had Inst ground, prisoners, and advantages which were not to he concealed nr counter-balanced by the successful offensive made against Rumania just as tho camnaign clortd, an offensive which was actually successful, because Rumania was sold out by tho Russian ruling faction, betrayed, and thus abandoned to destruction. Germany had found herself hard pressed all through the latter half of 1916, and her enemies might reasonably have expected nt this tim-e last year that with the renewal of a concentric attack in 1917 Germany would be forced to shorten her lines east and west, or court the disaster which came to Leo when he endeavored to hold a front too extended for his numbers in the last days of the Confederacy.

THE CONCENTRIC ATTACK was resumed, but after a preliminary round of allied successes—French and British on the west front, Italian, on tho Isnnzo. and Russian in Galicia—Russia suddenly collapsed, and from that moment onward rapidly disappeared as a factor in the situation. With the disappearance, of Russia the Allies lost their advantage in numbers. Conceivably they were still more numerous, hut they had no longer a derisive advantage. " Moreover, since tho western front has onlv a- limited extent, Germany at once acquired a reserve to be used on this line when there was need, although she did not make and has not as yet made any largo draft upon it. ALLIED FAILURE- IN 1917. Tho failure of the allied offensive in 1917 was assured tho moment Russia dropped nut-, and Germany was henceforth in a position to level a new blow. Rho bad tho numbers on the. line and behind it to make the security of the western front absolute, despite minor fluctuation's. What should she do with her new reserres acquired through Russian- defection? P'no elected to use a portion of thorn-—-a small fraction, certainly less than 100,000—in an offensive against Italy, whose Tsomso attack was becoming dangerous to Austrian safely. The result was the Italian disaster and the loss bv Italy of 200.000 prisoners, half of all her artillery, and more than half of all her military accumulation in stores and munitions. The Italian disaster completed the ruin of allied prospects which tho Russian cniLarse had begun. Italy now became a- liability, and it was necessary to send men .and guns at once to save her. At the moment when the Germans were beginning to transfer their troops from tho eastern to (ho western front the Allies were obliged to detach two armies from the western front to soivo in Italy ; and with tins action they lost all advantage of numbers on the west. The recent British attack at Cnmbrai, which might have resulted in one of the decisive battles of the war had Haig been able to support Bynff with the corps sent, under Plainer to Italy, ended in a. hitter disappointment and a dashing of all British hopes. As the New Year opens the Germans arc able to put on the western front substantia!’,’.' as many troops as Hie British and tho French. I do not think that even Austrian aid will give the Germans anv decisive advantage in the matter of numbers. They are able to concentrate in the g’est most of the guns hitherto used again-t the Russians, all those captured from the Italians, and it is not impossiMe that emuo of the Russian artillery will presently find its way to the German lines in the west. In this situation any allied offensive on a- large scale becomes, if not impossible, altogether unlikely. To attack now would mean for tile Allies huco losses, with relatively small possibility of a supreme success. It-would risk exhaustion v.-i'V-vt commensurate promise of victory. On the other baud, to wait, to -accent the d.-Rwivo, is to enable the United Statei to tiring up its forces, of which no large portion can be effective in. 1918, but perhaps a million will he ready to take, part- in the campaign of 1919. Heueo tire Allies, since Hie submarine warfare docs not threaten them with, famine or defeat in the next 16 months, are hound to accept the defensive ■au-d let Germany risk e-xhauption bv the attack. WHERE WILL SHE STRIKE? Now, as tho sit-nation stands to-day, Germany has the men and the material for an attack. But- she cannot wait. No great new ally is gating ready behind her guns, as we are preparing behind the French and British armies. Her prospects next year will certainly he worse than thev are now. But far and away beyond the-"mili-tary arc trio economic questions. Every month the war continues tho world is becoming insensibly but unmistakably organised industrially, economically, and'fir.ancially against- the German. The hostility to Geimanv is spread mg, and the task "f regaining the old markets and establishing tho old commercial Tclatinrs is becoming more difficult. Thus, if Germany has the opportunity to strike, she has also the necessity of making prompt efforts to close the war, which is; no longer merely a problem of military factors. But wiie.ro will she strike? This is tho question which is filling the Press of the world to-day. Will she strike in Asia Minor to regain Bagdad and Jerusalem, restore her dream of a Bcrlin-Byzantium-Bngdad Railway, regain her old sally-port against British Egypt and the Suez Canal which a Turkish Palestine supplied? Will she attack the heterogeneous force now defending Salonika. and offering the sole European obstacle to tho completion of Mittol Europa, walling off this wist Teutonic ci'p'dimi from the TEgean and from the natural outlet- of the Central Empire at the south? WESTERN OFFENSIVE UNLIKELY. Or will the Germans make one more colossal effort in. the west? They failed at the Marne, they’ failed at the Yser and about Ypres. they failed at Verdun ; and in these three attempts they had all the advantages that numbers, preparation, munitions could give them. Can they hope to succeed now? Is it worth the sacrifice, recognising that if they trv and fail they will come to the end of the year facing victorious foes who are assured of a great strategic reserve in the following campaign, when the United- States is at last ready? The Germans have announced their forthcoming attack is to be made in the west. They have heralded it with brass bands and a- blare of trumpets; but their attack upon Verdun, upon Russia in April, 1915, upon Italy a few weeks ago, all these were surprises ?o far as German publicity was concerned. If Germany contemplated an attack in the west would she talk about it, giving her foes duo warning, tho chance to make the last iri’enaration. and search,, their own fronts

yet one© more for some weak point? It seems to mo-—and this is the conclusion I find in most of the Lurope-an journals—that a German offensive in the we*;t is unlikely. It is by no means inconcelv■able; it may come—it mil come if the Germans aro actually in possession of information, naturally lacking in our own case, which would load them to believe that either the British or the French armies are breaking down in morale, as were the Italian before the recent disaster; but, accepting the possibility, it remains plain that the great weight of chanco is against such a. venture. A western offensive can come, it seems to me, only if the German situation—l mean economic, not military'— is so desperate that the Germans feel that they- must risk everything on one more bid for a quick decision. In that case they will attack in the west, because nowhere else can a decision be had. A complete victory' in Italy, even a victory yvhicb brought Italy to make a separate peace, would not jie decisive so far as Britain, Franco, and the United States aro concerned. Much less would a complete success at Salonika or about Bagdad win the yvar, or even compel peace on terms which would leave Germany any substantial profit for her great sacrifices in men and treasure. Victory in tho yvar, if it is to come on the field of battle, must como somewhere between the North Sea and Switzerland, and if Germany feels that she must risk all on one more hid for a decision under conditions far less advantageous than on the other occasions she will attack in the yvest, and we shall see the greatest conflict of the yvar unfold within the next two or three months. MINOR GOAL PROBABLE.

On the other hand, if Germany hopes simply to last the yvar out, if she hopes to yvin it as Frederick the Great yvon his most terrible struggle, by wearing out his foes, as Louis XfV. saved his territory in the War of the Spanish Succession, sho is most likely fo seek to break tho nerve of her opponents by aiming at victories in indecisive fields, which, despite the fact that they are minor, yvill impress the yvorld, and because of local circumstances can bo won with a minimum of coat to herself. Such an operation yvas the attack upon Rumania- a year ago. The recent Italian affair is an equally good illustration of this strategy. If Germany desires to take Salonika, I think the majority of allied military critics are of the opinion that she could do it at a price. She has the interior lines of communication. An attack upon Salonika would put tho allied transport system to a very great strain; it would compel a further shift of French and British troops to the Near East, certain to be opposed bitterly in both nations, and it would thus weaken the western front, which remains the decisive front. The Germans could also rely upon Bulgarian troops for tho main effort. For Bulgaria Salonika is the prize that has been sought ever since Bulgaria began to have great aspirations. A MACEDONIAN VICTORY. Germany would supply the guns, the generalship, a few chosen troops, perhaps no more than those Below is leading in Northern Italy. Certa in Austrian units might be added, noyv that Austria has been saved from immediate anxieties. Such an attack would be directed against a very strange allied army, made up of Italians, Serbs, Greeks, Russians, British, French, and contingents dra'.vn from British and French colonics. These forces hold a yvido front, yvith comparatively few good lines of communication behind Diem, and the people of the districts they occupy are in jiart hostile, as is a considerable element in all of Greece, Kow, conceive what yvould be the effect of a sudden and successful push early in the spring yvhicb carried the Germans close to Salonika, if it did not immediately win the town. At the outset of a new campaign tho Allies yvould suffer a moral defeat. They yvould have promptly to decide yvhethor to send troops from the Ivest to the Near East at a moment yvhen the German blow in the west yvould still seem t-o be hanging over their heads. For, whatever happens, tho Gentians are going to have the men and tho guns to attack in tho yvest if they choose, yvithout regard to any Macedonian effort. In fact, if the Allies should decide to send men and guns from the yvest to Salonika, in addition to the armies which will have to be maintained in Northern Italy, the Dormans might decide, rightly or wrongly, that the situation in thAWsst, thus modified, warranted tho launching of a real offensive which should aim at a decision. WHAT ABOUT, SALONIKA? In y word. a- German offensive against Salonika which would have a real chance of success would, at the opening of Dio fighting season of 1918, upset all" the Allied plans and precipitate a real crisis, tho crisis incident to making the decision, wnelhe-r to continue to spend men and guns and transport, the most precious element ot all, upon a Macedonian sideshow. if the decision was against such dissipation • Greece might fall” and the German domination of tho Balkans yvould be complete, the Kaiser would re-establish his and confront the yvorld with the accomplished fact. Now, as to Asia. Just as tho attack upon Salonika would, in the main, be made bv Bulgur troops, an offensive against Bagdad ami Jerusalem would bo chiefly the work of Turkish troops, German ied. reinforced by a few Gorman divisions, and munitioned and gunned by the Gormans. It yvould cost the Germans little, in life and a failure would have no disastrous effects at home. And the same is equally true of the Salonika enterprise; if* it succeeded. Die British would have (o face the problem ol making new sacrifices in the West and withdrawing now divisions, or of accepting the loss of Mesopotamia ami gi\ing all Ine-ir attention to the doi'enoo lu hqypt. Egypt and India would, in a sense, _be imperilled, and both have a value in tho British mind wholly' unappreciated by any other nation save the German. VENICE LIKELY TO FALL. Hie last thing iu tho work! I am Irving to do is to prophesy that the Gormans'wiil make tnoir great effort for 1913 in Macedonia or in Asia, or in both’ regions. VWut I am trying to point out is that the yyeiglit cf evidence points in this direction. I expect to sc, the AustroGernnm offensive in Northern Italy reach the Adige eiiaer before winter shuts down or in the spring. The Central Power? have advanced in tho mountains now to Die point where they possess most of the necessary ground, and tho Italian position seems to me untenable. The Italians will naturally hold ;(■ is long as possible, to gain time to prepare the line of tho Adige, but the line of the Piave. m the judgment of military men. is no longer permanently tenable,' in the Lace of recent Anstro-Gcrman gains on the A.siajto Platotu. This means that Venice will fall. U means that a new strain may be put upon Allied resources in men if Italy cali? for further reinforcements. Add to this a successful offensive in the spring against Salonika, and what will the result be? Will the Allies then send still more iroops from Dio West to save I'm Balkans? If they do. so much the better opening for a German offensive in the W;sl. so much .greater the strain upon Allied'. transport and by so much more the domestic problems of food and power in the Allied countries aro complicated. Exactly the same circumstances arc in the picture if the Salonika blow i s preceded by a winter campaign against Bap-dad ALLIES MUST WAIT.” If the Germans can wait six months if their economic, political, and indm-ti-W condition enables the high command to pursue a strategy puraly" concerned with military considerations, then it seem? to me they are bound to make their first campaigns in Macedonia and in Asia, with an intensification of pressure noon T talv if they do not push her behind ‘the Adige oefore the epriny campaign opens Thereafter, if the Allies should viehl to hi ■ obvious temptation and French and j>iitish Hoops are .sent to Ttalv and to Salonika, if British troops are withdrawn ti-nm r landers for Egypt and Palestine, Hum Dio Germans can launch their great Western offensive. Meantime they can threaten tins gV'it buiw, using it as : political rather than a military weapon, holding it over the heads of their Western iocs and thus possibly contributing to She discussion of peace. Ti the Allies hold fast to the west, aiul take their losses in the east, Germany, having launched no western offensive, can

still seek a peace by negotiation with the coming of the winter, using the successes she may have attained, perhaps at Salonika, perhaps at Bagdad, probably in Northern Italy, as arguments to prove that she is invincible. And in all this time the Allies yvill hardly be in a position to make a really great offensive in the west because the United States will not yet be able to supply the troops necessary to ensure a decisive advantage in numbers. If this German pence bid fails, then tho advantage will pass for all the period o! the yvar to the enemies of Germany', because our reserves of men are yvell-nigh unlimited, and by the spring of 1919, thanks to a million American troops. Germany' yvill be outmanned on the western front, and we and our aJlies will be in a position to launch _ and maintain an offensive which yvill bring Germany to terms. DOMESTIC POLITICS ANOTHER MATTER, The campaign of 1918, ns I see it, promises, then, to be one in yvhicli the Germans yvill have the offensive, and thus the opportunity to strike where thev choose. I believe they will strike, not in the west" and immediately, but that, while continuing their pressure upon Italy, they will open theb operations yvith an offensive against the British in Mesopotamia, and poaibly in Palestine, using Turkish troops and yvhen spring comes direct another attack, this time upon Salonika, employing mainly' Bulgarian troops. As the Austrians will supply most of the man-power for the Italian campaign, this will ] 6a vo the Germans with practically all their man-power m band for use on the yvestern front if they chose; but Ido not believe they' will use it there unxess the economic and industrial situation within Germany is such that they cannot endure another ten months of war, or the Allies make such a general dissipation of their foives thus yveakening their western fr6nt, that the Germans see a chance for a decision in the yvest. If they do, they will take it. In Jill this discussion I have left out any examination of the domestic political conditions of Britain, Franco, and Italy. If the people of any one of these nations become war weary, the Germans will profit. On the other hand, a collapse of the German or Austrian publics would be similarly advantageous to the Allies. But these are not, immediately, military considerations, and it is with tho military considerations that I have endeavored "to deal.