AFTER VERDUN

Evening Star, Issue 16092, 18 April 1916, Page 6

AFTER VERDUN

the mmon OBJECTIVE,

METZ AND LORRAINE.

THREAT TO SYRIA.

GREECE CONSENTS.

[By Camcus.]

The German Press aro hinting at the ! abandonment of the attack on Verdun, and putting forth the usual sequence of excuses which are considered proper after a failure. They assert that the French estimates of German losses are absurd, and they add that 90 per cent, of their wounded will be able to return to the front. To the fi rst assertion it is sufficient reply that the German philosophy of war teaches that a good general should be prepared to sacrifice the last man in order to secure the victory. They are still outside the fortress, aid. the inference is that their losses have been on an enormous scale, or else that they have lacked the courage to carry out their own principles. The assertion that 90 per cent, of their wounded return to the front is too grotesaue to merit criticism. It is further stated that the attempt on Verdun was merely intended to forestall a big French offensive ngamst Metz, which is now due. To this it may be replied that the move was no less gross a blunder on that account. The proper placo for the delivery of a blow is where it will have the maximum chance of success and the maximum measure of results in the event of success. This is as true- of a blow intended as a diversion as ot one which is intended to be pushed home. The Germans selected the point which gave them the smallest chance of success and the smallest measure of advantage in the event of success. ThmV reward has been what such stupidity deserved.

The statement that the French were planning a big attack on Metz, although obviously a mere excuse, raises some interesting questions. Wo may trust in the first place, that the French will'not allow themselves to be led into the German blunder of attacking some bia fortress for no other apparent reason than that the prospect of hammering at so prominent a target tickles their imagination. No fortress should be attacked save as a definite move in some big strategical scheme. Whenever possible fortresses should bo surrounded before being attacked, in order to cut off reinforcements and fresh ammunition supplies, and this can only be done by well-conceived strategical operations. It is possible that the French are preparing a plan which will involve the capture ot Metz as one of its details. ACROSS LORRAINE.

It has been shown in these notes that the best strategical scheme that the Germans i could have adopted against the -brencn was an attack across the Lorraine irontier. Conversely, an attack across that irontier offers considerable attractions to the French. The great German fortress of Metz lies 35 miles due east of Verdun. Between Metz and the Vosges Mountains to the east is about 40 miles ot comparatively open country which offers no really formidable military obstacles A successful blow to the north-east in that quarter by the French would bring them well round the rear of Metz, and would enable them to surround that fortress. IJiey might then hope to batter it down by an overwhelming concentration of artillery, and thus gain control of the important system of roads and railways of which it is the centre. Pushing on successfully to the north-east, they would cut right in behind the German position in i'ranee ana render it so salient and dangerous that it would probably be abandoned, 11ns plan has one marked disadvantage. _ While rendering the German position in France very salient, the French would themselves be pushing into a salient. Then- right flank would be exposed to a blow irom the direction of Strassburtr the great Alsatian fortress. Against this !■? , t0 be ,, set . the fact that their Hank would in some measure be covered by the Vosges Range. As they advanced northwards they would have to wheel their right flank eastwards and soize and entrench the mountains llie operation, however, would be very difficult and dangerous in the face of an enemy still powerful in numbers and material and still full of fight. It has been suggested by one of the most capable of our local strategists that the trench plan will be to debouch into the Rhine Valley m Alsace, and then, wheeling to the left, advance down the river thus turning the whole German position in 1< ranee. This plan offers much the same advantage as the advance across the Lorraine border and the same difficulties m an accentuated form. It will bo possible to go into them more fully another day. J There are the usual small details from Verdun It is noteworthy that the Germans claim nothing beyond the repulse of French attacks. The French have made some progress southward of Douaumont, and the cables contain an eloquent order from General Retain congratulating his troops on their conduct in the action of the 9th inst. THE MIDDLE EAST.

Although, the Turks are fighting in a most determined fashion and indulgine ir> constant counter-attacks, the Russians have further progress to report in the oaucasus. They have repulsed Turkish attacks m tho direction of Baiburt, which Ms 60 miles north-west of Erzerum on the road to Trebizond ;• and they have driven tho Turks from a strong position on the left bank of the Karadero, only 16 miles east of Trebizond. We may hope, therefore, to hear of that city bein* attacked before very long, but the facAhat they are still fighting around Baiburt indicates that the Russian progress along the Erzerum-Trebizond road lias been rather disappointing. According to the Petrograd correspondent of 'The Times,' the Turkish army in Asia Minor has practically ceased to exist as an organised force and the Russians' difficulties are now chiefly chmatical and topographical. 7,™ " not bor , n <? <*ut by the accounts of the fighting, and is probably exaggera-

The Press Bureau states that on Friday there, was a heavy gale, with rain, on the ligris but gradual progress was made on the right bank. On Saturday he weather was hazy but finr\ and our troops drove m and occupied the enemy's advanced lines. Evidently our present plan is to seize the enemy's lines on the south bank in order that our artillery may enfilade the lines to the north of the river. Success will doubtless depend on the weather and the floods, but there is still a hope for Townshend. A PROMISING PROSPECT.

Mr Pierpont Morgan declares after a visit to Britain that the immense supplies of munitions ordered in America early in the war will not be continued, because England and France are now manufacturing on such a scale as to be independent of the United States. This is a gratifying tribute to the progress made and to the prospects for the future. If we can manufacture sufficient for ourselves wo shall no longer be worried by the "problem of the exchange. Yet it is doubtful if the statement was wise. We shall probably need as many guns and as much ajfflnuaition as we can get. We cannot ha.ve too many guns. Given enough of them, we can blast our way through anv fortifications that the Germans can erect, and carry their lines with a minimum of losses. There is practically no limit to the amount of ammunition that the masses of guns we need to win a reasonably quick victor}' can expend, and such masses of guns and such expenditure of ammunition will be the cheanest way to win. Mr Pierpont Morgan's* words are likely to discourage the laying down of fresh plant by American business men. INTO THE DESERT.

Tho Australians are pushing into the desert from the Suez Canal. They have had a brisk fight at Jif-jaffa, in which.

they captured 33 Turks, and nave occupied the oasis of Katia, on the ctast road to Syria, 25 miles from tho canaJ and about six miles from the coast. How far into the desert they will go remains to be seen, but a London cable talks of the Turks pushing their preparations for an attack on the canal in a half-hearted fashion. From this it would appear that there is etill some apprehension of a Turkish attack. It would be far better to cros3 the desert (which we could easily do with the command of the sea to assist usj and attack the Turks in Syria rather than allow them to continue to bluff us into maintaining a large garrison tied up in passive defence in Egypt. Napoleon crossed the desert, and was only held up at Acre through lacking the com mand of the sea. Ibrahim Pasha crossed the desert from Egypt in 1352, and having the command of the sea was enabled to take Acre and to push right through Palestine, cross the Taurus Mountains, and threaten the complete overthrow of the Turkish Empire, until he was pulled up by the Powers. Perhaps the Australasians will follow the same routo. THE PATBAS ROUTE. •

There seems no doubt that the Allies have definitely decided to use the Patras railway for transporting the Serbian troops. Mr M. Donohoe reports that it was originally proposed that the Serbians should be shipped from Corfu to disembark at Salonika three days later, but th« journey being a perilous one the Allies determined on the journev of 12 hours to Patras, and thence to take the men "by the Peloponnesian railway via Athens. This explains the statement of the British Minister, that had the Greeks properly guarded their coastal waters against submarines the question of transporting the Serbians via the Patras railway would never have arisen. We may hope that the Allies will carry their proposition through. It will be an enormous advantage in every way. There will not only be less danger during the- short sea journey, but there will be a great economy of shipping transport. After all, there is only one real difficulty in the way of reconquering the Balkans, and that is the difficulty of communications. If the Italians cross Albania, and the Serbians go bv way of Patras through Monastir, the Vardar line w-,11 be left for the use of the AneloFronch forces. Between them the three armies should muster at least 500,000 men in _lho front line; and if an additional British iorce is sent up the Adrianople line, and the Austro-Germans prevented from aiding the Bulgarians by heavy pressure on the western and eastern fronts, then Bulgaria should soon be crushed. The decision is gratifying, as it suggests the eventual development of a definite strategical scheme.

Germany is threatening Greece, and Greece, of course, objects. But the Central Powers are not in a position to coerce Greece, and we -are. The Allies are said to have informed her that they will have recourse to strong measures 'if she attempts to thwart them. Greece may offer as many formal protests as she pleases, but any opposition should be met with the intimation that after her previous treachery towards the Allies and Serbia the least that she can do is to facilitate the transport of the 'Serbian troops. She may consider herself fortunato that the Allies have not thought fit to deal with her as her conduct would have justified, and will have only herself to blame if they even now reconsider their attitude towards her. A later cable announces that Greece will offer no opposition 'beyond a formal protest.