CREATIVE IMAGINATION

Evening Star, Issue 15892, 26 August 1915, Page 6

CREATIVE IMAGINATION

. ROMANCE AND REALITY. THE SUVLA POSITION. COMPARATIVE STRENGTHS. ADMISSIONS. [By CniTjctrs.] The imagination of the war correspondents truly a wonderful thing. In yesterday’s notes two alleged descriptions of the operations round Suvla Bay were criticised. One was from the correspondent of the ‘ Daily Chronicle ’ at Athens • the other was from an American correspondent at Mudros. These seers, from their distant stations, had been enabled by some wonderful faculty of clairvoyance to describe the events at Suvla Bay. N6r was there any lack of versimilitude in their accounts. The fighting was described in considerable detail by the ‘ Daily' Chronicle’s ’ correspondent, who informed us that the British forces had pushed six miles inland; while both of these trustworthy observers announced that we were astride the main Turkish line of cummunicafcions, and commanding the chief alternative line with our artillery. The dubious character of these alleged descriptions ' was pointed out, and to-day we have what amounts to an official description from Mr Ashmead-Bartlett, the representative of the British Press at the Dardanelles. It reveals the fact that we must-make large discounts from the clairvoyant descriptions contained in previous reports. THE REAL FACTS. What actually occurred was this : The British troops were swiftly, landed at Suvla Bay, apd on the evening of the Bth seized the high ground on the left overlooking the Gulf of Saros, known as the Kislar Dagh. Another division swept round the north end of the salt lake, and. wheeling to the south, seized the high ground to the east of the lake, which Dir Bartlett calls Anafarta Height, presumably the hill on which Kuchuk Anafarta stands. Between that village and the salt lake is a hill, to which Mr Bartlett probably refers when he speaks of the capture by a brilliant attack of the commanding position of Yelghin Burnu, eastMard of the Jake. JEJiifc the of Anafarta miming from the village of that name to the Gulf of Saros near Ejelmar Bay remained in the hands of the Turks our centre lying in the low ground between the ridge and the sea. This was unfortunate, as that.ridge is of supreme importance, and nothing ‘is s aid of its subsequent capture. In the meantime the Australian and New Zealand forces, who had been reinforced, had struck in with the double purpose of occupying the attention of the lurks jis much as possible, and of joining hands with the troops advancing from Suvla They were supported bv a British division and some Indian units. An advance was made towards the northeast by Australians and New Zealanders on the night of the 7th, with orders to rely upon the bayonet alone for the ntoht fighting. Not a shot was to be fired. °ln a few minutes all the Turkish positions nearest the sea were seized, and the way cleared for the main advance. " Then opened a long and confused struggle in a tangle of ridges and ravines, in’ which Australians, New Zealanders, British Maoris, Indians, and probably a few other races took part, not to mention the lurks and which continued throughout the Bth and the Sth. The-New Zealanders particularly distinguished themselves, judging by Mr Bartlett’s account. As a result the Turks were pushed back sufficiently far to enable the left flank of the , Anzac zone to join fiends Ulth the British around Anafarta. While this was happening considerable- progress had been made in extending our positions to the £ouin. ai <3 oast. the PRESENT POSITION. On Saturday we will sot forth the preeent position in the Gallipoli Peninsula with the aid of a map. For the. present description must suffice. M r Bartlett’s account is not very clear, and it abounds in local names for the smaller features of the landscape, which are not gtven in the.map. This makes the tangled description difficult to unravel. Bub so far as it can be followed, the British loft flank rests on the Kislar Dagh. overlooking the Gulf of Saros. From there ifc runs across the open country between the sea and Anafarta ridge, the latter feature still remaining in the hands of the Turks apparently. It crosses the hills immediately to the east ,of the salt lake and then joins up with the left flank of the Australasian forces across the Asam Dere. Irtom there the line runs down, not very fa h,^ on ? the to Gaba Tepe. Th’s is a very different position to. that pictured by the imaginative correspondents, and is a glaring illustration of their unreliability. We are not astride the main Turkish line of communication, and we do not command the other line with our artillery. We are probably not within six miles of the main road, while the alternauye route is • still farther away U hat is worse is that between our forces J oads are stron b r Turkish posinone based on rugged lines of hills Gatest cables announce the capture of an additional 800 metres- (874 yards) of' trenches in the northern zone. In the Tha h Aii- IV > ty :s to artillery duels, ifie Allies aeroplanes bombed Ak Bashi totn' t0 (. the north of Nagara, where a big tiansporfc was sunk at its moorings. Another cable announces that four krae sloops carrying troops from Lansaki ton posito, Gallipoli) have been sunk by the Allies submarines. But this is from Athens, a.nd unofficial, and therefore „nCOMPAEATIVE STRENGTH. Some remarkable and interesting figure* the best available information puts the number ot Germans under arms on the east front as 1.400,000 and on the west 3 200 000 p 1 ’ 800 ’ 0^ 0 ’ g l ™? a total of 6.300,000 German troops in the field This of course is far less than the number of able-bodied men available for war, but it is assumed to represent the number tha+ Germany is able to arm and equip. Rifled uniforms,- and equipment generally are being worn out and used up at a gigantic rate, and it is not improbable that the figures given, may fairly represent the number of men that the German Government can maintain equipped and supplied. As-sim.-ing that they are approximately corquestion of vital importance is : Gill the Germans bo able to materialV increase the number? Ifc will be years before there is any actual shortage of fighting men, in spite of the present huge Josses, since half a million youths attain military age every 12 months. But it the Germans should be unable to materially increase their output of munitions and equipment they will soon he outnumbered. Ifc is quite probable that they will not be able to do so, since they are heavily handicapped in many directions and their resources are not unlimited. The cutting off of their cotton supplies', the scarcity of copper, the heavy Josses of able-bodied men, and the consequent necessity of constant fresh drafts from the productive industries to replace them wil] all tell heavily against any great increase of the output. But Kitchener’s army alone must number some 3,000,000 by this. The French must have at least that number, either in the field or in reserve, and Russia’s resources in men axe practically unlimited. Austria is credited with having perhaps 1,120,000 men in the field, and as that country is not a, manufacturing country of the same class as Germany, she will probably not be able to largely increase, them. •‘hie gives an Austro-German total of 4,320,000 in the fighting line. But the Allies should have no threat difficulty in putting 10,000.000 men, or move than double that number, into the field, jfhen thecy? can be supplied with, equip-,,

Mont and munitions. This latter result should bo only a matter of time and hard work, seeing that we have the resources of the world to draw upon. What organisation and energy can accomplish is revealed in a cable from Petrograd, which contains the encouraging announcement that the Russian output of munitions, is now double what it was at the beginning of June, in spit© of the removal of the works from Warsaw, Vilna, and Riga into the interior. THE AVERAGE MAN. These considerations throw some light on the measure of depth, and foresight displayed by certain amateur German statesmen. The. German newspapers and most Of Germany’s public men are increasingly jubilant as the result of th© run of German successes over Russia. This could have been safely predicted. The fundamental law upon which the social science of the future will be built, when the race throws up th© man with the analytical and synthetical faculty necessary for th© building, will be that the average man will react to average circumstances in an average manner. So it could be eafely predicted that the average German, or the average German statesman, would become elated over German successes, and begin to act and talk foolishly. This is seen in the absurd proposals "to make the Allies pay the expenses of the war and the rearranging of th© map to suit German eelf-conceit. ‘hiese people, dazzled by the glamor of momentary success, hav© no grasp of possible future developments. Did they reflect, they might perceive that it is only a matter of time before the forces of the Allies will outnumber their own by two or three to one. The sole Gorman hope of success lies in the possibility of crippling Russia before this result is brought about. The assistance of the Balkan States will bi'ing an enormous accession of strength to the Allies, and reports from Serbia, th© real crux of the problem, indicate that both the Press and the Premier of that country favor an understanding with Bulgaria. A few of the more level-headed among German statesmen can dimly visualise the probable developments of the future. These men perceive that Germany’s chief hope lies in taking advantage of her present successes to endeavor to secure an honorable peace. But the predominant psychological factor among the mass of them is just excited conceit, and men in that mood are not likely to act wisely. ADMISSIONS. There are some admissions in the latest communique from Petrograd which make it clear that the German claims to have occupied Ossowiec and to have cut the Bialystok-Brest-Lifcovsk railway at Bielsk were justified. After stating that there have been alternating successes on the Jacobstadt-Dvinsk sector, the communioue that the Russians have abandoned the left bank of the Bobr and evacuated Ossowiec. This will presently furnish, the Germans with another lino of railway communication. The communique claims that German a Uadis east of Bielsk were stopped. But this is an admission that the enemy are across the railway at that ponit. The German offensive acrossi the Bug in tbs direction of Kovel is also declared to be held up. For the present the Austro-German attack seems to have lost impetus. This, however', is probably merely due to, the necessity of relaying railways and reorganising communications. AN ELOQUENT SILENCE. The German Admiralty is eloquently silent in regard to the naval battle in the Gulf of Riga. But a semi-official report announces that no large German warship was sunk or damaged at Riga, and no lauding was attempted at Pernau. The ships which the Russians claim to have captured were sunk by the Germans to block the channel. Perhaps, with characteristic indifference to human life, the Germans crowded these vessels with soldiers merely to ballast them. The claim that no large German warship was sunk or damaged at Riga is transparent equivocation. No one lias yet stated that the •Moltfce was- sunk at Riga, Such clumsy evasions are better practised by proxy, through the medium of a “ seini-official” note. Tim Russian Admiral’s despatches arc not yet- available, and nJ further details have been published winds call for comment. THE PSYCHOLOGY OF A SPY. Unfortunately, most of the people who wnto books about spies are men of the same kind of temperament as their subjects. Not that they arc dishonest, but tney have the same'psychological peculiarities The average spy is marked by a fondness for mystery. He loves to dazzle the naive imagination of the average man by a display of inside knowledge. He loves to imagine that he is taking a part in the shaping of great events. And naturally, when relating his adventures, no does not err on the eidc of pedantic exactitude. • When he gains the ear of a romantic novelist lie unfolds a tale which, though dazzling to the imagination of the average man, bears very little relation to the real facts. The story is told to gratify The vanity of the spy rather than to instruct the public, while the novelist writes for effect rather than for the dissemination of cold prosaic truth. The result is the production of works admirably calculated to “make yer flesh creep,” so far as the average reader is concerned. But to the eye of the reader with a certain amount of psychological insight and critical faculty these alleged “revelations” of great “secrete” are far from impressive. Reading the revelations of the above-mentioned Dr Armgaard Karl Graves, one is irresistibly reminded of a certain Jesuit spy who figures in one of Thackeray’s novels, arid ‘‘whose foible was omniscience. ’* .but the omniscience under critical exanimation revealed itself as a miscellaneous accumulation of inaccurate cossip. “ OMNISCIENCE.” ~ Dr Graves’s work shows all the peculiar qualities and defects of its class. Its author is clever, superficial, and ■ very vain. His “revelations ” are of the character which any reader may discover for himself much more accurately by consulting books of reference. He dazzles the reader by the fluent and easy way in which he talks of the secrets of kings But the alleged secrets consist of dubious anecdotes which cannot be tested. There is much in the book, however, which can be brought to the critical test, and which shows the utter superficiality and unreliability of the man. For v instance, he boasts of having impressed the court at his trial at the Supreme Court at Edinburgh by his knowledge of ballistics, in which, on his own admission, he completely outshone the British admiral brought to give evidence against bun. He exhibited a detailed knowledge of the new 14in gun under construction for the British Navy greater than that possessed by the admiral himself. But alas for omniscience ! The British Navy possesses no 14m guns whatever, and the amount ot ballistic Knowledge exhibited by Dr Graves is just what can be lifted out of any text book. The work is full of such errors as a reference to Sir Edward Grey as “His Lordship” and the making of “Admiral' Fisher” the Commander of the Channel Squadron during Mr Winston Churchill's term of office as First Lord of the Admiralty. When the “revelations” are not of a character which can be obtained from works of reference, they are usually mere nonsense. Thus the Zeppelins are filled with a wonderful new dioxvgenous gas of exceptional lifting power, ‘which has the additional merit of possessing a liquid form. Apparently the writer was unaware that all forms of gas (indeed all forms of matter) are credited by science with a solid, liquid, and gaseous form, the different forms being assumed under different conditions of temperature and pressure. He credits the Zeppelins constructed before the war with » carrying capacity of seven tons of explosives. It has been abundantly demonstrated that th© most modern Zeppelin cannot carry more than about one ton. He makes Lord Haldane, the British Lord Chancellor and Mr Winston Churchill negotiate an alliance with Austria and Germany, at ScfyUancren<bad, in the Black Forest, unknown “apparently to Sir Edward Grey. In short his grasp of policy is that of a clever Child, and his revelations those of a vain and clever man with a fertile imaginaiion but little critical faculty. Still, there is, no need to doubt that he was a genuine spy, since ifc is from that class of people that spies are largely recruited.