THE WAR IN THE FAR EAST.

Evening Star, Issue 12397, 10 January 1905, Page 6

THE WAR IN THE FAR EAST.

A ffIBTOMU INTERVIEW WHY RUSSIA WENT TO WAR SHE UNDERVALUED JAPAN KUROPATKIN'SVAIN PROMISES THE BALTIC FLEET USELESS RUSSIAN CASUALTIES 25,000 TOKIO GREETS HER I ADMIRALS ADMIRAL TOGO'S PROMISE Press Association—By Ttetegrapb-Copyrighfc. . GENERAL NOGTS REPORT. SYDNEY, January 9. General Nogi's report has been received by the Japanese Consul-General here. He states that on Sunday the delivery of prisoners under capitalaijon was completed. The numbers -were: 875 officers and 23,000 men, -whereof 441 officers and 229 orderlies were given parole. Generals Fenk, Smirnoff, Gorbatvosky, and Admiral Wiflrnan preferred to be sent to Japan. General Stoessel leaves for Russia on the 10th inst LONDON, January 9. (Received January 10, at 8-13 a,m.) Renter advises that the Russian prisoners will he-sent to Kure. THE SICK AND WOUNDED. LONDON, January 9. (Received January 10, at 8.33 a.m.) General Nogi's reported total of prisoners does not mcmde tie sick and wounded. [These were estimated in a previous message at 16,000.] RUSSIA'S ESTIMATED CASUALTIES. LONDON, January 9. (Received Jannary 10, at 8.53 a.m.) The Japanese estimate the Rnssian casualties in Port Arthur throughout the siege at 25,000 men. CAUSES AND REASONS. LONDON, January 9. (Received January 10, at &53 ajn.) Baron Kkist, of the Russian Navy, interviewed at Cbefoo, said that the main cause of the capitulation was the lack of heavy guns and the want of aramnnition. THE ARMY HEARS THE NEWS. LONDON, January' 9. (Received January 10, at 8-13 aan.) The Russians on tie 4th inst interpreted the Japanese "bansais," which were heard along the whole front on the Sha-ho, to mean that Port Arthur had fallen. When the news was confirmed it produced a. deep impression. THE RUSSIAN WAY. , LONDON, January 9. (Received January 10, at 8.43 a.m.) The 'Daily Telegraph' states that the rumor of the capitulation of Port Arthur was allowed to spread at Mnfcden on tbft sth, but Was nob officially rarfirmed ud to tie 6th. V ; : ..v OTTAWA; TO KUROPATKIN. UNIVERSAL DEPRESSION. BERLIN, January 9. (Received January 10, at 8.43 a.m.) The Mukden correspondent of tie 'Lokal Anzeiger' states that Marshal Oyama wrote a letter to General Kuropatkin informing him of the capitulation of Port Arthur. In it the Japanese oommaader-in-<3Hef expressed his admiration for the gallant defenders. The effect of the news proved overwhelming, since a longer defence on the part of the garrison had been expected. FIRING ON HOSPITALS. -JAPAN'S EFFECTIVE ANSWER. TOKEQ, January 9. (Received January 10, at 8-33 a.m.) A Russian map of the hospitals in Port Arthur has been published in Tokio. This shows thai tSnrteen hospitals were scattered over the ok! and new towns, and that four others were in a eonrparatively segregated position within the normal lines of fire. RELIEF THAT NEVER GAME. STOESSEL THANES THE MIKADO. THE "TURNING-POINT." LONDON, Jannary 9. (Received January General Kuropatkin at the beginning of October promised General Stoessel speedy relief. During his interview with General No<n in the cottage at Slnri-shi, near Port Arthur, General Stoessel expressed nimself grateM for the Mikado's kindness in allowing the Russian officers to retain their swoids. He also acknowledged the eonsjderateness of General Nogt throughout the war. The real cause of the war, be is reported to have said, was that the Russians were ■unaware of their opponents' fighting qualities, and the turning-point, in the defence was the arrival of the Japanese llin guns. He expressed surprise at the defeat of General Kuropatkin, adding that it is useless for the Baltic fleet to come. UNHAPPY RUSSIA SUPPRESSING THE TRUTH. A CLEVER CENSOR. LONDON, January 9. The 'Daily Mails' St. Petersburg correspondent advises thai the public in the provinces were kept ignorant of Port Arthur's fate for days. The Censor at Moscow: altered leading articles wherein the capitulation was bewailed by substituting in everv instance the word' "frost" for the words ** fail of Port Arthur." HOW RUSSIA SPENT CHRISTMAS. LONDON, January 9. (Received January 10, at 8.13 a.m.) The Russian Christmas was kept' with the usual gaiety in St. Petersburg. Small congregations, including a few high officials, attended a service in the Isaac-Kazan Cathedral in memory of the Port Arthur dead. RAISING THE BLOCKADE. PORT ARTHUR'S INSIGNIFICANCE. LONDON, January 9. The blockade of Liao-tung has been raised. A small garrison will remain at Port Arthur, and a naval station is being establisb^there^

, SYDNEY, January, 9. The Japanese Consul has received a «able message advising chat Admiral Togo raised the blockade of Port Arthur on the 7th mst. At present, however, only Japanese Government service.-woods are. allowed to enter the port. TOKIO REJOHXBSr 80,000 PEOPLE JUBILATE. TOKIO, Jannary 9. (Received January 10, at &33 ajn_) Eighty thousand people in Tokio celebrated the. fafl of Port Arthur in Hibiya Park. Admiral Togo, in the«mrsß of a speech, said that he was determined to deserve the natiorfs good-will by. increased vigilance and exertion against their enemy. The admirals who were present at the celebration each planted a laurel tree in the park. A DOMESTIC LOAN. LONDON, January 9. (Received January 10, at 8-53 a.m.) Japan will shortly propose a further domestio loan of £10,000,000. JAPAN WILL PRESS ON. WASHINGTON, January 9. (Received January 10, at 8.33 ajn.) M. Takahdro, the Japanese Minister at Washington, states that Japan intends to press the war sn tie north, and that his Government are reinforcing Oyama. AN ALLEGED REPULSE. LONDON, January 9. General Kuropatkin reports that the Japanese attempted a night surprise on, the Russian centre and front, but were repulsed. A MOBILISATION FIASCO. DON'T WANT TO FIGHT. ST. PETERSBURG, January 9. (Received January 10, at, 8.53 a.m.) The .mobiEsataon at Odessa proved a fiasco. A few scores of reservists were collected by force. Out of 2,000, only 180 enrolled themselves vohmtarily. NOTES ON THE WAR, [Bt Kasdoa,] —Coming Events^— The Japanese intention to vigorously prosecute the war in Manchuria is cabled today, but the means to be employed are not indicated. All that is mentioned is that it is the Japanese intention to shortly reinforce the field army now lying at the Sha-ho. This is very good as far as it goes, but J am but il-persuaded that the mere addition of, say, 50,000 or 60,000 troops to the force commanded by Fieldmarshal Oyama covers the whole Japanese intention with respect to the war. At the present time the army at the Sha-ho probably numbers something between 200,000 and 230,000 men, and the mere raising of its strength to something like 300,000 men Js not a measure calculated to achieve an out-and-out win. The important question is not " Will Japan continue topush up the Manchurian railway towards Harbin?" but Will Japan take up a secondary line of operations?" My own opinion is that sooner or later she will, if she can, but the thing is not eo as it looks. A forward movement towards the same objective, but on separate paths of advance, has its advantages, as can readily be seen by reconsidering the South African War, where at least four separate but conjoined forces moved forward together—Buller through the northern salient of Natal, Roberts through the Free State, Methuen towards Boshof, and a fourth force towards Mafeking, all ultimately converging first towards PretoFal later those positions which the Boer leaders selected for the final stands with their more or less " regular" (as distinct from guerrilla) commandos, this advantageous division, of force looks very, simple and' very nice on paper, but in practice it is not nearly so easy as it looks. Japan will presently take the field with one army of something like 300,000 effectives. S P"""* weak—that is to say, if the Trans-Siberian Railway does not respond to the strain placed.upon it, if the reservists do not answer the call to join the colors, if, in short, it is found impossible to organise those projected armies which Unpenberg and Kaulbars have been appointed to command—*hat single force may prove sufficient. On the other hand, should Huasia manage to bring half a million men mto the field.by May or June, it will not be possible for Oyama to make headway up the Manchunan railwav, the more especiaUv as every step which he advances makes his position more and more salient, and his .communications more and more easy to interrupt. To ease the pressure on his army a second line of operations from some point on the Siberian coast will in time become very necessary. Looking at the map Merely, one is inclined perhaps to suppose that this would be easy; and so it would be if the whole problem consisted in movinjr toiegspiel blocks over a paper theatre of war To effect a landing either close to VJadivostock, or further north along the bibenan coast, Japan wffl first of all require a secure base, whence the second army can draw its supplies regularly and without interruption. The chance of interruption arises from ocean-going submcrsibies of large radius of action. It is true that tue cables have not told us of tie arrival of any of these craft in Vladivostock except the Fulton, but it is ridiculous to suppose that the Fulton is the only submersihle which has been sent to the East and which is now there. The probabdifcy is that if Russia has one submersible in Vladivostock at the present time she has a dozen, and these will materially influence the plans of the Japanese General Staff. The railway to Khabarovsk and a number of other matters also enter into the question, and, generally, it can be said that the problem of placing a sk>°e army in position to effectually isolate Vladivostock is by no means an easy one. At Port Arthur the" task was simpler, because the Kwan-tung Peninsula is a salient, while Vladivostock is, on the whole, re-entrant from the sea. As to the fortification of Vladivostock, it is quite safe to say that few people outside the garrison know very muchi about.it At the beginning of the war the defencei were not so strong as those round Port Arthur, but during the past ten months the trace of the enciente must have been greatly altered and the works themselves enormously strengthened. But, ootwithstanding all difficulties, I believe that ft is the Japanese intention to reduce Vladiyostock ultimately, and that all movements in the theatre of war, whether at the Sbabo or anywhere else, are simply means looking to that end. I believe that tbe severe Manchurian winter will prevent logistics being undertaken on a large scale, though it may nob prevent fighting. When °two armies face each other, as at the Sha-ho, and the initiative rests equally with either commander, it is very, difficult to keep the peace, and a battle might be brought on at •any time. I also think that should the Japanese Stiff decide to work on two separate lines of operations there is notiing to prevent the prefinanary steps being taken or the preliminary lodgment on tneSiberian coast being made during the winter months; but any extensive movement inland during those months seems to me out of the question. There is still another difficulty about forecasting the time when such a movement might be made, and that is the necessity f or the co-ordination of all movement on the theatre of war. Special circumstances might make it advisable to delav the landing of a seeond force until Kuropa&rin has been driven further north than he is at present, although, for my own part, I cannot help thinking that the further south Kuropatkin remains the better will be the chances of a second Japanese army making good a footing on the theatre of war. Besides, driving Kuroparlrin north will be a difficult task, and the forcing of the Tieh4ing position, just beyond Mukden, will probably bring on a battle beside which Liao-yang and the Sha-ho will appear small. The position in Manchuria now much resembles the general jgosition in South- Africa, during- tbe-eariy

days of February, 1900. In those days there was a good deal of rattle and noise in Natal and Cape Colony, but a complete silence on that part of the Free State salient where Lord Roberts intended to make his main effort.- This article, which merely touches the fringe of> an exceedingly difficult v question in strategy, is an attempt to roughly indicate the advantages and drawbacka of two lines of operations, and also to oufchnes some of the cdrcumstancea under which a secondary line of operations is acU visible. Of coarse, if it comes off, as I thank ft will, the correspondents and others wfli take it all as very obvious. But how much of it is obvious just now?