SUPREME COURT.-IN BANCO.

Evening Star, Issue 9185, 14 July 1893, Page 2

SUPREME COURT.-IN BANCO.

(Before His Honor Mr Justice Williams.) WOOD V. THK SHAW', SAVILL AND ALBION COMPANY, LIMITED. Motion for a nonsuit, or for judgment for the defendants, with costs of the action and of this motion, upon the following grounds: —(1) That there was no evidence of negligence on the part of the defendants; (2) that there was no evidence of any duly which the defendants owed to the plaintiff, and which they had broken ; (3) that the evidence proved that the plaintiff placet! himself uninvited in a position in which he had no right to be, and that but for thin the damage complained of would not have arisen; and in the alternative for a new trial on the grounds that (1) the learned judge misdirected the jury in refusing to tell them that the plaintiff had failed to prove that he was in the position where the injury occurred on lawful business, and that there was no evidence of negligence towards him ; and (2) that the verdict was against the weight of evidence. Mr P. R. Chapman appeared for the company in support of the motion, and Mr J. F. M. Frasef for Wood.

After learned counsel had addressed the Court at great length on the legal aspects of the ease,

His Honor gave judgment. He said he did not think that the case turned upon the question as to whether the plaintiff was on the wharf as of right or merely as a licensee, and by the tacit permission of the Harbor Board. As a matter of fact he thought it was clear that the plaintiff was there as a mere licensee, but the action was not by the licensee against the licensor, but by the licensee against a third party, and different considerations applied. It was notorious, and must be taken to have been known to the defen ■ dants, that persons were in the habit of frequenting the wharves as the plaintiff did, without being interfered with by the Harbor Borrd, and therefore by their tacit permission. It must be taken from the findings of the jury, and be thought also from the evidence of Mr Stevens, that the plaintiff was standing in a safe place, that be was not in a position which in any way interfered with the operations of the defendants, and that it was only by reason of what the jury harl found to be a negligent act on the part of the defendants that the plaintiff had suffered injury. Looking at the fact which, as he had said, must be taken to have been known to the defendants —that people were in the habit, with the tacit permission of the Harbor Board, of frequenting the wharves, and in remaining at places where there was no apparent danger—he thought that the defendants bad a duty to such persons to take reasonable care in their operations, and to take reasonable care not to injure them. The wharf was, of course, not a highway, but if it was habitually used, by the tacit permission of the owners, as a place for persons to frequent, either upon business or for pleasure, and if, as in a highway, persons might be expected to be about there, then so long as these persons kept out of any apparent danger and did not get in the way of shipping operations, there certainly diaoeemto nim a duty laid upon persons conducting shipping operations to take reasonable care, in order that no injury might accrue to the persons who might be reasonably expected to be in the neighborhood. For these reasons he thought the .motion must be dismissed. Motion dismissed, with costs (£5 as).