CAUCUS RULE

Evening Post, Volume CXXX, Issue 143, 13 December 1940, Page 6

CAUCUS RULE

The principle of selecting Cabinet by caucus, upon which Mr. W. Downie Stewart has commented, is not one for the private consideration of the Labour Party, since the public and the whole country are concerned with the results. If these should be favourable, the country will profit by greater harmony and better administration; but if disharmony and faulty administration should follow the country will suffer. The Labour Government may suffer by loss of repute, but the country will not escape injury. The arguments submitted by Mr. Stewart show, as he says, that full application of the democratic principle to Cabinetmaking can succeed only by a happy chance. Caucus selection departs from the principle under which one man, the Prime Minister, is responsible to the Crown for the selection of Ministers, and if he resigns the Ministers of his choice resign with him. It also introduces the weakness of many counsellors, instead of one leader. Ability to make a sound choice of men is an essential qualification for leadership. A nian who lacks that quality can never be a successful leader. But caucus selection definitely affirms that the judgment of many in this matter is better than the judgment of one— and he the chosen leader. If the leader should make a bad choice, the responsibility can be sheeted home to him, but not so with the caucus. Moreover, caucus selection is liable to be subject to so many influences —popularity, prejudice, and sectional bargaining. The plea that the caucus method is more democratic is the main argument advanced in its support. Yet this is really fallacious. If the Prime Minister is to give way to caucus in the selection, why mot to the Labour Conference or to the people as a whole? In practice the caucus method probably works out less democratically, because it increases the power and extends the authority of the caucus, and the caucus can become more powerful only at the expense of democracy. We have had convincing proof of this in recent Parliamentary experience. Legislative proposals are submitted to caucus first and to Parliament afterwards, and the measures as approved by caucus cannot (in practice) be altered in any important point. Debate in the House of Representatives, which should be fully effective in the decision of principles, is in fact more or less nugatory. Caucus has already decided. A caucus-chosen Cabinet is unlikely to curb this encroachment on the rights of Parliament. Rather, it may be expected to confirm it.