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NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS

THE FIGHT FOR NORWAY

WHAT GERMANY

FACES

ROLE PLAYED BY NARVIK

The news of the two latest blows at German imperialism by the British Fleet brings, in heartening fashion, fresh realisation that our sea power is being used in a most determined effort to crush the power of the Nazis once and for all. It must not be overlooked that a dual purpose inspires such feats as the capture of Narvik: The Germans are driven-from their hold on part of the Norwegian territory, and they are also menaced at a point where they can ■ least afford to be threatened—the j source of their high-grade iron ore. / . Some people seem' to have \ been puzzled at the continued blows delivered against Narvik, because of its isolation from southern Norway. The Germans, they say, cannot ■ hope to shipiron ore from this port; and if the occupation of the rest of Norway fails before our attack, then Narvik becomes our prize as a matter of course. Why then the intensive effort against It? • '■)■".•■ ■■ ',' ■'■'■ } : Of Strategic Importance. Such bewilderment is nqptur'al, but it comes from a failure to understand the military situation. This makes Narvik a most important point; the strategic point of the north which. Germany was bound to attempt to hold. Every military operation must proceed on the basis of an alternative plan. That is to say, if the goal proves unreachable by one route, it must be possible to vary the plan and attempt to gain it t>y another. ' , The variable quantity in the plan for the occupation of Norway almost certainly is an attack on Sweden. If, in other words, the seizure of Norway and Denmark does not succeed in bottling up Sweden, or if the military plan runs off the rails, a German move into Sweden appears almost inevitable. Now Narvik, which is the way by which iron ore leaves Sweden through Norway, is also the way by which British, troops could enter Sweden from Norway. It is in addition (1) the only railway gateway in the north, (2) the only railway gateway between the two countries, apart from the' TrondheimStundsvall railway, until the railroad network of the far south is reached, and (3) an ever-present threat to the ore supply. A Defensive Action. Suppose a German invasion of Sweden-were carried out, Britain could move troops along the Narvik railway and in a few hours could invest the country around the famous iron mines in territory which the Germans could reach only with the utmost difficulty. The occupation of Narvik thite was a defensive action, and one which was vital .from. the. German- point- of view. The loss of the place means that their forces'in this region will probably be dispersed, and will be mopped up withDUt.the necessity for opposing them with large-, highly organised actions. Another aspect of the events of the list two days.is the satisfying way in which the campaign is being pushed at liigh speed. It is now only a week since the- struggle began, and already the German se- forces have, been routed, the ocean communications cut, and one of the. principal strategic points involved has been captured. Pushing1 Into Baltic. ' - In addition, the war has been carried ■"ar into the Baltic, and the Admiralty announcement of the creation of minefields there appears based on the knowledge that the Germans, cannot prevent us from pushing this plan with ;he utmost thoroughness. The employment of our minelayers to meet the Nazis at their own game may jnean that the Navy has established an mtrance to the Baltic which the Germans cannot hope to seal, no doubt because it is protected by our mineaelds, and through which our ships have been steadily passing to leave '•heir deadly freight along the German :oast. The magnitude of our mining warfare may be gauged from the size of the- earlier minefield which was resently created along the British coast to shut. out the German submarines, rhis, according to neutral statements, which claimed to base their, news on Admiralty sources, consisted of 120,000 mines. Mine warfare must be on a large scale to succeed at all. World War Experience. We learnt a'great deal about minelaying in the World War, and after the Armistice we had to sweep up 23,000 /nines which had been placed to check the enemy U-boats and surface craft. £t was exactly a year after the operations of the force began that the waters around Britain, the Dominions md colonies, and in the Mediterranean, were reported free of mines. It is quite possible that at the moment -when Hitler chose to deal a blow at the inoffensive Norwegians the Admiralty had accumulated a great stock of mines, perhaps for the purpose if repeating the 1918 feat of building i northern barrage from the Orkneys 1.0 Norway. The German attack on Scandinavia has given the opportunity ?or the use of these mines much nearer aome. In Carrying Out this work Britain, iccording to recent information, had at least six minelayinff submarines which could be used. They are the boats' of the Porpoise class, with such, names as Grampus, Narwhal, and Seal, and are exceeded in size by only one other class. They are of various lengths, from 271 ft to 289 ft, and 28ft beam, of up to 1520 tons surface displacement, and .2100 tons when, submerged; able to do about 15 knots on the surface and nine knots submerged. Their draught," 15ft, exceeds that of almost all other British submarines. Maintaining the Fields. Now that the minefields are established, can they be maintained? The experience of the World War showed that German commanders of submarine minelayers reckoned that the mines sown by them would be discovered and swept up in from 10 to 14 days. If the entrance to the Baltic is kept open and protected by our minefields, which may be laid in such a way as to enable submarines to lurk along their fringe, secure against enemy craft, then the Navy can always attempt the renewal of the fields. But even if the blockage is a short one, and the minesweepers which the Nazis rushed to completion last year, postponing construction of their 600----ton torpedo-boats for the purpose, are able to clear', the fields, the delay of even two weeks may prove fatal to Use Invaders of Norway:

Permanent link to this item

https://paperspast.natlib.govt.nz/newspapers/EP19400415.2.68

Bibliographic details

Evening Post, Volume CXXIX, Issue 89, 15 April 1940, Page 9

Word Count
1,057

NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS Evening Post, Volume CXXIX, Issue 89, 15 April 1940, Page 9

NOTES ON THE WAR NEWS Evening Post, Volume CXXIX, Issue 89, 15 April 1940, Page 9

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