THEY SOUGHT TO CONQUER EUROPE

Evening Post, Volume CXXVIII, Issue 73, 23 September 1939, Page 20

THEY SOUGHT TO CONQUER EUROPE

ALL - the experience of history since the fall of the Roman Empire shows that no one nation, however strong, can conquer and hold down the rest of " Europe. Great men and great nations —Charlemagne, the Holy Roman Empire, Spain, France, Napoleon—have tried and failed, says a writer in the "Sydney Morning Herald." The tragedy of Europe has been that it is sufficiently small and homogeneous to tempt the man of broad vision, to weld it into a unity, yet not enough -so iv enable him to succeed. .Less than five hundred years after the fall of Rome, Charlemagne made himself master of most of Christian Europe, and founded the Holy Roman Empire. Charlemagne's Empire soon collapsed, but the ideal possessed great fnv— in the Middle Ages. The great German Emperors in the twelfth century swayed the whole of the territory of the present Axis Powers, and more. Had it not been for quarrels with the Papacy and the sturdy resistance of some of the Italian city republics, the Empire might have come close to reality. From 1500 onwards, however, we are in a Europe more recognisably like our own; the Europe of the Renaissance, the Reformation, and of nationalism. For the last four hundred years we have been witnessing a series of struggles for the mastery of Europe, all ending in failure through the working of a strikingly similar series of causes, which are Still in force today. In the first half of the sixteenth century Spain rose to the height of her power. Her great King, Charles V, succeeded to the Empire, including the overlordship of Germany, and the vast AustrorHungarian dominions. He controlled Belgium and Holland, certain 'French provinces, and at times the whole of Italy. At sea the Spaniards founded a vast and wealthy oversea Empire, dominated the Moors in North and crushed the Turkish fleet at Lepanto. On'land the well-trained Spanish armies • were 'for long as invincible as Napoleon. Why did not Spain with these apparently overwhelming resources master Europe, and .reunite Christendom as she planned? First, we have the revolt of the Netherlands in 1567. A small nation arises, ready to be drenched in blood rather than submit. The stout defence of their cities by sea and land occupied Spanish troops and money to an extent not believed possible. Secondly, we have the influence of Dutch and British sea power; not, it is true, so conclusive as in later centuries, but enough to show clearly the vital importance of the sea in European wars. The defeat of the Armada in 1588 _rtainly prevented the conquest of England, and probably of Holland also. The raids of the English on the Spanish oversea .communications with America were.of very great value. , Thirdly, there was one Power, too great in extent and resources, for the Spaniards to conquer. France began the- century by having her armies crushed, her King taken prisoner, and an onerous peace imposed; but for the greater part of the. century she never gave up the struggle. Though consistently beaten in the field, 'she

plunged, in; again "and .again, leaving the Spaniards little time to dealwitht their othej . enemies; awhile the task -of a; complete conquest of France was one which the Spaniards wisely did not attempt. There is no Waterloo to mark the. end of Spain's career, but a steady sapping of her strength from her stupendous efforts all over Europe eventually had its effect.

The- decay! of Spain . found France ready and eager : to. take , her place. The first Bourbon monarchs, Henry IV/ Louis XIII, and Louis XIV, were determined and capable men, with a brilliant assemblage of Ministers and generals. -■■■.-

Until the end, of the eighteenth century the population and wealth of France were greater than those of Great Britain and Prussia together, her two chief adversaries. France was genuinely the leader of civilisation, in science and the. arts, no less than in military affairs, and it took 120 'years and three world wars to break her will to dominate Europe.

The Spanish Empire had separated from the Austrian, and the Throne of Spain itself was in dispute. On his deathbed, Louis XIV challenged the whole of Europe by claiming for his son the vast Franco-Spanish Empire, including all the. rich possessions of those countries overseas. The war dragged on for fourteen years, 1701 to 1715, arid again the same factors played their part in foiling the conqueror. We have the tenacity of the Dutch, whose country was being fought over, the sea power of England and Holland, and. the difficulty of' subjugating permanently so large a Power as Austria. Marlborough's. headlong dash from Holland, down to. Austria with the British army to fight the battle of Blenheim, when the French jaws were closing around the throat of Vienna, is one !of the epics of history.

•.The unhappy Continent was seldom at peace for the rest of the century. Another check to French ambition was administered in the Seven Years War, 1757-63, fought by -England and Prussia under Frederick the Great against France and Austria. With the elder Pitt as Prime Minister and Anson at the Admiralty, this was probably the

best-conducted war ever wagled by Great Britain. With a series of brilliant joint military and naval operations, Canada, India, and the whole of France's oversea possessions were stripped from her, and a strong effort exerted in the Continental war, too.

However, the coming of the French Revolution and of Napoleon finds France stronger than ever, and the weary task had apparently to be begun over again. The story of Napoleon is too well known to repeat, but a glance at the map of Europe in 1810 will show the nearest approach to a complete conquest of Europe ever achieved. The French dominions include France, Spain, the whole of Italy, Switzerland, Belgium. Holland, Dalmatia, Polcnd. and about half Germany (the "Confederation of the Rhine"). The strength of this Empire may be judged by the fact that in the campaign of 1812 against. Russia, no fewer than 170,000 troops from outside France fought in Napoleon's armies. Looking back on those times, it seems almost a miracle that the rest of Europe did not surrender and make what terms it could.

But once again a similar cause produces similar effects. Once again a nation arises which is ready to be drowned in blood rather than submit. This time it is Spain. For the first time in Napoleon's career, a French general, with an entire army, about 20,000 men. was forced to surrender — in Andalusia by the Spaniards. Both as a call to arms and a blow to French prestige, and as a material drain on French resources, the effects of the never-ending guerrilla warfare in Spain are incalculable.

Once again, too, we have the throttling effect of British sea power, now stronger than ever in spite of the existence of powerful French fleets. Napoleon is forced by this to try to 'draw the whole of Europe into his eco[nomic net. Russia, his ally, objects, and he attacks here with the "Grand Army." Once again it is shown that countries in Europe of considerable extent and wealth can survive the defeat of all their armies, and present insuperable difficulties to those who hope for permanent conquest. The end after the 1812 campaign and the terrible retreat from Moscow was inevitable.

Hope was now renewed, and by 1813 Russia, Prussia, and Austria could greatly outnumber Napoleon. With careful and well co-ordinated generalship, they forced him back from his strong position, and crushed him with superior numbers at Leipzig. With that defeat, Napoleon's dream of Empire ended. He might, if he had wished, have ruled a greatly-enlarged France in peace for the rest of his life, but the dream had become a reality without which Napoleon could not live. The war went on, and in the following year the burning of Moscow was avenged; the Russian Emperor rode into Paris at the head of his troops. A victory at Waterloo would. have won the Emperor back his throne, but never his European Empire.

The Great War of 1914 and the present situation form but another act of the same old drama, but with a new protagonist, Germany. The end must be the same, and Germany must fail.

The failure of Germany and her powerful allies in the Great War is not surprising in view of past history. Once again we have the initial shock taken by the desperate patriotism of two small Powers, this time Belgium and Serbia. Once again we have the Continental aggressor enmeshed by the naval power of Britain; causing, through trade restrictions, a slow but steady drain upon his vitality.

This power ensured that economic help from America was available exclusively to the Allies, and it indirectly drew the United States into the war; and, as always, it provided Britain with a safe breathing-space to convert herself as a military power from

the second or third rank into the first. We now come to what may be called "The Bloodless War," still in progress, which represents the effort of the "Third Reich" for supremacy over Europe, beginning with the seizure of Austria in March. 1938. Whoever should gain the initial success, the war wiir be fought along the same lines and with the same inevitable conclusion as the struggles for European mastery described above. Weapons have altered, but human nature has not, and political and economic factors remain surprisingly similar. This time it is Poland who will take the shock borne by Belgium in 1914; by Spain in Napoleon's time; by Holland against the Spaniards. The Poles will be fully worthy of the dubious honour to be thrust on them. Their chequered and erratic career in the past shows them to be an intensely virile and impetuous race, to whom compromise and surrender are meaningless phrases. They can be depended on to the last man and the last mile of territory.

The second great factor, sea power, will operate as completely and as decisively as in previous wars. This will be so as regards the interior economy of Germany, even if the blockade within ■'. the Mediterranean should be but partial, • and irrespective of what vicissitudes the Empire might undergo in the, Far East. Indeed, owing to Hitler's preference for guns over butter,

similar effects to those of a blockade already have been visible in Germany. The third factor, that of a v?st Eastern Power, may operate even more decisively than before. Those who are alarmed by Russia's tortuous policy and the Russo-German non-aggression pact should remember Napoleon and Alexander embracing each other in the sumptuous houseboat on the Nic men at Tilsit in 1807, and agreeing to divide up the world between them; yet the inevitable clash came as the French pretensions grew, culminating in the campaign of 1812. Pact or no pact, Russia will again follow her own interests. If Germany seems likely to secure Poland, the Baltic States, or Rumania, Russia must sooner or later stand in her way. A I policy of dividing the spoils may be tempting temporarily, but the march of German hegemony must have its effect, and, at the rate at which history now moves, the diplomatic events of 11807-12, as far as Russia is concerned,

CHARLEMAGNE, CHARLES V. OF SPAIN AND NAPOLEON ALL FOUND THEIR PLANS GO ASTRAY

may happen now in months or even weeks. It is sometimes argued that air power and the possibility of massed tank attack on a scale not heretobefore seen or conceived of have so changed the technique of warfare as to upset all defensive theories. The correctness of this theory is most improbable. The experience of the Chinese war shows that, while air power can do much damage and can kill civilians by the thousand, it cannot seriously cripple civilian activities or destroy military preparations, behind the lines to any fatal degree. Therefore, where Powers of approximately equal strength are concerned, as they are in this case, air power cannot conceivably be decisive. The slaughter of civilian populations has been tried in the past, notably in the seventeenth century, when entire towns were sometimes sacked, burnt, and utterly destroyed. Such a practice did not win wars then, and it will not win them now. Moreover, both sides will soon find themselves needing most of

their resources, and,more particularly their diminishing numbers of experienced pilots, for military objectives nearer the front.

As to the prosrects of mechanised or mobile warfare, there is a fact so simple that it is often passed over. That is that the defender can move his firing power up and down the line, and into the gaps made, by the attacker, just as quickly as the attacker; and that im,mense concentration of tanks, artil- | lery, and supplies at one point are, by their very magnitude, becoming less land less likely to pass unobserved. Thus the question whether a break through at one point in the line will lead to a complete collapse depends entirely on good or bad organisation and generalship, exactly as it did in 1914, in 1814, and in 1714. All that the scientist and the soldier can devise for the attack are being countered in some way or other by the defence, and there is not now, any more than in previous centuries, a golden key which will suddenly throw wide the gates of victory against a well-prepared, defender.

Incidentally, the ill-conceived French strategy of 1914 of attacking a superior foe in an age when the methods of warfare give the defence a great advantage has gone by the board. The whole of French tactics and organisation are based on defence, and they would not again be caught with an unprotected left wing against a German sweep through Belgium, while their right was vainly attacking.

In short, it has become a platitude that in 1914 Germany's only hope of victory was a rapid one. Not only is that even more true today, but the chances of a rapid decision are appreciably less.

Looked at from the general moral and political standpoint, the position of Hitler is a good deal worse than that of former great conquerors. They have all had some plausible theory to put before conquered foes or to cajole possible enemies—the unity of Christendom, the Holy Roman Empire in early ages: in Napoleon's time a professed attachment to the principles of the Revolution and to nationalism, and a breaking up of old dynastic bonds. Hitler sets out to conquer Europe on the bttsis of worship of the German people, and contempt and intolerance for all other races aiid all religions. He is a throw-back to barbarism, less fitted to rule Europe, to conciliate, to impose peace by force and win its acceptance, than anyone since the days of Attila the Hun. His attitude is not even calculated to retain the firm support of his Italian allies, who know well enough that if they ride to victory it will be upon the back of a tiger from which they cannot dismount.