DEFENCE PROBLEM

Evening Post, Volume CXXVI, Issue 77, 28 September 1938, Page 6

DEFENCE PROBLEM

AUSTRALIA AND DUTCH

CONFUSION OF POLICY

THE EXPERTS DIFFER

Malaya, the Netherlands Indies, and Australia are relying for their defence ultimately on the presence of a strong British fleet, and such a fleet in its turn depends upon a secure base at Singapore, says a writer in the "Sydney Morning Herald." So far as Australia is concerned, however, there seems to be good grounds for doubt whether i Singapore, with or without a fleet, ' offers a guarantee of safety. The military situation of the British and Dutch possessions in Indonesia and " the western Pacific is seen more clearly ■ if their defence plans are considered ■ as advancing by three stages. In the ; first stage defence against raids is ! prepared. In the second sxage measures are taken so to delay an attacker, : while the British fleet or some other ; decisive outside help is arriving, that i he will fear to undertake an invasion ; because a quick decision will be im- , possible. In the third stage absolute ; defence, reasonably sure of success in ; any circumstances, is the objective. j Malaya, the Netherlands Indies, and • Australia have or are preparing naval ! and air forces that offer considerable : defence against commerce raiding on ( a small scale. Even in this stage there ■ is no exact standard by which the necessary forces can be measured as there was in 1913. Then the strongest conceivable enemy was the German Pacific squadron. Today there is an Asiatic fleet of nearly first-class strength, capable of sending out a very strong commerce-raiding squadron. INADEQUATE AIR FORCE. For its delaying force, intended to ensure that an invader cannot obtain a decision before help arrives from Europe, Singapore has today five inadequate air squadrons; nor can the air force that was assembled at Singapore for the manoeuvres tnis year be considered equal to its task. Despite a stronger air force than that one, the Japanese landed an army at Shanghai, and Great Britain cannot be sure that in a crisis Irak and India will be able to spare the squadrons that were sent to Malaya in February. In this respect the Netherlands Indies are better off, and, if their plans mature, will be able to offer a substantial deterrent to any invader who cannot be sure that he has unlimited time for the conquest of the Dutch Indies. In addition to flying boats for reconnaissance trie Dutch are counting on a rapidly-growing force of fast modern bombers. No planes that were seen at the opening of the graving dock at Singapore in February so impressed the onlookers as these swift, expertly-handled Dutch bombers. Australia is Struggling with difficulty towards the creation of an adequate delaying force. Today's air force of 100 first-line machines cannot be regarded as an adequate deterrent to a possible attacker well equipped with aircraft carriers. The Japanese navy, for example, can carry perhaps _ three times as many machines in aircraft carriers, and Japan is. building more carriers. However, the" Australian air force as it will be in 1941, with its 200 first-line machines, could be counted on to maintain aerial superiority over any seaborne air force, provided that Australia has machines whose performances approximate to those of similar types possessed by foreign countries. NUCLEUS OF A FORCE. The militia, re-armed with modern weapons, should provide the nucleus of a force which, provided ,jthe Navy and Air Force can delay a large-scale attack for two or three months, should be able to offer a strong defence of the key industrial areas. -Australia is banking heavily, however, upon the ability of a strong Air Force to prevent a landing near one of the vital areas during the time the Army is being brought up to war strength, trained and hardened. A "sudden incursion, perhaps, by a small but well-equipped and highly-trained enemy force, might find the Army without any units fit for active service. Thus, to prepare Australia to meet even raids, a mobile regular fierce would appear essential, and the Government's decision to add a mobile! unit to the garrison at Darwin brings the realisation of such a force closer, because any force stationed at Darwin should at least be duplicated by a relieving force stationed in a healthier climate. It is the British custom to have at least one battalion at home for each battalion serving abroad, so that units serving in the tropics can be relieved at regular intervals. Few British regiments serve in conditions as unattractive as those at Darwin, and to station there a battalion of infantry (or whatever it is to be) in perpetuity would be most unwise. If the naval view is accepted, Australia will be exempt from invasion so long as a substantial naval force is in being at Singapore. It has been pointed out that this contention is in conflict with both British and American orthodox naval doctrine in that it leaves out of account the probability that Japan, for example, could make it perilous for a fleet to operate among her mandated islands where, to quote a recent visitor, the traveller "sails for weeks on enH never out of sight of land—and all the land is Japanese"; where there are "waters where hundreds of lagoons afford nests for Japanese submarines and planes." COMMERCE RAIDERS. The Navy maintains also that Australia could be subdued by a force of commerce raiders strong enough to smother the defending squadron. It contends that the stoppage of interstate sea traffic, leaving oversea traffic out of account, would produce economic chaos in Australia. .This view is disputed by Army leaders, and while such a difference of opinion exists on a subject that must form the very foundation of Australia's defence policy, no logical policy can existBoth problems —the ability of a fleet based on Singapore to stop Japan from maintaining sea traffic along the mandated islands, and the economic effect of a stoppage of inter-state sea traffic; —are sufficiently precise to be subjects of expert investigation. Until the Government has made up its mind, elaborate plans for the mobilisation of the nation's man-power and machinepower are premature. If Australia cannot be protected with certainty from Singapore, and if at the same time she cannot be quickly defeated by a partial blockade (a complete blockade would be impossible), the next step is to consider whether a Navy strong enough to cope with sporadic commerce raiders, an Air Force stronger than any an attacker can accommodate in aircraft-carriers, and a militia army stronger than any attacker could find transports for, would give a reasonable guarantee of security, and whether the nation can find money to pay for them. No less important is realistic planning for the regimentation of transport' and industry in a crisis. Time will be of tremendous value to Australia if

war comes. By planning in peace the mobilisation of industry in war, whole months may perhaps be saved. Australia is not only the only country in the Indonesian area that could conceivably defend herself against a strong and prolonged attack; she is also the only highly-industrialised country in the area.

If Australia can and does provide herself with adequate defence forces and drills her factories for war, she becomes not a liability, but an asset to the defence of western interests in Indonesia and the Pacific.