Evening Post. THURSDAY, JUNE 17, 1937. M. BLUM'S BLANK CHEQUE

Evening Post, Volume CXXIII, Issue 142, 17 June 1937, Page 8

Evening Post. THURSDAY, JUNE 17, 1937. M. BLUM'S BLANK CHEQUE

"In Germany and even in Belgium," writes Alex. Werth in "The Fortnightly," "France is only too readily regarded as being on the verge of financial collapse and political disintegration." Therefore the recurring French crises are serious not only to France but to the world. If France, through increasing internal weakness, were to lose her diplomatic power to play her part in Europe, every European problem, including Spain, would enter upon a new phase, and, in most cases, a more dangerous phase. An actual weakening of France's influence would be bad for the present European balance; and, as the quotation shows, even a fancied weakening— if the fancy took firm shape in dictatorship countries—would endanger the present precarious peace. Therefore all the world, however mindful of the injunction to mind one's own business and not dig too deeply into the internal affairs of neighbours, is compelled to be a most interested spectator of any French domestic crisis. t Until quite recent times, France militarily dominated Europe. Treaty-breaking Germany's rearming ended that period. France thereupon sought an ally in Russia, increasing the European ferment. So changes consequent on France's loss of European hegemony already have been disturbing. And it seems to be most important to the European balance that she should not lose further ground.

The problem of how to raise wages and shorten hours, without increasing prices to an extent cancelling or half-cancelling the wage-rise, is neither new nor peculiar to France. That problem is old and universal. The outside world might take a purely social-economic interest in how France (or New Zealand, or any other country) tries to deal with an old and recurrent question, were it not for Ihe above-mentioned fact that France is not only a social experimenter under M. Blum, but a European factor, on which the existing peace relies. Even if it is confined to its purely social-economic selling, the French ferment is interesling enough. Rising wages, falling hours, rising prices, and a Government pulled on the one hand towards public works and spending, and on the other hand towards s\ balanced Budget and financial conservatism — what better material than this can be found for the usual f)blitical drama in which the first act is promise, the second act is confusion and disappointment, and the thjird act sometimes is crash. If "the essence of [drama is conflict," the essence of it iis abundantly present inside as well as outside the three-jointed Popular Front. How to defend the franc and yet keep money cheap, how to defend the Budget and yet spend enough to suit the Communists and the trade unions (whose views are not necessarily identical), and how to meet all the internal pulls and yet save the Three Powers monetary declaration (on which largely depends British co-operation and American sympathy) might well tax the powers of either a Hamlet or a Machiavelli.

M. Blum probably is neither of these, yet his problems have something in common with that which wrecked Hamlet and with those which Machiavelli is supposed to have solved by special methods. As head of a Government composed of Radicals and Socialists, and relying on the support of Communists, he has to play off, one against the other, not only enemies but friends.

By refusing to deal brutally with stay-in strikes, he pleased the Communists (and the Socialists for that matter); by refusing to be dragged into a Spanish adventure, he delighted the Radicals (and most of the Socialists agreed with this, too).

In his handling of the stay-in strikes he created a model which Mr. Roosevelt must have studied; and by resisting the Communists he rendered possible the non-intervention policy of the Powers. The dualism of the Radicals, whose mental states and monetary situations are not always in line, requires special study. While the Radicals hate the old Bank of France policy, they are yet monetarily conservative; "though their hearts are on the Left, their pocketbooks are still on the Right." So there could be no better summary of M. Blum's recent policy than the expressed opinion that (up to April) "the Radicals are the most satisfied" of the three groups in the Popular Front. His present demand for a blank cheque was anticipated:

The greater part of the Socialists have enough personal regard for Blum to give him a blank cheque; but what about the Left Socialist minority, the Communists, and the trade unions?

This question seems to be answered as far as the Communists are concerned, for the blank cheque is reported to have been passed by the Chamber of Deputies by 346 votes to 247. Its reception by the Senate remains to be seen. It aims to give the Government absolute control over the banks in the matter of the franc, of public spending, and of policy in general, It gives M. Blum

nil powers, lies him to none, and is in this sense Rooscveltiaii.

The relations of M. Blum's Government with the banks have been most complex, not unlike the relations of Hamlet with his uncle. When he told the Chamber of Deputies "Either you vote for me or for the banks," he over-simplified the issue. When appealing to the public, all adroit politicians' seek an oversimplification for the obvious reason that complex positions are not understood. To say "Choose between the banks and me" is a vote-catcher, whereas an outline of economic facts is, to a great majority of people, the work not of a strong political man but of a doctrinaire. But behind this apparent simplicity is a varied background. Earlier in the year M. Blum made a compromise.

Free transactions in gold wore restored; the legislation penalising "gold profiteers" was scrapped; the Government pledged itself not to increase Budgetary expenditure . . . and to reduce outstanding extra-Budgetary expenditure .. . which meant an enormous slowing-down in public works and in advances to local authorities.

Behind all this, it was rumoured, was an agreement with, the banks that, on certain unpublished conditions, the banks should subscribe "a large part" of the new defence loan, the subsequent success of which was acclaimed by M. Blum as vindication of his policy. Now, if M. Blum wished (in June) to refute a rumour of some unspecified compromise (in February) with the banks, to name them as' his antagonists might be the simplest and easiest way to do so. But whether in fact lie has any plan for doing without the banks, or without the monetary conservatism inherent in-his Radical supporters, is another question. A question that will only be answered when the writing on the blank cheque becomes plain—that is, if the Senate accepts it.