THE GREAT STRIKE

Evening Post, Volume CXIII, Issue 60, 12 March 1927, Page 21

THE GREAT STRIKE

WHY^IT COLLAPSED.

"General Strikes and Transport." By George Glasgow, with introduction by Mr. Lloyd George. London: Geoffrey Bles. Threats of a general strike had been made long before it was given effect to in May last year. It came and the wonder lasted tho proverbial nine days. The astonishingly quick methods adopted by the Government in maintaining communications caused its collapse. So far back as 1919 plans were prepared, and ready for use to moet such an emergency, and all that had to bo done when tho great general strike came in 1926 was to slightly modify them, bringing them up to date. Mr. Lloyd George writeß that these measures had been in readiness since tho end of the war. Tho Coalition Government, indeed, not only made the scheme but used it in the great railway strike of 1919, and bo saved the strikers frorc starving tho nation. Mr. Lloyd George writes:

Even before the end of the war preparations were being made by my Cabinet to meet any industrial crisis which would involve interference with the transport and food supplies of the country. After the Armistice a very complete organisation was created by the Ministry of Food, at my desire, for that purpose. At the time the vast machinery of food control was still in existence, and, utilising in part the existing machinery, arrangements were made tc divido the country into sixteen divisional areas, each with its own commissioner and staff, ready to act at a moment's notice, in the event of a transport, or general, strike. . Full and detailed particulars of the transport and drivers whose services would be available were registered by the Ministry of Food, and if a general strike came, the sending of the one-code telegram to sixteen district commissioners was all that was necessary to set the whole machinery in motion. Mr. Lloyd George shows how, in 1919, within 48 hours the food position was secure and at the end of that strike the stocks of food throughout the country were practically normal. Ho concludes his foreword with these important statements: "This record of Great Britain's actual experience in 1926 has something in it of close interest to all who are seriously concerned about modern industrial disputes, not only in Great Britain, but in other countries which have had or may have to face similar emergencies. "Strikes ana lock-outs as mcanß of settling industrial disputes are methods of barbarism. But until more civilised methods have been found and accepted the "non-combatants" in the community must be safeguarded against privation. In organising such protection, trovernments express no opinion on tho merits of a dispute. They are simply performing the elementary functions of good government. Mr, Glasgow hag done his work .well.

and his documents are of great value for reference. He shows how—

"The experience of Great Britain has added something new and something important to the sum total of the world's experience in this field. It is not only, or even mainly, that in Great Britain the shock was effectively withstood; that the "concerted and simultaneous withdrawal of organised labour from the entire transport system of the country failed of its paralysing purpose. The important thing is that an emergency organisation of transport by road was tested and proved to be adequate to the essential needs of communal life. That is a new fact in history, as the political philosophers have been quick to recognise."

Apart from its historical value, Mr. Glasgow's book is of importance in drawing public attention to the great importance of road traction in times of industrial peace, no less than in those of great industrial upheavals. It is interesting to note that Mr. Glasgow found that "the petrol supply during the strike presented no serious problem," although it was as necessary as food. This is an altogether valuable work for any Government, British or foreign, that is seriously determined to maintain law and order.