MARRIED TEACHERS

Evening Post, Volume CXI, Issue 13, 16 January 1926, Page 7

MARRIED TEACHERS

QUESTION OF DISMISSAL

A TEST CASE

ISO BUSINESS OP "THE COURT.

(From Our Own Correspondent.) LONDON, Ist December.

A few mouths »ago Mr. Justice Romer gave a decision in a test case relating to the vexed question of the enforced retirement or dismissal of women teachers on their entering into marriage. The case in question was that of Mrs. Ethel Short v. tho Poole Corporation. The Judge upheld the claim that the resolution of the Corporation in dismissing Mrs.. Short was invalid, ultra vires its statutory powers, and inoperative to terminate her contract of service.

She was the wife of the borough librarian. The local authorities had inquired into her financial affairs and those of her husband, and had taken the line that if her husband could afford to support her _she should giv-o way to an unmarried successor. She claimed that the resolution to dismiss her was jpassed, not in the best interests 01 education, but for "an alien and irrelevant reason." Th~e Judge said it "was not in the best, interests of the community to debar a married woman from teaching, and that the council's motives were alien and irrelevant," and he therefore pronounced the notice of dismissal to be invalid.

The cast was next taken to the Court of Appeal, composed of the Master of the Bolls and Lords Justices Warrington and Sargant, who have unanimously reversed the decision of Mr. Justice Bomer.

THE JUDGMENT.

The Master of the Eolla gave judgment, in the course of which he said tliat by virtue of the Education Act, 1021, section 3, the Poolo Corporation was constituted the local education authority; by section 17 it was charged to maintain and keep efficient the elementary^ schools within its area; and. by section 148, subsection 1, ik was authorised 1 to appoint teachers to -hold oftjee during its pleasure. No questibn arose as to Mrs. Short's efficiency. On 6th August, 1921, she married Mr. Short. On 31st July, 1924, she, in common with other married women teachers, received a notice terminating her engagement at the expiration of the month. The question then arose whe-' ther the Corporation had the power, in the circumstances, to , serve the notice, and whether the notice was operative. The powers given to the Corporation by section 148, sub-sec-tion 1, were not circumscribed; the teachers held office daring the pleasure of the authority; 'the authority could ' not impose limits upon its powers if the statute had not done so. '

On 6th February, 1923, the Corporation adopted a resolution to the effect that no fresh appointments of married women, whose husbands were alive and capable of supporting them be made, and that it be a condition of appointment in the future that in the event of a woman teacher marrying, she should forthwith resign her employment. On 6th May, 1924, it adopted a report of the Education Committee recommending that notices be given to such married women as were employed to terminate their engagements unless they could satisfy the committee that some sufficient reason existed for continuing the engagements, and that the managers of non-provided schools be recommended to take similar action. The circumstances affecting Mrs. Short were not considered a sufficient ■■ reason for retaining her services, and on 30th July, 1924, notice was given to her dismissing her as from SJst August. At the trial a letter sent through the Town Clerk to the managers of the nonprovided schools was put in as containing the evidence for Mrs. Short at its high-water mark. It stated that the Corporation was led to its decision because: (1) It considered that the duty of a married woman was primarily to look after her domestic concerns, and that it regarded it as impossible.for her to do so and effectively and satisfactorily act as .a teacher at the same time; and (2) it was unfair to the large number of nnmarried teachers seeking situations that those positions should be occupied by married women who presumably had husbands capable of maintaining them.

COURTS COULD NOT INTERFERE,

The Act indicated that where the authority exercised its discretion bona fide, and not arbitrarily, the Courts could not interfere. Where the discretion was exercised the Courts were slow fo interpret the action taken as invalid. The Corporation contended that it had acted without corruption or mala fides, therefore its action could not be challenged; that it had acted strictly, with a view to educational ends.

Where the exercise of the discretion of an authority was challenged it was for those who challenged it to prove that their view was right, and in his judgment that proof had not been given in this case. The course adopted by the Corporation might be subject to criticism, but it was not for this 1 Court to pronounce, upon that criticism so long as the discretion had been properly exercised. In his opinion, the appeal should be allowed, with costs of tho appeal and the trial. Lord Justice ,Wurringtou said he could see nothing done in the present case which was alien- to the keeping efficient of the schools. If the adoption of the Corporation's policy was due to a desire that single women might be encouraged to undergo training with a fair hope of employment, it would not be irrelevant to their duties. Mr. Justice Eomer had laid stress on the fact that in some cases: the Corporation had retained, the ser^ vices of married women teachers. In his Lordship's opinion that 'only amounted to this, that the Corporation, while seeking as an\ideal to maintain exclusive employment for unmarried women, hnd abstained from dismissing in cases whero hardship •would be caused.

except where there had been corraption, mala fides, or an exceeding of authority. A decision to employ only unmarried teachers could not be interfered withj however mistaken such a decision might appear. The Town Clerk's letter did not purport to represent tlie views of anyone but the Education Committee, and could not be held to bind even the members of that committee, still less could it be taken to reflect the reasons which actuated the general council. It could not boused as in.'the nature of an admission, nor did it prove that the Corporation had acted mala fides. He could find nothing to indicate that the Corporation acted with any other purpose than fulfilling its duty in regard to education.

The appeal was accordingly allowed, with costs here and below.

85, Fleet street.